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ABSTRACT
This is a study of Charles McC lung McGhee (1828-1907), a Southern
capitalist who achieved prominence as a railroad financier after the
Civil War.

Based primarily upon McGhee ' s personal papers in the McClung

Historical Collection of Lawson McGhee Library, Knoxville , Tennessee , the
dis sertation de scribes McGhee ' s trans formation from planter to busines s
man and his rise to power in the affairs of the East Tennessee , Virginia ,
and Georgia Railroad.

Having become a provincial magnate by 1886, McGhee

moved to New York City where he interested himself in the Richmond and
West Point Terminal Company, a system of railroads which later became
the Southern Railway Company.

His role in the formation and dissolution

of the Terminal is analyzed and evaluated.

As a New York financier Mc

Ghee made a number of investments , notably in the American Cattle Trust
and Western Union Beef Company in the West and in the Roane Iron, Coal
Creek Mining and Manufacturing, Lenoir City, and Nashville Street Railway
companies in his native Tennessee .

The history o f his involvement in

these enterprises is examined in detail.

Although the study is essenti

ally an analysis of McGhee ' s business career, it also deals with his
political activities and his personal life .

iv

PREFACE
Charles McClung McGhee was not an empire builder, an entrepre
neurial innovator, or one of the nation ' s major financiers .

He ranks ,

however, among the most succe ssful Southern busines smen of the latter
third of the nineteenth century, an era in American history which might
be called the age of the capitalist .
Like many of his contemporarie s , McGhee made his fortune not by
literally building or managing railroads but in buying and selling them ,
speculating in stock, and shaping the policies of corporations to his own
ends .

In the process of a thirty-year association with the East Tenne ssee ,

Virginia , and Georgia Railroad he helped put together a regional rail
system.

At the peak of the East Tennessee ' s corporate life McGhee moved

to New York and participated in the sale of the controlling interest to
a mammoth railroad combine , the Richmond and West Point Terminal Company.
Serving on the boards of both corporations , he and his associates used
their positions to achieve substantial pe rsonal profits , often at the
expense of the companies which they directed.

When the Richmond Terminal

collapsed in bankruptcy in 1892 , McGhee became co- receiver of the East
Tennessee but was e�cluded from the Southern Railway Company, built from
the ruins of the Terminal by J . P . Morgan in 1894.

Thus as the world of

business changed , McGhee became obsolete , a "back number, " as he said,
in the affairs of great railroad combinations .

Yet this obsolescence

does not lessen his leading role in making the se changes possible .
Despite his many opportunistic business decisions , McGhee was
sincerely devoted to the economic development of his native Tennessee ,
v

vi

investing heavily in, and drawing Northern capital to , a variety o f enter
prises there--among them the Roane Iron, Coal Creek Mining and Manu
facturing, Lenoir City, and Nashville Street Railway companies .

Another

significant episode in his busine ss career was his involvement in two
Western cattle companie s , the American Cattle Trust and the Western Union
Beef Company.
The purpose of this study is to show how a Southerner, born to
wealth in land and slave s , made a fortune from the industrial revolution
and established himself as a financier in New York City.

It is intended

to recount how he accumulated, invested, and spent his money.

An attempt

is made to illustrate the working of nineteenth century busine ss and
finance and to analyze the relationship of the financier to the social
and political world about

him.

Finally, it is hoped that the character

and personality of the subject will be understood ; that McGhee ' s virtues
and vices , his objectives and accomplishments will be as fascinating to
the reader as they have become to the writer.
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CHAPrER I
THE EARLY CAREER OF A FINANCIER
Rising among the high mountains of southwestern North Carolina ,
the Little Tennessee River ( once called the Tennessee , thus giving its
name to a state ) flows toward the west and creates a beautiful valley
at the foot of the Great Smoky range .

l

Though Charle s McClung McGhee

is considered a Knoxvillian, it was in Monroe County in the valley o f
the green and winding Little Tenne ssee that he was born on January 28 ,
1828 .

His maternal ancestors , the McClungs and the White s , were lead-

ing citizens in Knoxville , which they had founded almo st forty years
before .

2

Of his paternal ancestry less is known.

Charle s ' grand-

parents , Barclay and Jane McClanahan McGhee , are thought to have emigrated from Pennsylvania to what is now Blount County, Tennessee ,
about 1787 .

They probably came with friends and relatives , part of

the great tide of Scotch-Irish immigration which flowed into the Old
Southwest after the American Revolution.

In 1788 Charles ' father,

John, was born in or near the site of the present town of Maryville ,

1

Early traders among the Cherokee Indians called the stream
Tenase , or Tennessee , after one of the Indian towns on its banks .
For a description of the changing nomenclature of the Tenne ssee River ,
see James R. Montgomery, "The Nomenclature of the Upper Tennessee
River, " East Tennessee Historical Society ' s Publications , No . 28
( 1956 ) , 46-57 .
2
McGhee 1 s son- in- law, Calvin Morgan McClung, was a diligent
genealogist . Information about McGhee ' s ancestry is largely drawn
from a manuscript compiled by McClung , entitled "McGhee Family,"
McClung Historical Collection, Lawson McGhee Library, Knoxville ,
Tennessee .
l

2
some eighteen miles south of Knoxville .

3

The area was on the ultimate fringe of white civilization.
Within a few miles of John McGhee ' s probable birthplace was soon to
run

the line designated by the Treaty of the Holston of 1791 and sur-

veyed in 1792 between the lands open to white settlement and the
tribal lands of the Cherokees .
many

so

Five years after that first survey,

whites were found to the south of the boundary in Indian

territory that a new line was

run

in 1797 .

The Tennessee frontier was

in turmoil during the 1790 ' s , and the United States maintained several
military posts at the edge of the Cherokee lands .

4

Meanwhile , Barclay

McGhee and his three sons became merchants and seem to have prospered.
Barclay is known to have done considerable busines s with the United
States government in the supplying of the garrison at Tellico in 179798

•

.5

When he died in 1819, he was referred to as "Barkley [ sic ] Me-

Ghee , Esq. , late a contractor in the United States Army, a useful mem
ber of society and a

man

of unblemished integrity. "

6

By 1820 , when he married Betsy McClung, John McGhee was 32 years
old.

A family legend relates that he had first seen his future wife in

181.5 , when she was only twelve , that he instantly fell in love with her,
and had to wait five years before he could marry her.

Besides being

3 Ibid.
4
stanley J. Folmsbee , Robert E . Corlew, and Enoch L. Mitchell ,
Histo!l of Tennessee (4 vols . ; New York : Lewis Publishing Co . , 1960 ) ,
I , 194- 20) .
S
navid Henley, "Wastebook, " typescript in McClung Historical
Collection.
6
Knoxville Register, August 31 , 1819.

3
young and presumably pretty, Betsy had much to recommend her to a mature
bachelor. Her grandfather, General James White , was a great landowner,
the founder of Knoxville , and a

man

heavy with public honors and offices.

After building a small fort below the confluence of the French Broad and
Holston rivers in 1 7 8 6 , the Revolutionary War officer had fallen in with
William Blount , who later became governor of the Southwest Territory, an
area coterminous with the present state of Tennessee . Blount made White ' s
Fort , soon renamed Knoxville in honor of Henry Knox, secretary of war,
the capital of that federal territory. Thus the prosperity of White ' s
new town was assured. 7 Betsy' s father, Charles McClung, a recent immigrant to the territory from Pennsylvania, married White ' s daughter,
Margaret , laid off the streets of the town, and later participated,
along with Blount and others , in drafting Tennessee ' s first constitution--of 1 7 96 . Surveyor, public official , and merchant , Colonel MeClung in 1805 retired to a country seat , "States View, " ten miles west
of Knoxville . Like his father-in-law, he was one of the most wealthy
and distinguished men of the state. 8
John McGhee , who was known as a "merchant of Maryville" at the
time of his marriage , soon became a planter as well and began to acquire
lands which were to be his great domain on the Little Tennessee . 9 By
7Mary U. Rothrock (ed. ) , The French Broad-Holston Count;r: A
History of Knox County, Tennesse�Knoxville : East Tennessee Historical
Society, 1 946), 50 3-5 .
8 Ibid. ,
446- 47 .
9Knoxville Register, September 1 9 , 1820 .

4

Calhoun' s Treaty of 181 9 a substantial territory between the Little
Tennessee and Hiwassee rivers was opened to settlement by white s , but
a number of tracts were reserved to the Cherokee inhabitants , 10 and
it was from these Indians that John McGhee and others acquired some of
the choice bottom lands in this fertile river valley. 11 A persistent
family tradition describes one such transaction. According to the
story, a well-to-do Indian, sometimes called a chief, approached MeGhee and described to

him

a dream in which the white man had given his

Indian neighbor a fine rifle. Such a dream, the Indian explained,
must at all costs be fulfilled. McGhee , it is said, obliged and gave
the Cherokee the rifle . Several weeks later, McGhee told the Indian
about one of his own dreams in which the red man had given his white
friend a large and valuable island in the river. The outwitted Indian
accepted his loss and closed the contest , remarking, "white man and
Indian dream no more . 1 1 12 :By dream or by purchase McGhee accumulated
thousands of acre s , and in 182 3 he and his wife settled on his bur
geoning plantation. 1 3 Included in the McGhee holding, which lay on
1 0Folmsbee , History of Tennessee , I , 2 .
73
1� transfers of land from Cherokee Indians to John McGhee
are recorded in Monroe County deed books ; see Reba Bayless :Boyer
(comp. ) , Monroe County, Tennessee Records , 1820-1870 ( 2 vols . ; n. p. :
1 969- 7 0) , I , 88-193 .
1 2As related to the author by John McGhee ' s great-great-greatgrandson, William Ross McNabb, in an interview, December 8 , 19 7 2 . A
slightly different version of this story is told by W. :B. Lenoir in
History 2f � Sweetwater Valley (Richmond : Presbyterian Committee of
Publication, 191 6), 41-42 .
l 3McGhee is listed for the first time as a resident of Monroe
County in an 1823 tax list . :Boyer, Monroe County Records , II , 1 63 .

5
both sides of the river, were the sites of the colonial Fort Loudoun
and the ancient Cherokee town, Tuskegee . Near the latter, John McGhee
built the house in which Charles McClung McGhee was born, the last of
John and Betsy' s five children. 1 4
The little boy had a sister, Margaret , and a brother, Barclay;
two other sisters had died within weeks of their births. When he was
fourteen months old Charles' mother died, the first of a series of personal tragedies which were to mark his life . By the time he was seven,
he and his brother were going to a school at Kingston, Tennessee. 15
Later they removed to Knoxville , where they lived in the home of Joseph
Estabrook, the Dartmouth-educated president of East Tennessee University. Here Charles was taught by the president ' s first wife , Mrs .
Nancy Dickinson Estabrook, a first cousin of the poetess, Emily Dickinson. 1 6 The boys ' sister was also away at school , first at Salem, North
Carolina, and later in Hartford, Connecticut. 1 7 A letter from her,
written in 18 3 7 , illuminates to some degree the pathos of the children's
lives :
Nothing would gratify me more than to spend the coming summe r
at home with father, but I am very happy here & ought not to wish
l4Zella Armstrong, Notable Southern Families ( 6 vols . ; Chattanooga :
Lookout Publishing Co. , 1 9 18- 33}, I , l47-lt9 ; William McClung, The McClung
Genealogy ( Pittsburgh: McClung Printing Co., 1 904 ) , 33 -34 .
l5Margaret W. McGhee to John McGhee;-November 9 , 18 , Niles
35
Family Papers , McClung Histo rical Collection.
1 6Jay Leda, The Years and Hours of Emily Dickinson (2 vols . ; New
Haven: Yale University Pres�, 1 9 60) , I , xxxvi -xxxv�i ; Rothrock, French
Broad-Holston Country, 4 11 , 415 .
l 7Armstrong, Notable Southern Families , I , 1 8 .
4

6
for any thing, five or six months is all that I have yet to
spend from home. When I return I hope to add much to our
dear father's happiness, at least, I will endeavor to do so.
How happy I will be when we are again united as a family,
down at home.
Then she added a postscript to the younger brother:
My dear Charles

I think it is nearly time for you to answer
sister's letters. Don't you think so? Write anything about
your plays, your walks, your visits, & & everything which
concerns you, sister will be glad to hear. How do you like
the little book I sent you by Mr. Dickinson? Have you read
it all through? Be a good boy, do every thing which you
are told & then Mrs Estabrook will love· you. God bless you-Good bye.
l8
Margaret
In 1841 Charles entered the preparatory department of East
Tennessee University and two years later was admitted to the fresh
man class.

19

While preparing for the University, he lived with one

of Knoxville's most remarkable women, Mrs. Margaret Christian Russell
Cowan Humes Ramsey, known to generations of her many descendants as
"Grandmother Ramsey."

Thrice widowed and bearing each of her husbands

a posthumous child, Mrs. Ramsey was the mother of rm:omas Wil�iam Humes,
clergyman, university president, historian,
Unionist.

librarian, and a staunch

One of her stepsons was James G. M. Ramsey, a physician,

historian, and devoted Confederate.

The only female among the incor-

porators of the Knoxville Library Company
0
netic personality and a keen intellect.2

in

1817, Margaret had a mag

Together with Mrs. Estabrook,

18
Margaret W. McGhee to Barclay McGhee, March 30, 1837, Niles
Family Papers.
l9

East Tennessee University, Catalogue, 1841, 1842, 1843 ( Knox
ville, 1841-43 ) .
20
Rothrock, French Broad-Holston Country, 471-72.

7
she may have exerted a strong and benevolent influence on the childhood
and adolescence of Charles McGhee.
The East Tennessee University from which he graduated in 1846
professed to offer "a thorough and extended course of st-q.dy," which
would allow its students to "qualify themselves for the learned pro
fessions.1121

There is no indication that McGhee ever intended to pur-

sue law, medicine, theology, or

any

other "learned profession," but it

is evident that he took the cour:ses of the University's "Classical Department," for the "English and Scientific Department," which gave no
degrees, was not established until he was almost ready to graduate.
Thus he studied Greek and Latin, as well as mathematics, moral and
natural philosophy, history, English g rammar, and logic, with a smatte;ring of courses in such subjects as French, political economy, unit
.
.
eng1neer1ng,
and architecture. 22

During his years there, the Univer-

sity was in one of its more flouri:shing periods.

Though distracted

by recurring controversies among the three leading religious denomi�
ations, Presbyterian, Methodist, and :Baptist, the institution did not
suffer in the 1840's from the extent of bitter sectarianism, declining
enrollment, and financial impoverishment which almost wrecked it dur
ing the following decade.23

Under the leadership of Joseph Estabrook,

21 East Tennessee University,
Catalogue, 1842, p. 15. In ibid.,
1846-47, p. 8, he is listed as a member of the class of 1846.
22

�., 1844, pp. 13-15.

23stan1ey J Folmsbee, East Tennessee Unive:rsit ' l840-l.§.1.2., in
.
� University of �ennessee Record, LX II, 3 (May, 1959 , 3-29.

)

8

who had taught at Amherst, the University was consciously modeled after
New England institutions of higher education. Estabrook brought

to

Knoxville several Amherst graduates, including Horace Maynard, later
a congressman and postmaster general, who was a tutor and later instructor of'mathematics . Maynard ' s successor and McGhee ' s mathematics
instructor was Albert Miller Lea, a Tennessee-born West Point graduate, engineer, explorer, and acting ! s ecretary of war under John
Tyler. 24 In view of his later interest in the University and his long
service on its board of trustees, McGhee must have had a successful
and satisfying· undergraduate career. If his formal education did not
especially fit him for a life in business and finance, the same could
be said of most of his contemporaries . But even the liberal arts
education at a small Southern university gave
least a pretense to learning which
gilded age lacked. 25

many

him

a polish and at

of the millionaires of the

'Charles was eighteen when he graduated from the University, a
young man of fortune and excellent prospects . During the next year he
may have travelled, perhaps taking something like a "grand tour" and
seeing the world beyond Tennessee, or he may have returned to his
father' s plantation and begun to learn how to

mana

ge the estate. In

the summer of 18 47 he married his second cousin, Isabella McNutt White,
24Ibid . , 9-1 2 , , 5 ; George Frederick Mellen, "Joseph Esta
33 3
brook," in ibid . , II (Jul;y; 1899), 1 65-8 4 .
25Thomas C . Cochran, Railroad Leaders, �-1890 ; The Business
Mind in Action (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1 953 ), 29 .

9
another o f the ubiquitous descendants of General James White .

Isabella ' s

father, Hugh Andrew May White , was the cashi�r of the Union Bank in Knox
ville .

Her mother, Elizabeth Humes White , was a daughter of "Grand-

mother Ramsey, " whose son Andrew Russell Humes , had married Charles '
sister Margaret in 1840 .

26

Charles and Isabella would have known each

other from childhood , and the union of cousins probably followed naturally from these ties of family.

Eleven months after their marriage ,

Isabella had a son, whom the parents named John for his grandfather.

A

few days later Isabella died , and in August , 1849 , the little boy died
too .

27

Thus at twenty-one McGhee had lost mother, wife , and son, and

now began what must have been the darkest moments of his life .
Years later he wrote a daughter who was suffering through a period
.
that he had undergone a s1m1"1ar exper1ence .
o f depress1on
.

.

28

It may be

surmised that this occurred after the tragedies which beset his early
manhood, and indeed it is likely that until his second marriage

:41

1857

Charles McGhee led a sad and lonely life punctuated by the wild e scapade�
which are sometimes the product of despair.

A solitary glimpse of him

29
during this period is given by William G. Brownlow in a letter
of
October JO, 1852 , t o Thomas A . R. Nelson.

Brownlow had attended a

speaking and ��rbecue at Maryville at which he had stated his reasons

26
McClung, "McGhee Family. "
27

Ibid.

28
McGhee to Annie McGhee McClung, March 28 , 1898 , McClung Family
Papers , McClung Historical Collection.
29
tion.

In the Thomas A. R. Nelson Papers , McClung Historical Collec-

10
for not supporting General Winfield Scott, the Whig candidate for president in that year's election, in contrast to the pro-Scott speeches of
Gustavus A. Henry and John Netherland, leading Whig politicians in the
state.

After describing the meeting, Brownlow reported the following

incident:
After speaking, late, Charley McGhee, who was taking his liquor
rather freely, had come up with a buggy, with a top to it, one
common seat, and two fine horses, to take Henry to the Barbeque
at Calhoun, and started at 5 o'clock, taking both Henry and
Netherland in it, and, as I am told, a bottle of liquor. Henry
had taken a full tumbler of Brandy, before he got in--Nether
laud drank none. Three miles this side of McGhee's Ferry, in
the night, they £E-set, driving rapidly--broke the Buggy to
pieces--dragged a part of it over Henry's leg, and, hurt him
badly. Netherland was so badly injured, as to be put to bed.
McGhee's negro came back to this town, got here at 2 o'clock
this morning, and came for McCarty, of Hawkins, to go on down
there for Netherland. McCarty and Netherland had come here
in a Barouche, drawn by two mules. McCarty had gone down
the Nigro [sic] brought a verbal message, and awoke us all by
hollowing us up. I give you the case as I have received it,
and as an item of news, not vouching for the correctness of
any thing, except that the accident did occur, and the parties
are hurt.
•

From this we may infer two things:

•

.

first, that McGhee was a Whig,

and second, that he was inclining to a dissolute and dangerous way of
life.

The last probable restraint upon

him

had been removed when his

father died in 18)1, leaving a fortune to each of his three children.
Charles inherited several thousand acres of land, twenty-nine slaves,
five thousand dollars in cash and two thousand dollars worth of stocks,
O
a total inheritance of at least fifty thousand dollars. J
It would
have been a familiar story if he had squandered his fortune and drunk

JO

Will of John McGhee, typescript in McClung, "McGhee Family."

ll
himself into an early grave. Instead, he began a new life in 1857 when
he married his first wife ' s sister, Cornelia Humes White.3 l On what is
surely one of the most beautiful situations in East Tennessee he built
a large brick Gothic-revival bungalow. From its long windows framed in
marble McGhee could look over fertile bottom lands and islands and up
the lovely Little Tennessee River toward a spectacular view of the
Great Smoky Mountains. Much of what he could see belonged to

him

or

to his relatives , and in this idyllic setting Charles McGhee settled
down as a planter, justice of the peace , and family man.3 2
Across the river from his house McGhee and his sister built an
Episcopalian chapel which they called Saint Andrew' s Riverside. "The
church, " according to the historian of the diocese, "was a beautiful
edifice, built of brick with marble trimmings , stained glass windows ,
oak ceiling and elegant furniture, costing in all over $4 , 000.1133 Complementing the chapel were a rectory and a school for girls , called
Riverside Hall. Though Saint Andrew' s testified to the piety and benevolence of the McGhee ' s , it seems to have been a particular interest of
Joseph Warren Jenkins Niles , the second husband of Charles ' sister
Margaret. A ''high" churchman at a time when the Diocese of Tennessee
was decidedly "low, " Niles collided with Bishop James H. Otey over the
3 �cClung, McClung Genealogy, 33- 34.
3�cGhee is listed as a justice of the peace perfonning several
marriages , 1857-60. Boyer, Monroe County Records , I , 40, 47 , 52.
McGhee ' s house still stands on a knoll near the junction of the Tellico
and Little Tennessee rivers in Monroe County.
33Arthur Howard Noll, History of the Church in the Diocese of
Tennessee ( New York: James Pott and Co.:-1900) , llSo -

12

consecrati·on of Saint Andrew' s . The Bishop insisted upon the removal of
wooden candlesticks and a cross from the communion table , evidences of
"Romeward" tendencies . When Niles balked at this , McGhee acted as conciliator and attempted to reconcile

him

to the removal of the offending

appointments . Saint Andrew' s was consecrated, but , perhaps because of
Niles ' bitterness, the church and school did not prosper. During the
Civil War the chapel fell into disrepair, and in a few years nothing
was left but a cornerstone which now rests on the nearby McGhee burial
plot . 34
By 18 60 McGhee ' s property consisted of real estate valued at
$50,000

and personal property worth

$85,000.

Besides himself, his wife ,

and two daUghters , there were living on the plantation an overseer,
three white seamstresses, several white laborers , and sixty slaves . 35
Such an establishment was exceptional, especially in East Tennessee .
In the entire state fewer than four hundred people owned more than fifty
slaves each, and there were only one hundred and fifty-eight plantations
consisting of 1,000 acres or more in Tennessee . 3 6
How this particular member of the privileged caste of the old
South reacted to the disruption of the Union is quite clear. McGhee was
3 4william Mercer Green, Memoir of Rt. Rev. James Hervey Ote} ' LL.D.,
the First Bishop of Tennessee (New York: -yames Pott and do. , 1885 , 6667 . See also James Hervey Otey manuscript diary , August 7 , 8, and 9,
1857, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill.
35united States , Bureau of the Census , Eighth Census , 1860, Popu
lation (Tennessee , Monroe County) , population schedule , 211, slave
schedule , 295.
3 6Mary Emily Robertson Campbell, The Attitude of Tennesseans Toward
the Union, �-18 6 1 (New York : Vantage Press, 1961), 14-19, 24.
·
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one of a number of signers of a letter to T. A. R. Nelson in September,
1860, urging that leading Whig to answer publicly the "pernicious and
revolutionary" speech of the arch secessionist, William Lowndes Yancey,
in Knoxville.3 7 Like many East Tennesseans, McGhee evidently resisted
the idea of secession at first, but when the state seceded in June,
1861, he became a loyal Confederate. At any rate, the Athens Post of
July 5, 1861, reported the formation of a Confederate cavalry company
in Monroe County, which was called the "McGhee Invincibles" in honor
of C. M. McGhee, Esq. 38
It was probably about this time that McGhee moved to Knoxville,
where he went into business as a meat packer.

"Hogs ' Heads! Hogs '

Heads!" read an advertisement in the Knoxville Daily Register on
December 20, 1861, which proclaimed that the poor of the city could
have them free upon application at the Pork House of C . M. McGhee
Co. at the foot of Gay Street.

&

Though he was giving away the heads

to the poor and the livers to soldiers, McGhee seems to have found a
more lucrative market for the rest of his pork--the Confederacy, which
suffered from a severe meat deficit . With its midwestern sources cut
off by secession, it depended largely on Kentucky and Tennessee for its
chief supplies of meat.39 Knoxville, occupying a strategic location
3 7Knoxville Whig, August 10, 1861, quoting a letter to Nelson
of September 18, 1860.
3 8Athens Post, July 5, 1861, cited in Boyer, Monroe County
Records, II, 185 :--39� War of� Rebellion: A Compilation of� 0fficial Records
of� Union� Confederate Armies \)o vols. in 128; Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series 4, Vol. I, 869-79·
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astride a major rail line across the Confederacy, was a natural location for the pork packing plant operated by McGhee.

It has often been

said that McGhee was a colonel in the Confederate commissariat during
the war,4° but it has so far been impossible to find any record of
such a commission in the Confederate army.

More probably the title

"colonel" was bestowed upon him by the governor of Tennessee and did
not signify true military rank .
During this period he formed a friendship with Richard T. Wilson,
a

man

whose career was to be closely linked with McGhee's for many years.

Wilson held a commission as a major in the Confederate Department of
Commissary and Subsistence, and, besides being involved in meat packing projects in Nashville and Loudon, was in 1862 and 1863 the agent
in charge of purchasing hogs in East Tennessee and southwestern Vir
l
ginia. 4

Born in poverty on a north Georgia farm, Wilson became a

salesman, married Melissa Johnson of Loudon, and did well during the
Civil War.

In New York after the war he founded a private banking house

and joined McGhee in obtaining a controlling interest in the East Tennessee, Virginia, and Georgia Railroad.

By 1895, when his daughter married

Cornelius Vanderbilt, Wilson's estimated worth was $15,000,000.42

4°Rothrock, French Broad-Holston Count;y,
448. His name, however,
does not appear in Tennesseans in the Civil War, published by the Civil
War Centennial Commission (Nashville, 1964).--41 0. R·, Ser. , Vol. I, 879; Knoxville Daily Register, December
4
25, l862.-

42cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., Queen of the Golden�'� Fabulous
Sto;y of� Wilson Vanderbilt (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1956),
21-27.

_

His own lack of military rank notwithstanding, McGhee was considered a warm supporter of the Southern cause.

In January, 1863 , the

Knoxville Daily Register, the chief Confederate organ in East Tennessee,
endorsed him for mayor:
Knoxville.. is one of the most important military posts in the
Southern Confederacy. It has been cursed with Unionism; but
that has "played out." There is today no Unionism in East
[Tennessee] but its bastard and most malignant offspring
"NEUTRALITY" has succeeded it. Let our cit,izens show today
that they consider the offspring more odious than honest
enmity. Let them Vote for the ticket we present at the head
of our columns. Col. McGhee is a staunch and unequivocal
Southern man, and will not only make an efficient Mayor, but
we understand that he will devote the salary of the office to
the relief of the destitute families of soldiers and the poor
of Knoxville.43
But the Register's entreaties were apparently ignored, and McGhee was
defeated in one of his few races for office.

Perhaps it was just as well,

for before the year was out, Knoxville had fallen to the Union army.44
McGhee remained in the occupied city and, nervously perhaps,
1

tJ�

faced an certain future.
f\

The Register, which was now being published in

Atlanta, reported that he and other prominent citizens had been unjustly
accused of taking the Federal oath of allegiance.

"None of these men,"

it remarked, "have stained: their souls with perjury.'' 4S

In fact, it was

some five months after the capture of the city that he submitted to the

4�oxville Daily Register, January J , l86J.

�

eturns from the election are unavailable. J. C. Luttrell,
McGhee's opponent, is recorded as mayor of Knoxville, 1859-1868. William
Rule (ed. ) , Standard History of Knoxville (Chicago: Lewis Publishing Co.,
1900), 124-25, l62-6J.
45.Daily Register, October 27, 1863 .
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oath.4

Meantime, however, he may have been ready to do business with

the Federals.

General Burnside's Commissary Department decided to pack

its own pork in Knoxville and advertised for local parties to do the
slaughtering.

The

historian of this

__

packing project has written:

Only one Knoxville po� packer responded the the advertisement
and his offer was high: 52 pounds of po� to 100 pounds of
pig, the government fuxnishing both salt and barrels. Worse,
Burnside1s headquarters heard that this Knoxville porkma.n had
packed hogs for the Confederates in 1862.4 7
The combination of the high price and the packer's record made the army
decide to pack its own pork.

It is likely, however, that the man in

question was McGhee, since his was the only pork packing house in town.4

8

If he did not do as well during the war as his friend Wilson did,
McGhee emerged from it with his fortune roughly intact.

He had lost

his slaves, but he still owned his valuable Monroe County plantation.
He must have had a substantial amount of cash, because in 1865 he was
one of the founders and the first president of the People's Bank of Knox
ville.4

9

With Columbus Powell of Knoxville and one I. F. Green of

Brooklyn, New York, McGhee organized a b�ing and commission business
which began operations at New York City in the fall of 1865 as C. Powell,

186 .
4

6
4 Brownlow1s Knoxville Whig and Rebel Ventilator, February 6,
Cited hereafter as Whig.

7
4 Palmer H. Boeger, "General Burnside's Knoxville Packing Project,"
East Tennessee Historical Society's Publications, No. 35 (1963 ) , 77,
citing Records of the Commissary General in the National Archives,
Washington, D. C.
8
4 Ibid., 76. The National Archives is unahle to locate the
letter which might positively identify the Knoxville packer.
9
4 Rule, Standard History of Knoxville, 253 .

17
Green

&

Co.5

°

Soon he would be involved in the affairs of the several

railroads from which he would make a great fortune.
he was ready for the second stage of his life.
seasoned

him,

At thirty-seven

Personal tragedy had

and in the convulsions of civil war he had learned how

to land on his feet.

His business and political activities during

the era of reconstruction in Tennessee would reveal the shrewdness
of character which made him a success in a ruthless and troubled time.

5°Tennessee General Assembl7, The State Debt: Report of the
Committee Appointed to Investigate It, in Appendix to the House
Journal, 1879, pp. 126-27. Cited hereafter as The State �·

.,

CBAPrER II
THE POLITICS OF BUSINESS:

McGHEE, MABRY,

ANn THE KNOXVILLE ANn KENTUCKY RAILROAD
l.
At the end of the Civil War the city of Kno�ille was on the
l
threshold of a period of rapid growth.
Built at a strategic point near
the junction of the French Broad and Holston rivers, which drain much of
East Tennessee, the city enjoyed an early prominence as the capital of
the Territory of the United States, South of the River Ohio, and until
2
1817, as the capital of the state of Tennessee.

Because of its loca-

tion and its initial political importance, Knoxville became the commercial and cultural capital of East Tennessee, a distinction which remained
even after the state's seat of government and center of population moved
far to the west across the Cumberland Mountains.

Knoxville's merchants

hauled goods by wagon from Philadelphia and Baltimore; from their stores
along Gay Street, named for a familiar thoroughfare in the latter city,
they distributed manufactured products through the villages of the over
whelmingly rural area.

3

1

The population of Knoxville in 1860 was 5, 300; in 1870 it had
grown to 8, 682, and by 1890 it was 22, 253. After the turn of the century
the growth rate declined and has never matched the increase of the thirty
years after the Civil War.
2 Folmsbee, HistoEY of Tennessee,
3

I,

304-5.

Rothrock, French Broad-Holston Country, 92.
18

19
East Tennessee f�om early times was recognized as a distinct
region within the state. 4

Isolated by mountain barriers from the west-

ern two-thirds of Tennessee, as well as from the south Atlantic seaboard
and the Ohio valley, the area developed a diversified farming and small
manufacturing economy which was different from that of the more typically
"Southern," slave-owning, and staple-raising Middle and West Tennessee.
Binding these three regions of the state together was the Tennessee
River
.,
which drained the eastern portion and, after looping into northern Alabama, flowed northward across the width of Tennessee to the Ohio.

The

great river linked East Tennessee to its sister regions and was a highway
to the Mississippi and ultimately tq New Orleans, although the great
Muscle Shoals in Alabama was a serious bar to navigation.5

In 1828 the

steamboat Atlas ascended the Tennessee to Knoxville, and the region's
isolation from the rest of the state and the lower South seemed to be at
an end.

6

For a while advertisements of Huntsville and other Alabama

business establishments were common in Knoxville newspapers, but in time
the natural obstacles on the river put an end to the dreams of water
7
communication between East Tennessee and the outside world.
4Folmsbee, History of Tennessee, I, 5-�.

5For a discussion of the influence of geography on the histor.y and
development of Tennessee's sections, see Thomas Perkins Abernethy, �
Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee: ! Study in Frontier Democracy
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 193 2); Stanley John
Folmsbee, Sectionalism and Internal Improvements in Tennessee, 1796-1845
(Knoxville: East Tennessee Historical Society, 1939), especially l-19;
Eric Russell Lacey, Vanquished Volunteers: East Tennessee Sectionalism
from Statehood to Secession (Johnson City: East Tennessee ·state Univer
Sity Press, 19�.
6
Folmsbee, Sectionalism and Internal Improvements, ll-14.
7
Knoxville Register, 1820- 3 2.
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The railroad soon replaced the riverboat as the vehicle of East
Tennessee's hopes for breaking its isolation.

8

Conventions of railroad

enthusiasts were held in Knoxville in ;1..831 and 1836, and in the latter
year Robert Y. Hayne of South Carolina "published the Banne" for the
marriage of the South and West, a marriage to be consummated by the
construction of a Charleston to Cincinnati railroad runni ng through
Knoxville.

The �omewhat differen� vision of John C. Calhoun and the

fo�idable barrier of the Appalachian mountains delayed for fifty years
the realization of Hayne's dream.

9

Meanwhile, two railroads, the �st Tennessee and Virginia and the
East Tennessee and Georgia, were built through the relatively narrow and
level Tennessee valley above and below Knoxville.

On the eve of tne

Civil War these roads which joined at Knoxville linked the city to Bristol, Tennessee-Virginia, and to Dalton, Georgia.

From these points con-

necting roads ran on to Washington, D. C. and New York City and to
Atlanta, Memphis, and New Orleans.

Thus at the end of the antebellum

period Knoxville and East Tennessee had connections to the north and
south.

10

How these connections might have changed the economy of the

region, had not war inte+Vened, is impossible to determine.

8
Folmsbee, Sectionalism � Internal Improvements, 8 5- 91.

9
Ibid., 132- 36; Ulrich Bonnell Phillips,! History £i Transporta
tion in� Eastern Cotton� to 1860 (New York: Columbia University
l'ress, 1908), 182-220, 375-80.

10
James W. Holland, "The East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad, 18361860, '' East Tennessee Historical Society's Publications, No. 3 (1931),
89-107 and Holland, "The Building of the East Tennessee and Virginia
Railroad," ill£ ·, No. 4 (1932 ) , 83 -101.
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As a result of the Civil War Knoxville was again t�st forward
as a city of political importance.
lican stronghold.

East Tennes�ee w�s the state's Re�ub-

The Republicans dominated the state from 1864 to 1869,

and Knoxville, if not the state's capital, was the Republican party's
capital.

Here lived William Gannaway Brownlow, Governor of Tennessee,

1865-1869, and a number of other Republicans prominent locally or
nationally. ll
As early as 1832, rivalries within the Democratic party had produced a strong anti-Jackson movement which soon developed into the Whig
party in the state. McGhee's great-uncle, Hugh Lawson White, East
Tennessee's leading antebellum politician, carried the state in 1836
against the Democratic presidential nominee, Martin Van Buren.

Between

1840 and 1860 the two parties were almost evenly matched in East Tennessee, with both producing strong champions who engaged in bitter political combat.

Andrew Johnson emerged as the Democrats' leading spokesman

11The political history of Tennessee in the period 1828-2
9 is the
subject of a number of monographs. The principal sources for the follow
ing discussion are: AbernethY, From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee;
Thomas B. Alexander, Political R;Q00struction in Tennessee ( Nashville:
Vanderbilt University Press, 1950); Alexander, Thomas!· g. Nelson of
�Tennessee ( Nashville: Tennessee Historical Commission, 1956), and
"Persistent Whiggery in the Confederate South, 1860-77, " Journal of
Southern History, XXVII (1961), 305-29; E. Merton Coulter, William-Q.
Brownlow: Fighting Parson of the Southern Highlands ( Chapel Hill: Uni.,..
versity of North Carolina Press, 1937); Verton A. Queener, "The Origin
of the Republican Party in East Tennessee," East Tennessee Historical
Society's Publications, No. 13 (1941), 66- 90, and "A Decade of East Tennes
see Republicanism, 1967-1876, " ibid., No. 14 (1942), 59-85; Joseph A.
Sharp, "The Downfall of the Radicals in Tennessee," ibid., No. 5 (1933),
105-24; Oliver P. Temple, Notable � £! Tennessee from 1§11. to � '
Their Times and Their Contemporaries ( New York: Cosmopolitan Press, 1912).
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in the 1850 ' s , and Brownlow , who published a newspaper, the Knoxville
Whig, was unmatched for his vituperative defense of the Whig cause.
While they disagreed about almost everything else, Brownlow and Johnson ,
along with a great majority of East Tennesseans , opposed secession.
Union Democrats and Union Whigs in East Tennessee made common
cause against the Confederacy , or tried to remain neutral during the
war .

Alliances strange and wonderful resulted froa the war , as the

area ' s politicians jockeyed for position. By 1864 almost the entire
state was under Federal control , and the Union party of Brownlow and
Johnson was the only recognized political force in Tennessee.

With

Johnson in Washington as vice president and later as president , Brownlow
became the indisputable leader of the state ' s Unionists. Rapidly he
converted the Union party into a Republican machine. In East Tennessee
the conversion was es�ecially successful , for a large majority of voters
became staunch Republicans , and a party ascendancy was established which
remains to this day.
In large measure, the program of the Republican party in poet
bellum Tennessee was shaped by a single objective :

the reconstruction

of politics in such a way that Republican dominance would be guaranteed
for years to come. Brownlow and his followers sought to accomplish this
in two ways. First , they rewrote the state ' s constitution and enacted
statutes to disfranchise former Confederates and to concentrate con
siderable police power in the hands of the governor. Thus the natural
constituency of the Democratic party in Middle and West Tennessee was
barred from the polls , and, for good measure, the control of election

23

and grateful to the Republicans .

With a large white Republican majority

in East Tennessee and thousands of Elack Republican votes in the rest of
the state, the party seemed assured of control of the state government
in the foreseeable future.
The second part of the Republican program was based on the strong
antebellum Whig tradition of encouragement to business and internal improvements .

The Brownlow regime would actively seek immigrants from out
side the state. 13 It would attempt to lure capital investment to develop
the state's resources, and it would sponsor state aid to railroads.

The

resulting prosperity, it was hoped, would redound to the benefit of the
party which had so wisely encouraged it, and the Republicans would emerge
not only as th� party of the Union but also as the creators of a truly
reconstructed and 'revived Tennessee.
All of this seemed possible and plausible in 1865, and prudent
businessmen scrambled to assure their places in the new order .

Some ex-

Confederates, or men who had co-operated with the Confederacy, sought
favor with Brownlow, and the governor in turn welcomed men of capital
into the forgiving arms of his party .

"General" Joseph A. Mabry, of

Knoxville, who had once offered to outfit a company of Confederate

12Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 18-32,
39-44, 73-77, 110- 11.
13william E. Hesseltine, "Tennessee's Invitation to Carpetbaggers, "
East Tennessee Historical Society's Publications, No. 4 (1932), 102- 15 .

1
volunteers in gray cassimere , 4 was described in 1865 by Brownlow's
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Whig as "one of the mo st successful business men in East Tennessee ,
having by his industry and prompt attention to business accumulated a
1
large fortune . 11 5

When Charles McGhee was elected president of the

Knoxville and Kentucky Railroad in the spring of 1866 , his succession
was praised by the Whig:

"No better man

•

•

•

could have been selected

to look after the interests of the stockholders and to push the work
rapidly forward. 11

16
2.

The Knoxville and Kentucky , which came under McGhee's management
in the spring of 1866 , was one of the four railroads radiiting from the
city.

The East Tennessee and Virginia and the East Tennessee and Georgia

had been completed before the war , and they provided a �oute through
Knoxville from the Northeast to the Mis sissippi.

The Knoxvi lle and

Kentucky and the Knoxville and Charleston had been projected as the links
in a similar route from the Ohi 0 valley to the South Atlantic coast.

Be-

cause of the formidable mountain barriers which the latter two roads
would have to cross , their construction had lagged , and at the outbreak
of the Civil War neither extended more than a few miles north and south

1
o f the city . 7

14
aothrock , French Broad-Holston Country, 130 .
l5
Whig, December 29 , 1865.
l7

16

Ibid. , March 28 , 1866.

James W. Holland , "A History of Railroad Enterprise in East
Tennes see , 18 36-1860" (unpublished Master's thesis , The University of
Tennessee , Knoxville , 1934) , 66 , 81-82.
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Before the war ended Knoxville ' s hopes were raised by Abraham
Lincoln's proposal for a military railroad from Kentucky and the Ohio
into the South .

In March , 1864 , after the city was once more in Union

hands , the Knoxville and Kentucky was reorgani zed for the purpose of
pushing the road through . 18 Although the proposed military road never
1
received the support of Congress , 9 a new stimulus for the Knoxville
and Kentucky was found in the railroad building plans of the city of
Cincinnati .

Immediately after the war the "Queen City of the West"

determined to construct a railroad line which would provide direct
access to the South . 20
At about the same time that Cincinnatians held a public meeting
to get the Cincinnati Southern under way , 21 C . M. McGhee was e�ected
president of the Knoxville and Kentucky .

"He is a man of energy,

property , and credit ," remarked the Whig, "and will put the enterprise
through at once . " 22 Though he had had no previous experience at railroading, McGhee was probably a good choice for the presidency of a
railroad the success of which depended as much upon powers of persuasion as on a practical knowledge of railroad management .

He was already

interested in a large tract of mineral land which lay along the

18Whi , April 2 , 1864 .
g

19Jlli. , January 11 , 1865 .

20Riley Oakey Biggs , "Development of Railroad Transportation
in East Tennessee During the Reconstruction Peri od" (unpublished
Master' s thesis , The University of Tennessee , Knoxville , 1934) , 66 ,
81-82 .
22Whi , April 4 , 1866 .
g
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railroad ' s proposed route, and he had recently begun to establish
3
financial connections in New York. 2
Immediately upon his election, McGhee left for the east where
he hired a chief engineer, Colonel Adrian Terry, a Yale graduate who
4
had just been mustered out of the United States Ar.my . 2

McGhee and

Terry returned south through Washington where the latter obtained
copies of charts and surveys prepared during the war for the military
railroad.

In Washington McGhee conferred with Senator James Guthrie

of Kentucky, president of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, who
told the Tennessean that his company was interested in connecting with
5
the Knoxville and Kentucky at the state line . 2
With an energetic new management and the promise of important
connections at the Kentucky border, nothing stood in the way of the
road ' s completion except the lack of capital necessary to build it.
The antebellum railroad history of East Tennessee provided a lesson
in how this capital might be raised, for both the East Tennessee and
Virginia and the East Tennessee and Georgia had been built largely
with subsidies granted by the state .

Neither railroad company had been

able to sell enough stock to finance construction, and the money had
finally been provided by state subscriptions to stock or loans of state
bonds.

1865 .

Despite the great public enthusiasm for railroads, private
23 Rule, Standard History of Knoxville, 41; Whig, December 9,
2
2
2�oxville Journal and Tribune, April 8, 1906 .
25Biggs, "Development of Railroad Transportation," 65.
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capital had not been equal to the task and well over half of the cost
26
of the construction of these roads had come from the state.
The devastation of war and the impoverishment resulting from it
were strong arguments for a renewal of this aid , and in January, 1866 ,
the general assembly passed an act to issue $3 , 483 , 000 in bonds to fifteen railroads for the purpose of assisting their reconstruction and suc
cessful operation . 27 The Knoxville and Kentucky was to receive $2)0 , 000 ,
and upon the election of McGhee to the presidency in March Governor
:Brownlow assured him that the bonds would be issued immediately. 28
The act of January, 1866 , like several similar ones passed later ,
was based on the Internal Improvements Act of 18.52 which had established
the practice of lending state bonds to railroads.

The antebellum law

was quite limiting in its provisions , which required that enough stock
must have been subscribed to grade the road ' s entire length within the
state before a company could receive bonds.

When this qualification had

been met , the railroad could apply for bonds to complete a thirty-mile
section , at the rate of eight thousand dollars per mile.

It was further

stipulated that the proceeds of the bonds were to be used only for rails ,
spikes , and chairs , or for the laying of iron.

A sinking fund was estab-

lished to retire the bonds , and the 6 percent interest to be deposited
by the railroads at Nashville fifteen days before due .

Finally , to

26Holland , "East Tennessee and Georgia , 89-108 ; also "East Tennes
see and Virginia , " 83-101. This was the situation in many states at the
time. See Carter Goodrich , Government Promotion of American Canals and
Railroads , 1800-1890 (New York : Columbia University Press , 1960) , 61-16).
27
Public Acts of Tennessee (cited hereafter as Public Acts ) , 186.566 , Ch. XIV , 33-34. 28According
to an editorial in the Whig, March 28 , 1866.
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protect the loans a primary lien on all properties of the railroad was
given to the state . 29 Subsequent legislation in 18.54 increased the
allotment to ten thousand dollars per mile and required that the bonds
°
not be sold or exchanged for less than their par value. 3 The postwar
railroad aid laws were amendments to the act of 18.52, and the bonds
received by the railroads were subject to all of the above stipulations
with one important exception :

the pos-twar appropriations were in the

fonn of direct grants not dependent upon the "thirty mile" provision.
Thus the bonds were issued without regard to the progress of actual
construction.
Despite the efforts of antebellum Tennessee lawmakers to prevent
misuse of state aid , the builders of both the East Tennessee and Virginia and the East Tennessee and Georgia had resorted to fraud in order
to keep their charters.

Bogus stock subscriptions and misappropriations

of funds were among the reasons that the legislature had enacted the
stringent laws of 18.52 and 18.54. 31 By neglecting to maintain all of
thes-e strictures the postwar legislatures made new abuses possible ,
even likely , as the case of the Knoxville and Kentucky illustrates .
·

From its beginnings the line was dependent upon governmental

subsidy. Three quarters of its capital stock was subscribed by Anderson, Campbell , and Scott counties and by the city of Knoxville. Before

29 Public Acts , 18_51-.52 , Ch. CLI , 204-1_5.
30ibid. , 18.53-.54, Ch. CXXXI , 20_5-8.
3lHolland , "East Tennessee
Tennessee and Virginia ," 88- 9 4.

and

Georgia , " 9 1-102; also "East

29
the war , the road had received $180 , 000 in state bonds , and there could
have been no doubt that further construction would be dependent upon more
state aid. 32
In mid-April , 1866 , McGhee released a statement on the company' s
financial status and its prospects .

He reckoned that there was $810 , 000

in bonds available in state aid, including a grant of $250 , 000 under the
act of January 18 , 1866.

Labor was cheap and plentiful , thanks to the

discharge of hundreds of Negroes from the First and Fourteenth United
States Colored Infantry regiments , and McGhee was hopeful of pushing the
road as far as the coalfields near Clinton, Tennessee , by autumn. 33 But
despite these promising conditions , it soon became obvious that the state
bonds were worth much less in cash than their face value , and although
the law prohibited disposing of them for less than par , no one seems to
have considered this an obstacle to selling or trading the bonds for
what they would bring. 34 In May, 1866 , a bill to incorporate the Tennessee and Pacific Railroad was expanded to include an appropriation of
another $250 , 000 in bonds for the Knoxville and Kentucky. 35
At the second session of the thirty-fourth general assembly in
the fall of 1866 , the railroads were again requesting aid.

They had a

powe·rful ally in Governor Brownlow, who , in his message to the legislature

3 �iggs , "Development of Railroad Transportation," 57-60.
33Nashville Republican Banner , April 14 , 1866 .
34"Report to the Joint Select Committee , " in House Journal ,
Appendix , 1870-71 , pp. 19 , 156-57 ·
J5Private Acts of Tennessee , 1865-66 , Ch . LXXXVI I I , 268.

30
praised "the commendable spirit with which you have come to the rescue
of the railroads of the State ," and asked "still further exertions in
behalf of the same great interests ., 36 Brownlow ' s Whig reported that
•

McGhee "who is at Nashville

is , we understand, sanguine of pro
curing material aid in behalf of these important enterprises. n 37 A
•

•

•

bill providing a loan of $2 , 500 , 000 to needy railroads , including
$500 , 000 for the Knoxville and Kentucky , passed the senate unanimously
and was overwhelmingly approved by the house. 38
On New Year' s Day 1867 a "Grand Railroad Jubilee and Celebration" was held as the first Knoxville and Kentucky train rolled across
the new Clinch River bridge and into Clinton. Brownlow and a host of
dignitaries made the trip and heaped praises upon President McGhee and
Supe rintendent Terry for completing the first important section of the
Knoxville and Kentucky. 39 McGhee continued as president until November
7 , 1867 , when he suddenly resigned , "in part for reasons of health." 40
No other explanation of his departure was offered.

Although the effec-

tive date of the resignation was January 1 , 1868 , the board of the Knoxville and Kentucky elected Joseph A. Mabry to succeed

him ,

and soon he ,

the same "General" Mabry who had offered to handsomely outfit a company

36House Journal , 1865-66 , p. 23.
37Whig, December 12 , 1866.
38Tennessee , General Assembly , Senate Journal , 1866-67 , p. 100;
House Journal , 1866-67 , p. 140; Public Acts , 1866-67 , Ch. XII, 11�13 :
39Whig, January 2 , 1867.
4 °Knoxville Daily Free Press , November , 1867.
9
as Free Press.

Cited hereafter

Jl
of Confederates, was acclaimed as the "Napoleon" of the railroad
lobbyists at work on the Radical Tennessee legislature. 4l
There are several plausible reasons which might explain McGhee's
abrupt retirement from his first railroad presidency.

His health may

indeed have been bad, or he may have been distracted by the financial
difficulties of C. Powell, Green

&

Company, the New York commission

house which had sold many bonds for the Knoxville and Kentucky.

McGhee

was supposed to have severed his partnership with C. Powell, Green when
he assumed the presidency of the railroad in the spring of 1866, but
there are strong indications that he remained intimately involved in the
business of his former associates. 42 Another explanation is that MeGhee foresaw that the Knoxville and Kentucky could not be completed
without the aid of even more Tennessee bonds.

He may have recognized

the precariousness of a situation in which the bonds brought much less
than par while the Knoxville and Kentucky remained liable for interest
on those bonds which one day would have to be retired at full face value.
In

any

case, McGhee's retirement came at a fortuitous moment.

running

Time was

out for the Knoxville and Kentucky and the other railroads which

owed their lives to state aid.

Resistance to the railroad subsidies was

mounting, and the ominous warnings of trouble ahead were apparently not
lost on McGhee.
The thirty-fifth general assembly, elected in August, 1867, was
significant for its strong Radicalism and for the inexperience of its

42The State Debt, 127.
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members. 43

Among the problems facing it , those of the railroads once

more demanded attention.

A number of companies (not including the Knox-

ville and Kentucky) owed interest on the bonds issued in the past and in
his message to the legislature on October 8 , Brownlow advised that:
I have reason to believe that , in some instances, the Bonds
of the State have not been disposed of according to law , while
in others , the confidence of the State has been abused , and
her credit sought to be injured even by the recipients of her
favors. And in all future appropriations to railroad companies ,
let us know the characters of the men into whose hands State
Bonds go , both as to integrity and loyalty. Meanwhile , let us
guard against any future increase of the State debt by the
issuance of Bonds t o railroads , unless it be in cases where the 44
interests of the State would suffer for the want of further aid.
Soon Leonidas Campbell Houk , a Brownlow protege from Knoxville ,
reported in the columns of the Whig that the railroads had many friends
in the legislature.

He expect!3d that an aid bill would pass , and he

noted the presence of Joseph A. Mabry in Nashville , "wo:rlcing for his
Road [ the Knoxville and Kentucky] . "

"It is conceded by all, " wrote

Houk , "that he is the right man in the right place. "4.5
Not only the Radicals approved of the railroad aid measure.

The

Conservative Knoxville � Press praised Mabry "for the faithful and able
manne r

in which he has presented the subject to the favorable notice of

the legislature. .

. . 46

Another Conservative paper , th e Nashville

Republican Banner, urged liberal assistance to "give to our uncompleted
7
railroads all the necessary facilities. 11 4
43Alexander , Political Reconstruction !a Tennessee , 160-61.
�ouse Journal , 1867- 68 , p. 27.
46Free Press , December 1 , 1867.

45Whig, December , 1867.
4

47As quoted in ibid. , November 22 , 1867.
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Mabry, to whom the Knoxville papers gave the credit for pushing
through the "omnibus" railroad aid act of December 7 , 1867 , was one of
the most colorful figures in Tennessee ' s Civil War and Reconstruction
history. 48 Born to a wealthy and prominent Knox County family in 1826 ,
he was a large landowner and had served as president of the Knoxville
and Kentucky from 1858 to 1864.
·

A red hot Confederate in the early days

of the war , he emerged later as a Radical and a friend of Brownlow.

At

one time he was proposed as a Radical candidate for Congress , but in
1870 he was elected to the state constitutional convention which "redeemed" Tennessee from Radical reconstruction.

His brother-in-law ,

William Montgomery Churchwell , a Democratic congressman from the Knoxville district , 1851-55 , preceded Mabry as president of the Knoxville
and Kentucky and was accused of embezzling from the Bank of East Tennes
see of which he was also president. 49
Personal violence , as well as financial and political intrigue ,
were familiar themes in Mabry' s family circle.
Alabama
in 1870.

gun

His father died in an

fight , and Mabry himself shot John Baxter , a Knoxville lawyer ,

One of Mabry ' s sons was murdered in 1881 , and the following

year both Mabry and another son died in a blazing shoot-out with Thomas
O ' Conner on the streets of Knoxville.

48Jerome Gregg Taylor , Jr. , "Public Career of Joseph Alexander
Mabry" (unpublished Master ' s thesis , The University of Tennessee , Knox
ville , 1968 ).
49Ruth Osborne Turner , "Public Career of William Montgomery Church
well" (unpublished Master ' s thesis , The University of Tennessee , Kno�ville ,
1954).
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Mabry' s varied and important political connections , his railroading experience , and his recklessness made him perhaps the ideal lobbyist
for the Knoxville and Kentucky. The same board meeting which elected him
president voted him $5 , 000 to pay his Nashville expenses , and soon he was
at the capital managing the passage of Tennessee 1 s last railroad aid act.50
What came to be called the "Omnibus Railroad Act" began as an inocuous bill to amend the charter of the Harrison , Selma and Cincinnati
Railroad.

Offered by Senator A. M. Cate who represented a district in
lower East Tennessee , 51 the bill passed its first reading , was reported

favorably by the committee on internal improvements , and came up for its
second reading on November 20 , 1867.5 2 At this point the friends of the
railroads seized upon Cate ' s bill as the vehicle for granting further aid.
John B . Rodgers , representing several Middle Tennessee counties , offered
an amendment appropriating bonds for a number of railroads , including
$800 , 000 for the Knoxville and Kentucky.53 On the following day Rodgers'
amendment was passed by a vote of 11 to 8.54 Of the negative votes all
but two came from Middle or West Tennessee senators.

The two East Tennes-

seans voting against the amendment were Cate and P. P. C. Nelson who
represented a district in extreme upper East Tennessee. John Fuson , of
a Middle Tennessee district , offered

an

amendment granting substantial
aid to the Tennessee and Pacific Railroad which was voted down; 55 then
50Shea

y.

Mabry, 69 Tennessee (1878) 336.

51Senate Journal , 1867-68 , p . 5 9.
53 Ibid. , 137.
5 2 Ibid. , 9 , 137 .
2
55 Ibid. , 139-40.
54 Ibid. , 139.
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the senate defeated the bill on its second reading by a vote of 12 to
7. 56 Three Middle Tennesseans and an East Tennessean had defected from
the majority which had adopted Rodgers ' amendment.

The omnibus bill

seemed to be in serious trouble , but now Brownlow came to the rescue.
On November 22 the senate heard a special message from the governor
which pleaded for:

"A prudent but liberal aid to the railroads of the

state to place them in a condition to be productive and enable them
t·o meet , hereafter , the interest on the loans :rn.ade by the State to the
roads . "57 Brownlow argued that "a comparatively small aid now extended
to them , will preserve and save the interest of the State ," warning that
"If such aid is not given the State will lose much more

•

•

•

than the

whole amount required , by judicious expenditure , to place the roads in
S
a condition of productiveness ." S
Meanwhile the friends of the bill amended it to win the votes
necessary for its adoption .

Fuson's amendment for aid to the Tennessee

and Pacific was reconsidered and was attached to the bill , along with a
grant of $100 , 000 to the East T.ennessee and Western North Carolina railroad which ran through Nelson ' s upper East Tennessee district.

Several

Middle Tennessee railroads received appropriations , and at last the
omnibus bill had something in it for almost every senator.59 Eugene
Cary of Davidson County moved that any railroad accepting the benefits
of the act be forbidden from discriminating in rates between local and
through freight .

The speaker , D . W. C . Senter , ruled Cary ' s amendment

56Ibid. , 141.
5 B ibid .

57Ibid . , 144.
59�. , 142 , 145-46 , 150-51.

out of order , and the ruling was upheld by the senate. 60 The bill was
then given final approval with only Cary and A. M. Cate , the bill's
. .
.
•
orlglna
agalnst l• t 61
l sponsor , vot lng
•

In the house strenous efforts were made to add appropriations
for other railroads , but these were beaten down. 62 On December 6 , the
house voted 49 to 27 to approve the bill which in its final form
allotted $3 , 700 , 000 in bonds to various railroads. 63 The opposition
was strongest from Middle and West Tennessee members , for only five of
the negative votes came from East Tennesseans.

Almost half of the

omnibus appropriations would go to East Tennessee railroads , and the
reason for the bill ' s popularity among the legislators from that section is therefore obvious.

The other half of the appropriations were

spread among the railroads in the state's two other grand divisions ,
and the members from those sections were proportionately less enthusiastic about the measure.
But there was more than sectional rivalry involved in the division of the legislature over the omnibus act.

Or , to be more precise ,

there was another factor which aggravated these sectional animosities
coming to the surface in the Republican party.

In October , 1867 ,

Governor Brownlow decided to seek a seat in the United States Senate.
Opposing him for ·the post was General William Brickly Stokes , a Middle
Tennessean and a Union Army veteran.

One of Stokes ' staunch supporters

60 Ibid. , 151.
61 Ibi.d. , 152.
62
House Journal , 1867-68 , pp. 249 - 56.
63 I
bid. , 285-86.
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in the state senate was A. M . Cate who became deeply embittered over
Stokes ' defeat.64 For whatever reason , Cate was also the most persistent opponent of the omnibus bill in the senate , while D . W. C. Senter ,
Brownlow ' s heir apparent and the speaker of the senate , played an important role in getting the bill through. In the house the same pattern
was apparent. Fifteen of the twenty- seven members who voted against the
bill had also been Stokes supporters.

Two factions were forming in the

Tennessee Republican party. The group following Brownlow tended to be
composed of East Tennesseans , and they would follow their leader in his
policy of friendship for the railroads. The other faction tended to
come from Middle and West Tennessee ; it would coalesce around Stokes
and Cate , and would oppose further railroad grants.
Representative W. M . Woodcock of Macon County in Middle Tennessee
managed

to have a protest against the act entered in the journal of the

house. He opposed the bill because he did not believe that the bonds
would ever be repaid. The railroads if sold by the state would not
bring enough to redeem the bonds , he maintained , and he foresaw the
certainty of either repudiation or bankruptcy .

Woodcock said that he

had been warned of political ruin if he opposed the bill , but he believed that the railroad men were enemies of the Republican party

any-

way. The party , he said, "will have to answer in the next campaign the
charges of having made way with the credit of the state

•

•

" More-

over , "these charges will be preferred against us by a majority of these
65
very men who are now receiving the benefit of these loans."
64
rbid. , 84-86 ; Senate Journal , 1867-68 , pp. 59-61 ; Alexander ,
Political Reconstruction in Tennessee , 212.
65
House Journal , 1867-68 , pp. 289- 99 ·
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Soon after the first of 1868 Mabry began to collect the Knoxville
and Kentucky ' s bonds. 66 McGhee had meanwhile gone to New York City in
'an attempt to salvage something from the impending failure of C. Powell ,
Green

&

Company.

Founded in late 1865 by McGhee , Columbus Powell of

Knoxville , and I. F . Green of Nashville , the firm acted as financial
agents in. the selling of Tennessee bonds for several railroads which
received aid from the state.

McGhee officially retired from the firm on

May 1 , 1866 , and as president of the Knoxville and Kentucky he sold
through C . Powell , Green most of the $1 , 240 , 000 in bonds received by
the railroad during his administration. 67 By December , 1867 , the firm
seemed about to fail , and McGhee was in New York at the first of January
attempting to save the situation.

In several letters which he wrote at

that time to John Roper B ranner , president of the East Tennessee and
Virginia Railroad , McGhee proposed that he , Branner , Mabry, and C. W .
Jones , president of the Knoxville and Charleston , should advance C.
Powell , Green enough money to keep the firm afloat. 68 Anthony 1. Maxwell , a railroad contractor , endorsed McGhee's plan , and wrote "that
interests cannot dispense with Powell's services &
11 69 But however indispensable these services
influence in New York

Tenn. and her

RR

•

66 Ibid. ,

•

•

•

Appendix , 1870-71 , pp. 156- 57.

68The
four letters in the Charles M. McGhee Papers , McClung Historical Collection , from McGhee to �ranner were written in New York on
January 2 , J , 6 , and 1 but are variously dated 1867 and 1868. Since
McGhee is known to have been in Knoxville on January 1 , 1867 , it is
probable that the letters were written in January, 1868 , and that Mc
Ghee made the common error of dating some of them 1867.
69Note from Maxwell to Branner in McGhee to Branner , January 7 ,
186[8] , ibid.
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may have seemed, it was apparently decided to let the firm die , and by
its failure the Knoxville and Kentucky lost the proceeds of $90 , 000
7°
of Tennessee bonds then in the firm ' s hands.
This failure did not prevent Mabry from selling the bonds re
ceived under the omnibus act of 1867 through other New York firms .

Nor

did it prevent Mabry, McGhee , and others from developing a profitable
plan for speculation in Tennessee bonds.

The operation of this scheme

in the spring and summe r of 1868 would cause all of the participants a
good deal of trouble later, but at the time it must have seemed an ex
cellent opportunity to profit from the already disturbed state of
Tennessee finances.
As early as July, 1867 , some railroad companies failed to pay the
interest due on their state bonds. 71 To cope with this threat to the
state's credit the legislature passed an "Act to Liquidate the Debt of
the State , falling due in 1868 and 1869 ." Under this law a state board
of finance , composed of the governor, secretary of state , comptroller,
treasurer, and the president of the Bank of Tennessee , was cl�rged with
arranging for the prompt payment of interest on state bonds , beginning
with those whose interest was due in July, 1868. 7 2 The passage of the
act had a favorable effect on the price of Tennessee bonds which rose
from about sixty in February to a high of seventy-six in June. 73 Toward

7 °House Journal , Appendix, 1870-71 , PP • 140-43 ·
7l"Report of the State Comptroller," .ibid. , 1867-68 , p. 45 .
72Public Acts, 1867-68 , Ch. LXIX , 87-8 .
9
73House Journal , Appendix, 1870-71 , pp. 156-57.
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the last of June the board of finance gathered in New York City to pay
the July bond interest , the money to come partly from the railroad companies and partly from a loan negotiated at the Fourth National Bank of
New York. 74 As July l approached , the New York Times reported heavy
trading in Tennessee bonds for delivery ten , fifteen , or thirty days
later . 75 On June 29 sales of Tennessee bonds at 72 l/2 to 74 l/2 reached
a total volume of $600 , 000 , 76 but the scene was set for the conversion of
the Tennessee "bull" to a "bear." At 2 : 00 on the afternoon of the
thirtieth, one David F. Forshay , an owner of twenty- four bonds , the
interest on which was overdue , received an injunction to prevent the
state from paying the July interest until the interest on his bonds had
been paid.

The injunction was only a temporary gambit to hold up the

July interest , but it was enough to send the price of Tennessee bonds
tumbling . 77 In the first few days of July they brought as little as
68 1/2 . 78 As the New York Times observed:
The State Bonds
were especially' agitated on Tennessees ,
in consequence of the success of a conspiracy to restrain
payment of the First of July Interest at the Fourth National
Bank tomorrow .
Both these legal or technical obstruc
tions are in good part the result of a prearranged stock
speculation here , against the Bonds and credit of the State ;
in which it is charity to presume that neither the officers
nor Directors , nor their confidential brokers of the Fourth
National Bank were in any way concerned. It is also fair to
add that such a result would not have been brought about but
for a well laid and long medi tated purpose by certain Railway
and State officials �U Tennessee to bring about this temporary
default of Interest. f �
•

•

•

•

•

•

74 Ibid. , 1868 , pp. 33-35.
75New York Times , June 2 , 1868 .
9
76Ibid . , June 30 , 1868 .
78Ibid. , July 1-4 , 1868 .

77Ibid. , July 1 , 1868.
79I bid. , July 1 , 1868.
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It was soon charged, and much later it was admitted, that Mabry,
McGhee, Richard T. Wilson, John R. Branne r of the East Tennessee and
Virginia, and Thomas Callaway of the East Tennessee and Georgia had sold
themselves short in Tennessee bonds; that they had sold bonds for delayed delivery, had arranged the injunction which drove down the price
of Tennessee bonds and then had bought the cheaper bonds to cover their
earlier sales.

Such a maneuver was not unusual on the New York Exchange,

but it caused a furor in Tennessee.
On July 6 Brownlow called a special session of the legislature to
deal with outrages committed by the Ku Klux Klan, but the recent assault
on the state's credit was also on his mind.

In his message to the

general �ssembly he proposed the appointment of a joint committee of the
legislature "with full powers to send for persons and papers, so as to
sift this �tter to the bottom, and ferret out the guilty parties, who" and, he added, "if found guilty, you should proceed to sue them for damages in the name of the State. 1180 Accordingly,
ever they, may be

the committee questioned under oath a number of the principals in the
affair, including Mabry, McGhee, and Wilson, but the results were inconelusive.

McGhee and the two others denied

any

impropriety or implica-

tion in a conspiracy to depress the bonds, and here the matter rested
for over ten years until another investigating committee revived the sub
. t 81
JeC
•

Despite the excitement over the state's finances and the fact
that many of the railroads assisted by the state were unable to pay the

80Rouse Journal,
1868, p. 13 .

81 Ibid. ,

227-34 .
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interest on their bonds , when the legislature met in November , 1868 ,
the governor argued that certain railroad companies needed still more
aid:
I recommend that no more appropriations be made to railroads ,
except in those cases where the State has a large interest in
said roads , and would suffer heavy lo2s o� account of the lack
of such appropriations . Of this class are the roads running out ,
North and South from Kno�ille , and the one extending South from
Morristown; and , also , the road of which Hon. Senator Parker is
President. These roads , in order to become profitable and pro
ductive to the State , will require enough additional appropria
tions to enable them to complete their lines , so as to conrect
with other roads now in the process of construction. I pro
pose , however , to meet these demands in a way not to increase
the liabilities of the State. The plan is this:
Leading gentlemen , connected with important railroads large
ly indebted to the State , are asking for authority to issue
second mortgage bonds with a view of exchanging them for State
bonds. Thus purchasing State bonds by the avails of these
second mortgage bonds the debt now due by the State would , in
like amount , be transferred to these railroad companies , and
so the State would be relieved of a burden of several million
of dollars of debt now resting upon it. 8 2
It is hard to see what Brownlow intended by this recommendation ,
for a provision allowing the companies to purchase state bonds with their
own second mortgage bonds while it might benefit the state could hardly
supply more capital to the railroads. Apparently no one took the second
part of the Brownlow proposal seriously

anyway;

his critics , like the

Nashville Republican Banner , lambasted him . for favoritism toward East
Tennessee , 83 and the friends of the railroads proceeded to introduce an
out and out subsidy bill on the order of the omnibus act of 1867. 84
82

Senate Journal , Appendix , 1868-69 , p . 4 .

83Republican Banner , November 11 , 1868.
84Senate Journal , 1868-6 , pp. 23-24 , 8 .
9
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The legislature convened on November 9 , and on November 25 the

Whig published the following telegram:
Nashville , Tenn. ,
Nov. 18 , 1868

To Gov. W , G . Brownlow:
A bill passed in the Senate on second reading , sixteen
to five , giving our roads five hundred bonds each .
M. , D. Bearden
Jos A. Mabry85
•

.

Mabry was once more in Nashville lobbying for the Knoxville and Kentucky ,
and this time he had been joined by Marcus D. Bearden , Republican politician of Knox County and the recently elected president of the Knoxville and Charleston .

Before the new omnibus bill passed the senate

it was amended to include appropriations for several other railroads .
On its third reading the bill passed the senate by a vote of ten to
. ht 86 Of the ten senators favoring the bill , six were East Tennese1g
•

seans , three were from West Tennessee , and only one ( Samuel Parker,
president of the Southwestern Railroad which was to receive $500 , 000
under the bill) was from Middle Tennessee.

The opponents were all

Middle Tennesseans , except for A . M. Cate of lower East Tennessee , who
I

was a critic of the Brownlow-Senter wing of the Republican party and
who had voted against the omnibus act of 1867 .
When the bill was brought up in the house , the opposition pushed
through a resolution calling for an investigation of the railroads'
handling of earlier appropriations . 87 A pro forma inquiry followed , the
85Whig , November 25 , 1868 .
86 Senate Journal , 1868-6 , pp. 28-29 .
9
87
House Journal, 1868-69 , pp . 64 , 84 , 86 , 115 .

44
results of which tended to vindicate the railroads , 88 and the bill
passed its second reading. 89 Then help came to the opposition from
the state comptroller , G. W. Blackburn , who urgently requested the defeat of the omnibus bill on the grounds that Tennessee ' s credit was in
serious jeopardy .

Blackburn had been quarreling with Brownlow ever

since the erstwhile state board of finance had been embarrassed by the
events of the summe r ' s raid on Tennessee bonds.

He had managed to have

the board of finance abolished by the legislature and the authority for
paying interest returned to the comptroller's office.

Now, in a message

to the house , he refused to be responsible for the consequences of a new
90 Rallying behind Blackburn , the house tabled the omnibus
bond 1ssue.
.
bill by a vote of 40 to 34 . 91 Only five of the majority votes came
from East Tennesseans , while those members who favored the bill included
only nine Middle or West Tennesseans.

Of these nine , six had voted for

Brownlow in the senatorial election and two others were from districts
through which the Southwestern Railroad

ran .

The dispute over railroad aid was not the only cause of the impending disruption of Republican rule , but it goes a long way toward
explaining the disastrous fracture of the party.

It is possible to

trace the emergence of a Stokes-Cate-anti-omnibus-Middle and West

88senate

Journal , Appendix, 1868-69, pp . 69-74 .

89
� Journal , 1868-69 , p . 151 .
90Senate Journal , Appendix, 1868-69, pp. 73-76.
91House Journal , 1868-6 , p . 1 .
73
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Tennessee faction, and it is also obvious that there was a BrownlowSenter-pro- omnibus-East Tennessee faction.

The anatomy of these groups

becomes even clearer in the light of the political developments and
disclosures which were presently forthcoming.
As the storm over state aid to the railroads built in int ensity
Charles McGhee began to make himself inconspicuous .

He had left the

presidency of the Knoxville and Kentucky to Mabry who rashly sought more
and more state aid while the interest on the bonds began to pile up .
The failure of C . Powell , Green and the clamor over the bear raid of
1868 must have shaken McGhee ' s confidence , and the ignominious defeat
of Mabry ' s last lobbying effort was yet another straw in the wind.

It

must have seemed to McGhee that the condition of the Knoxville and
Kentucky, like that of the Republican party, was bound to get a good
deal worse before it could show much improvement .

Probably with this in

mind he completely se.vered his relationship with the company, resigning
from the board some time before the annual meeting in the spring of
1869.

92

Thus he was not present on March 30 when the board voted thir-

teen to nine to reimburse Mabry for unspecified expenses , which, it was
later revealed , amounted to over $28 , 000. 93
One member of the minority which opposed Mabry' s reimbursement
was Edward Jackson Sanford , who for the rest of his life would be MeGhee 1 s close friend and associate .

92

McGhee and Sanford , foreseeing

The board elected George W. Mabry, Joseph Mabry ' s brother,
"in place of Col . C . M. McGhee , resigned . " Whig, March 31 , 1869 .
93

shea

y.

Mabry, 337,39 .
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Mabry ' s calamitous fall, may have devised a plan to pick up the pieces
of the Kn0xville and Kentucky.

Sanford would work from within, repre-

senting McGhee's interests and openly opposing Mabry's control; McGhee
would stand clear of the Knoxville and Kentucky and busy himself with
other matters.

When the collapse came, the two partners would be un-

scathed and could move in to reorganize and control the railroad.

If

this was their plan, it worked to perfection.
By the spring of 1869 the break in the Republican party had become open and unmistakable.

A convention in May to nominate a candi-

date for governor ended in disruption with the party unable to agree on
a single standard bearer.

DeWitt Senter, who was filling out Brownlow's

term as governor, had the support of the Parson's machine and its power
ful railroad allies, 94 including Mabry (who may have purchased the
Nashville Press and Times in order to insure its support for Senter) . 9S
General W . B. Stokes, claiming to represent true Republicanism, contested
the election with Senter, and the Democrats failed to offer a candidate.
Actually the opposition to radicalism in Tennessee included not
only Democrats and most ex-Confederates but
from Middle and West Tennessee.

many

former Whigs, esp ecially

In these sections Negro equality had

aroused bitter white resentment, and the high handed actions of Brownlow
in interfering with elections and local police powers had alienated
former Unionists and Whigs.

many

Those who opposed radicalism but could not

94Alexander, Political Reconstruction in Tennessee, 21)-2);
Sharp, "Downfall of the Radicals in Tennessee:" 10)-14 .
9SMemphis Sun, as quoted in Knoxville Daily Chronicle, June 2,
1870.
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stomach the Democratic label called themselves Conservatives, and they
constituted a powerful political force.

Both wings of the Republican

party soon realized that the balance of power lay with the Democrats
and the Conservative opponents of Brownlow radicalism .

Senter, moving

quickly to capture this support, reversed his earlier position and came
out for universal suffrage.

The Democrats, from Andrew Johnson down,

endorsed Senter who used his considerable power to enfranchise thousands
of former rebels.

Though many Republicans were dismayed by this sur-

prising turn of events, enough of them remained loyal to Brownlow and
96
his candidate to ensure a victory for Senter.
The Brownlow-Senter faction still held the governorsh ip, _but its
control over the state had been gravely compromised by the alliance with
the Democrats and Conservatives.

The latter groups had fielded

many

candidates for the legislature, and, capitalizing on the split among the
97
Republicans, had captured control of the general assembly.

Even when

this became apparent, Brownlow seemed satis fied at the result of the
election.

He admitted that the legislature included some former rebels,

but he correctly predicted that it would not repudiate Tennessee ' s bonded
debt nor elect Andrew Johnson to the United States Senate.

He expected

that the Stokes faction would try· to have the election invalidated and
98
would attempt to have Tennessee placed under military government.
He

96
Alexander, Political Recons truction in Tennessee, 21.5- 2.5;
Sharp, "Downfall of the Radicals in - Tennessee:" 10.5-24.
97
Alexander, Political Reconstruction in Tennessee, 226-JO.
98
Brownlow to Matt H. Carpenter, August 16, 1869, in Miscel
laneous Manuscripts, McClung Historical Collection.
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could not anticipate , however , how far the legislature could go in dismantling the works of Radicalism in Tennessee .
When the general assembly submitted to the people the que stion of
a new constitution, it became clear that Reconstruction was over.

Disre-

garding all limitations on the franchise , the legislature stipulated
that the issue should be decided by universal male suffrage .

The subse-

quent constitutional convention which met early in 1870 devised a document that merely ratified the legislative actions which had already
limited the extraordinary police powers of the governor and had removed
the disabilities of former Confederates .

More alarming to the Radicals

were the provisions for a poll tax aimed at limiting Negro voting and a
revision of the judicial system which removed Radical judges from office .

99

All of this was too much even for Brownlow, and he joined Stokes in work
ing for a renewed congressional Reconstruction of Tennessee .

100

Among those who went to Washington to try to prevent the overthrow
of the state government was C . M. McGhee .

101

The transition of power

from Radicals to Conservatives , while it certa.in1y meant the end of
state aid to railroads , did not portend an unfriendly attitude toward
capitalists and rai lroad

mana

gers

E?r

�·

On the contrary , the new legis-

lature had enacted a law which would allow the railroads to pay their
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John B . Brownlow to B . M. Branner, March 9, 1870 , in Branner
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debt to the state by turning in state bonds to the comptroller. While
this act could not do the heavily indebted companies like the Knoxville
and Kentucky much good, it was a windfall to those roads like the East
Tennessee , Virginia, and Georgia, which could discharge their smaller
obligations to the state by purchasing bonds at depreciated rates . 10 2
This law and other legislation which came later from the "redeemed"
Tennessee legislature explain why McGhee was active in the successful
fight against congressional Reconstruction.
Aside from undoing the Brownlow laws and constitution, the Conservative legislature undertook to harry the former governor with investigations . Rumors of the misuse of state bonds by the railroads had
been freely circulating for some time , and the new assembly lost no time
in establishing a joint committee to investigate those railroads which
had failed to pay interest on their debts. High on the list was the
Knoxville and Kentucky.
To no one ' s surprise the investigation turned up irregularities
in the handling of state bonds by a number of companies . Bonds had
been issued in large lots without proper certification of accomplished
construction; bonds bad been sold at prices below their face value ;
bonds had been used by railroads to pay interest to the state. All
these practices were in contravention of the letter of the law, but the
most startling discovery was that large sums from the funds of the Knoxville and Kentucky had apparently been used to secure passage of the
omnibus act of 18 67 and in attempts to procure further aid in 18 6 8
10 2 Ibid. ; Public Act s , 18 9- 0 , Ch. XLVII , 1- 2 .
6 6
6 7
-

-----:

and

186 9 .
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For months John Baxter, a Knoxville lawyer, stockholder in the

Knoxville and Kentucky, and a bitter c ritic of Brownlow, had been charging Mabry with all kinds o f malfeasance , but the c ommittee dismissed
Baxte r' s c omplaint which "bears upon its face the impres s o f a private
quarrel , [ and] which, in the opini'o n o f the committee i s of no im
portance t o the people of the State . "

l04

What was of importance was the testimony o f E . J . Sanford that
Mabry had been authorized by a close vote of the directorate to draw
money for expense s incurred in seeking aid from the legislature , and
that he had received some $ 2 8 , 000 for which he never had to account .

105

When pre ssed t o explain, Mabry refused t o answer the c ommittee ' s ques
tions .

106

He was not , however, directly asked if he had used the

$ 2 8 , 000 t o influence the legi slature .

In regard to Mabry the c ommittee

c oncluded :
That $ 2 8 , 000 o f the funds of the State were used by him, in
an evident attempt to perpetrate a further outrage , i f not
a swindle upon the Stat e ; and the committee are satisfied
that nothing but a �earching legal investigation will ever
expos e the frauds erpetrated upon the State by thi s company
and its officers . lB7
But having opened the fascinating subject neither the committee
nor the state pursued a " searching investigation. "

In fact the investi-

gation, which was pushed just so far and no further, served everyone except Brownlow and Mabry quite well .

l03

The Conservatives , who were looking

House Journal , Appendix, 1870�71 , pp . 75-9 2 .

l04
Ibid . , 8 3 , 159- 6 9 .
106I
bid . , 154 .

l05
Ibid . , 119- 2 1.
107I
bid. , 91.
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more and more like Democrats , received some good but vague campaign
ammunition.

The only Republican whose actions were condemned by the

committee was Brownlow, and his indiscretions appeared more careless
than cr�m�na
. . 1

•

108

His party was willing for the aged Parson to bear

alone the opprobrium of "Radical excesses . "

Mabry, of course , was

seriously compromised and his fall from power followed closely after
the publication of the committee ' s report .
An early act of the Conservative legislature required that all
"delinquent" railroads--companie s which had fallen behind on their in�
tere st payments--should be placed in receivership with the companies '
presidents to act as receivers by appointment of the governor.

109

Ac-

cordingly, Senter made Mabry the receiver of the Knoxville and Kentucky,
but in February, 1870 , the legislature changed the method by which the
so- called " s tate dii•ectors" were appointed.

The new law required that

such directors , though still appointed by the governor, must be confirmed by the senate , and since Mabry had been for some time a state
director, Senter faithfully re-appointed him.

110

The appointment came

just as the sensational news o f Mabry' s misuse of funds became known ,
and the senate lost no time in re jecting him. 111

After several weeks ,

when it looked as though the senate would not change its mind , Senter
withdrew the nomination.
108

11 2

Ma.bry 1 s control o f the Knoxville and
l0 9

Ibid . , 9 0 .

Public �' 1869- 70 , Ch. III , 4- 6 .

110
�. , Ch. VII , 7 2 - 7 3 ; Knoxville Daily Press and Herald ,
May 2 7 , 1870 .
111
11 2

Senate Journal , 1870- 7 1 , p .
Ibid . ,

56 ,

113 .
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Kentucky was now in real jeopardy, but a few weeks later an infirm member of the board , Thomas

H.

Callaway, resigned , and Mabry jumped at the

opportunity to reclaim a seat on the directory.

Calloway had been

e lected by the stockholders , and the other board members could fill the
vacancy.

Dr. James Rogers nominated Mabry, while Sanford suggested ;Dr.

John Fouche instead .

Mabry still controlled the board , and he was

elected by a vote o f eight to two .

11 3

Meanwhile , John Baxter kept up a running criticism o f Mabry in
the Knoxville press , reviewing the record of the railroad president �t
length and damning him roundly for a career of opportunism and corrup
tion.

114

As Baxter himself correctly observed :

The "oldest inhabitant" is unable to call to mind a period
when East Tennessee was not disturbed by some personal ,
religious or political controversy, conducted with such low
and vulgar epithets and personal denunciation as to o ffend
115
the refined sensibilities of every orderly and decent person.
The Baxter-Mabry quarrel fitted this formula pretty wel l , and it i s not
surprising that the feud degenerated into violence .

On June 1 3 , 18 70 ,

Mabry, goaded beyond endurance , met Baxter on the street and shot him,
wounding the lawyer in the arm.

While this incident served to cool o ff

the conflict it did not stop Baxter' s condemnations , nor did it do
Mabry ' s reputation any good .
In September the Knoxville and Kentucky stockholders met and
elected a new board of directors .

ll 3

If there was a contest between McGhee

Chronicle , July 1 7 , 18 7 0 .

ll4

Ibid . , June 1 , 4 , 7 , �0 , 1 2 , 1 7 , 19 , 2 1 , 22 , 18 7 0 .

ll5
� . , June 1 , 18 70 .
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and Mabry it was not recorded by the press , but McGhee was now clearly
in control.

Besides McGhee , the new board included Sanford and his

friend , Dr. Fouche , and
ate of McGhee .

H.

C . Chamberlain, who would be a close associ-

Perez Dickinson, G .

W . Ros s , and E . C . Edwards rounded

out the new directorate which proceeded to elect McGhee to the presidency.

116

Because he maintained that his term as president had not
The suit

expired , Mabry sought an injunction to bar McGhee from o ffice .

was heard by Chancellor 0. P. Temple who decided in October that the
board was within its right s when it replaced Mabry with McGhee .

11 7

Thus McGhee came to power in the Knoxville and Kentucky, and for more
than twenty years thereafter his control of the road would be absolute .

J.
The story o f McGhee , Mabry, and the Knoxville and Kentucky was
not quite over, however.

Although the Democrats were fairly secure in

their control of Tennessee state government after 18 7 0 , they soon fell
to fighting among themselves .

The most burning issue in politics be-

came the state debt , in other words the bonded indebtednes s which was
the legacy o f the Radical Republicans ' aid to the railroads .

A strong

movement , with its roots in the agrarian wing of the Democratic party,
demanded that the debt be repudiated.

In part the repudiationists main-

tained that the Brownlow regime had i llegally held power through the
dis franchisement of the rightful voters of Tenne ssee .

Additionally

they argued that the "average " taxpayers of the state were being required

116
� . , September 27 , 18 7 0 .

ll 7

Ibid . , November 1 3 , 18 70 .
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to pay heavy exactions to retire the bonds issued in aid of private corporations .

Finally they recalled the evidence of corruption uncovered

by the legislative investigation of 186 9- 70 , evidence which might indi
8
cate that the bonds were actually illegally appropriated and issued . 11
Men of capital and their allies within the Democratic party, sometimes called " railroad democrats , " were alarmed at the prospect of this
assault on property. Moreover , the men ( such as McGhee) who owned or
controlled the railroads which had been aided by the state were fearful
tr.1at the holders of repudiated bonds would seek redress from the railroad
companies themselves .

The opposition of these powerful men notwithstand-

ing, the repudiationist faction gained the ascendency within the now
dominant Democratic party9 and

the

state Democratic platform of 1878

promised to bring the Radical Republicans

19be fore

the bar of

public

opinion, as the author of all the misfortunes which now oppress and
threaten the people . 11 11 9 It was this pledge wh..i ch an investigating
committee of the 1 879 legislature tried

to

fulfill .

The report of the committee to investigate the state debt occupies
two hundred and eleven pages in the appendix of the House Jou1nal .
of this space is given over to testimony which purports
Mabry, McGhee, Bra��er , Wilson, Callaway, and M .

D.

to

Most

prove that

Bearden cor��pted

11 8Philip M. Hamer ( ed. ), Tennessee : ! History, illJ.-1.23.£ ( 4 vols;
New York : American Historical Society , Inc. , 1 933), II , 683-84; Alice
Lynn Hunt, "Tennessee Public Debt as an Issue in Politics, 1 870-1883 "
(unpublished Master ' s thesis, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville ,
1 934), 34-37.
11 9 Ibid. , .3
7.
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the 186 7 legislature , influenced other Tennessee legislatures in sinister ways , and bribed Governor Brownlow.

It was upon Mabry that the c om-

mittee focused its main attention, for it was Mabry ' s activities which
were most vulnerable .

He had , after all , been seriously compromised by

the earlier legislative inve stigation.
In his testimony Mabry admitted that he had lobbied for the Knoxville and Kentucky during the 186 7 , 1868 , and 1869 legislative sessions .
He conceded that he had sometimes brought suits for members , but he re-

1 0
.
• • t 1es
•
actlVl
. 2
fuse d t o answer o ther quest 1ons
.
ab out hi s poss1" bl e l obby1ng

H.

A.

Huntington, a Nashville clothier, testified that Mabry had main-

tained an account at his store and that he had some time s brought in unidentified men who bought clothe s .
1 1
times bought goods for others . 2

Huntington thought that Mabry someG. W. Blackburn, a former state

comptroller, said that Mabry had once told him that he carried the
1
legislature in his pocket . 22

These depositions comprised the sum of

new evidence linking Mabry to the passage of the omnibus act .

M.

D. Bearden, the former railroad lobbyist and ex-Union

Army

1
officer, 2 3 was also examined by the committee in connection with the
corruption o f the legislature .

Bearden admitted that while president

of the Knoxville and Charleston he had lobbied for the company.

He ad-

mitted spending several thousand dollars , but denied that he had bribed
anyone .

Several witnesses testified that they had heard or thought they

1 20

� State Debt , 16 7-68.

1 22
1 23

121

Ibid . , 55-58 .

Ibid. , 1 33 .

Rothrock , French Broad-Holston Country, 3 77- 7 8 .
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had heard Bearden tell of paying a member of the legislature $500 t o
vote for a railroad appropriation and of forcing the member to return
1
the bribe when he failed to deliver his vote . 24

One witness also

thought he remembered hearing Bearden relate that he and Mabry had
ordered thirty barrel s of brandy to help obtain the passage of an
•
1 25
. t 1.on.
appropr1.a
The Reverend N. W. Motheral testified that Thomas

H.

Calloway

had confe ssed before his death that he had employed whisky, women, and
clothing t o work his will on the legislature .

Motheral also believed

that just before the investigation Calloway' s widow had delivered incriminating papers to a railroad station agent , Sam Reese , who had
1 6
turned them over to MC�hee . 2

Reese was not called to testify, but in

a published statement he vehemently denied any knowledge of such papers . 1 27
The only really new evidence which was turned up by the investigation had to do with th9' bribing of Brownlow.

Under questioning,

·Mabry admitted that he and Thomas Calloway had given the governor five
$1 , 000 bills , a portion of the profits from the bear raid of 1868 on
Tenness·ee bonds .

According to Mabry, he , Callaway, McGhee , Richard T .

Wilson, and John. .,·R . Branner had consulted a New York medium, one Madame
Mansfield , who told them that the price of Tenne ssee bonds would decline ,
that there would be trouble in Tenne ssee , but that "old Scratch" (presumably Brownlow) could be contro lled with money.

1 24
rhe State Debt , 147- 49 .
126
�. , 8 4- 8 6 .

1 25

Whereupon Mabry and

�•

1 27
Nashville Daily American, March 15 , 18 7 9 .

•

67 .
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Call away returned t o Knoxville and offered the money to Brownlow who was
lying ill on a couch at his home .

The governor declined to receive it

but indicated that it should be given to his wife , who accepted the
1 8
$) , 000 . 2

Branner and Callaway were dead in 187 9 , and when first

1 9
questioned about �he bribe Wilson denied any knowledge of i t . 2

After

Mabry ' s testimoney, Wilson entered a deposition in which he admitted
that the five men - had agreed to give the money to Brownlow or some mem

l
ber of his family. J O

The Brownlow bribe represents the most serious evidence linking
McGhee to the corruption of the Republican government during Reconstruction.

Taken with the other evidence it support s the contention of the

majority o f the 1879 investigating c ommittee that "The greater part of
the present debt is the result of a vicious p�licy and corrupt legislation, superinduced by the various corporate bodies interested in securing
aid from the state . 11 l3

l

It is probable that Brownlow was first led t o

recommend aid to the rai lroads by the desire , very natural in an old

East

Tennessee Whig, to see the isolation of the region broken by the

transportation facilities which would secure the pro sperity and development of Knoxville and the surrounding area.

Later, the railroad men,

.especially Mabry, did everything possible to increase their influence
with the governor.

His son, General Jame s P. Brownlow, a distinguished

veteran o f the Union Army, was placed on the payroll as superintendent

128

The State Debt , 176-78 .

lJO

ibid . , 9 3- 94 .

129
lJl

Ibid . , 9 2 .
ibid . , 8 .
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1
of the Knoxville and Kentucky in March, 1868 . 3 2

Another son, John Bell

Brownlow, was reportedly hired by Mabry as a lobbyist , along with the
l
governor' s sometime newspaper partne+ , the Reverend Thomas H. Pearne . 33
Fina1ly, the $5 , 000 gift explains wby Brownlow did not push the prosecution o f those responsible for the bear raid of the summer of 1868 .

As

for the legislature , its generosity to the railroads was obviously due
in part to the lobbying of Mabry and his cohorts who must have spent
lavishly in order to have expended $ 2 8 , 000 of Knoxville and Kentucky funds .
The inyestigating committee , however, failed to produce the detailed evidence which would have proved that the state bonds were i lleThe minority o f the committee noted that

gally appropriated or issued .

though the Brownlow bribe was outrageous , "it had nothing to do with the
passage of any law or the i ssuance o f any bonds , and, i s not , therefore ,
l
relevant to the matter being considered. " 34

Senator J . H. C lapp ,

speaking for the minority, complained that the majority report was unsupported by specifics :
Who was bribed? How many? We request you to be specific in
so grave a charge as this . The testimony fails to fix the
charge of bribery upon a single member of the Legislature ,
The only specific case was that of the member bribed by
Bearden, and that member
returned the bribe and voted
1
against the bill for which he was expected to give his vot e . 3 5
•

•

•

The fact is that the committee never knew all of the intricate details surrounding the relationship between the railroads and the state

l3

�g, March 25 , 1868 .

l 33
l3

The State Debt , 189-90 .

5Daily American, March 1 9 , 1879 .
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government either during or after Reconstruction.

Those details will

probably remain incomplete as will the role of McGhee in that tangled
history.

One piece of circumstantial evidence , in which the committee

would have been interested , however, has come to light since 1879 o
Among McGhee ' s papers are a series of letters from B . M. Branner which
were written during June , 1879 .

Branner was the brother o f John R .

Branner who was involved in the speculation in Tennessee bonds and in
the Brownlow bribe .

B . M. Branner wrote McGhee that he had papers

"that may have an important bearing not only on the suit about which you
are now so much engaged but also upon private and individual matters
about which you may fin<i you are very materially interested. 1 1
suit to which B ranne r referred was probably Stevens

y.

136

The

East Tennessee ,

Virginia and Georgia and other railroads , an action brought by holders
of state bonds who hoped to assume the state ' s lien against the railroads which had received bonds during Reconstruction.

Had the suit sue-

ceeded it would have established the liability o f the railroads for payment o f these bonds which Tennessee was just then trying to repudiate or
" scale down. "

Surviving correspondence between Wilson and McGhee , who

were in control of several o f the ra;ilroads named in the suit , shows that
the matter was very much on their minds

in

the summer of i879 .

137

Apparently McGhee and Branne r entered into negotiations and on June 27
Branner wrote :

l36
B . M. Branner to McGhee , June 2 , 1879 , McGhee Papers .
l37
Ricbard T . Wilson to McGhee , April 27 , May 7 , 10 , 19, Septem
ber 6 and 11 , 1879 , ibid .
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Before leaving I make this further prqposition as a final
adjustment of matters between rou � ! individually.
To wit . You pay me 13 , 000 . 00 and loan me 1 2 500 on one and
two years , I to deliver. your letters and the Green letter
r�ferred to .
•

•

•

I f you accept you can t elegraph Monday morning saying
"all right" and I will come down.
·

P. S .

Your proposition to pay $ 3 , 000 will not do .

13 8

Among the letters to which B. M. Branner referred were probably the
several notes which McGhee had written to John
1868 .

R.

Branner in January,

These show, as stated above , that McGhee was deeply involved in

the affairs of C . Powell , Green & Company whose failure resulted in the
loss of funds belonging to the Knoxville and Kentucky and other rai lroads .
The letters seem to indicate that McGhee might have salvaged some of these
funds had he not been so concerned with working C. Powell , Green out of
its difficultie s .

At any rate , �cGhee wanted very badly t o get the

letters back , and it is assumed that he and B ranne r came to some sort
of agreement .
Branne r must not have sold all o f the letters in his possession,
for in 189 2 he tried some more blackmail :

I have letters (which you never saw nor dreamed o f) showi�
how the last omnibus bill just after the war was past [ �J .
You saw some o f these letters which related more particularly
to you in person. These others are of a more general charac
ter, and show what relation the road and certain individuals
occupy towards the people and the state .
You can show or advertise this letter if you wish. It
will be an invitation to me to advertise some others , that
the people and e specially the Legislature may see how things
have been done . l39
·

138
B . M. Branne r to McGhee , June 2 7 , 1879 , �·
l39
B ranne r to McGhee , July 5 , 1892 , �·
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Such letters would have been interesting in 1870 or 1879 , but by
1892 the corruption of the past had lost its political usefulness.

Most

of the principals were dead, the state debt question had been settled,
and the statute of limitations had long since

run

out .

There is no in-

dication that McGhee was moved to curiosity about Branner' s second
collection of papers .
McGhee emerged almost unscathed from the post-war debacle which
ruined Mabr,y and seriously wounded the Republican party in Tennessee .
Indeed he protited especially from the bankruptcy of the Knoxville and
Kentucky.

It had become obvious that the railroad would never be com-

pleted without outside help , nor would the company ever be able to pay
its interest or retire the state bonds .

In an effort to tidy up the un-

happy railroad legacy of Reconstruction the Conservative legislature
provided for the sale of the defaulting companies .

A commission was

appointed to establish the minimum value of the railroads , �d the Knoxville and Kentucky was appraised at $892 , 500 in state bonds .

The com-

mission advertised for bids , and on September 20 , 1871 , it was found
that only $300 , 000 in bonds had been offered.

Since this bid was well

below the minimtim value , a new sale was held, and on October 5 the
Knoxville and Kentucky was sold for $350 , 000 , no other bids having
l
been received. 40 Thus the state disposed of its interest at a loss
of $2 , 000 , 000 .

l40Fairfax Harrison, ! History of the Le l Development of the
Railroad System of the Southern Railway Compan.y Washington, D. C . :
1901) , 870-72. Cited hereafter as Legal History.

�
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The new owners were a group of Northern and Southern capitalists .
The only Tennessean in the combination was McGhee , but the group ineluded Anthony Legget Maxwell , a railroad contractor and bridge builder
who lived sometimes in Knoxville and sometimes in Macon, Georgia.

Other

Georgians included were Joseph E. Brown, a former governor and a leading
Democrat ; W. C . Morrill , secretary-treasurer of the Western and Atlantic
Railroad ; and Alfred Austell , a former East Tennessean who was an
Atlanta banker and cotton factor.

Northerners were Thomas A Scott ,

president of the Pennsylvania Railroad ; United States Senator Simon
Cameron of Pennsylvania and his son Donald ; Secretary of the Interior
C olumbus Delano and his son John. l4l
T�s combination had been brought together by McGhee after months
of painstaking work.

As early as July, 1870 , he stated that the East

Tennessee , Virginia, and Georgia would be unable to complete the Knox�
ville and Kentucky, and he hoped that the Louisville and Nashville would
142
buy it and complete it to a junction with that line .
The 1. & N. hung
back, however, and in March, 187 1 , McGhee interested Morrill in the Knox
ville and Kentucky, as well as in some coal land which lay along the
railroad ' s route.

Morrill had important connections in the group which

had just leased the state-owned Western and Atlantic in Georgia ; among
these were Scott , the Camerons , the Delanos , and Brown.

After having

the coal lands and the Knoxville and Kentucky examined, the northerners

141Press and Herald, October 14, 1871.
142Chronicle ,

July 27 , 18 7 0 .

l
and Brown agreed t o join in the purchase . 43

63
Apparently the new ow,ners

intended to complete the road to a connection with the L. &

N.

and at

some time to merge it with the East Tennessee , Virginia, and Georgia
which was soon to come under the control of Scott ' s holding company,
the Southern Railways Securities Company.
Scott ' s dreams of a Southern rail empire failed, however, and
for a decade the Knoxville and Kentucky, reorganized as the Knoxville
and 0hio , was operated by McGhee as a coal hauling subsidiary of the
1
East Tenne ssee . 44
In 1881 when the East Tennessee began an aggressive policy o f expansion, McGhee and associates sold the Knoxville and Ohio to that system for $1 , 808 , 745 . 7 2 .

During the ten years between the sales the Knox-

ville and Ohio was extended by seven miles , and four miles o f branch
line were built .

The value o f the coal trade on the line had probably

increased greatly by 1 881 , but neither this factor nor the improvements
seems sufficient to explain the more than 400 percent profit which Mc
Ghee and his group made on the sale to the East Tenne ssee . 145

Just how

much McGhee personally made on the deal is unknown, but it is likely
that his return was enough to have made him feel that his long connection with the Knoxville and Kentucky had been worthwhile .
Since he was presiden� of the Knoxville and Ohio and vice president of the East Tennessee , any profit which he made is subject to c ondamnation on the grounds o f conflict of interest.

The se conflicts ,

l43
w. C . Morrill to McGhee , March 27 , April 24 , 2 8 , May 11 , 14 ,
July 14 , 15 , August 3 , September 5 , 1871 , McGhee Papers .
1�rris on, Legal History, 87 2- 7 6 .
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however, were hardly recognized as such in the 1880 1 s .

In fact , among

the new breed of financiers who ran Southern railroads in this period,
146
exploitive manipulation was the chief means of profit making.
McGhee
�as learning these new skills , and he was leaving behind the men like
Mabry whose talents for merely manipulating provincial legislatures did
not make them equal to the challenges of a new era in railroad building.

l46Maury Klein, The Great Richmond Terminal : A Study in Business
� !E! Business Strate8i' (Charlottesville : University Press-or Vir
ginia for the Eleutherian Mills-Bagley Foundation, 1970) , 12-16.

CJIA.PTER III
A

NEW

REGIME : McGHEE
VIRGINIA,

AND

AND

THE EAST TENNESSEE,

GEORGIA RAILROAD

As Joseph Mabry' s prospects waned along with those of the
Republican party in Tennessee , the fortunes of McGhee and the Democrats
waxed.

In the decade of the seventies the Knoxville capitalist stepped

forward not only as a spokesman of the Democracy but also as a civic
leader respected for his wealth, power, and public spiritedness.

He

helped to impose a new regime upon East Tennessee ' s railroads while
assisting the Conservative and Democratic redeemers in the establishment of a new state political order.

He nevertheless avoided the spirit

of vindictiveness and maintained good relations with the Republicans and
Unionists .

His friends and business associates were drawn from parti-

sans of both persuasions , and he seemed to have had a respect for men of
principle and character that transcended political labels .

In 1877 he

commissioned a portrait of the unreconstructed historian, J . G. M.
Ramsey, w�eh was hung in the Tennessee State Library. 1 When the venerable and outspoken old Unionist , Thomas W. Humes , was deposed as president of East Tennessee University, McGhee gave him the position of librarian at the new public library which he established in memory of his

lDavid Lawson Eubanks , "Dr. J . G. M. Ramsey of . East Tennessee :
A Career of Public Service" (unpublished Ph. D . dissertation, The Uni
versity of Tennessee , Knoxville , 1965 ) , 357 .
65
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daughter in 1885 . 2 Withal , he was definitely a Democrat and he did play
a role in the party' s resurgence of the 1870 ' s .
The first legislature elected ��der the new or redeemed constitu
tion of 1870 was strongly Conservative and Democratic. 3 D. W. C . Senter' s
successor as governor, John Calvin Brown, was an ex-Confederate brigadier
and a member of a Middle Tennessee family which had furnished the state
4
an antebellum governor.
The speaker of the senate was John C . Vaughan
from Monroe County, who had also served the Confederacy as a brigadier
5
general .
James D. Richardson, a Middle Tennessean who was speaker of
the house , had been only eighteen when the war broke out , but he had
immediately enlisted and had become the adjutant of his Confederate
regiment . 6 The new complexion of state government was clear : the
rebels had recaptured the state house , and the influence of Middle and
West Tennessee in the councils of state would be relatively enhanced,
while that of the East would be partially eclipsed.
Among the ex-Confederate Conservatives and Democrats who took
office in October, 1871 , was Charles McGhee , chosen Knox County' s member
2stanley J. Folmsbee , Tennessee Establishes � State University
1§12-1887, in The University £f Tennessee Record , LXIV 1 No . j (May,
1961 ) , 67-89 ; McGhee to E. J. Sanford , July 1 , 1886 , McGhee l:>apers .
3Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 234.
4John Trotwood Noore ( ed. ) and Austin Foster, Ten.YJ.essee :
�
Volunteer State , 11.§.2.-J-m. 0+ vols . ; Chicago and Nashville : S . J Clark
Publishing Company, 1923 ) , II , 49 .
5Daniel M. Robison (ed. ) , Biographical Directo;Y of � Tennessee
General Assembly, 1796-1.2£2., Preliminary No . 24, Loudon County, Monroe
County (Nashville : Tennessee State Librai� and Archives , 1968) , 40 .
6
�. , Preliminary No . 6 , Rutherford County, 45-46 .
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of the house of representatives at the election held a r�ar before on
November 8 , 1870. 7 His election was almost unopposed, and although the
Knoxville Daily Press and Herald, the Conservative newspaper, carried
his name at its masthead along with those of other Conservative candidates , the Republican Chronicle ( successor to Brownlow' s �g) did not
.
8
oppose· him .
In fact the Press and Herald, as it endorsed his candidacy,
stressed the fact that McGhee was not a politician. 9 A letter to the
editor spoke of him as "the People ' s candidate , " rather than as a Demo. . 10 McGhee , in his announcement for office , declared
erat or C onservat 1ve
that he was becoming a candidate "In response to the calls which have
1 1 11
been made upon me by members of both political parties
•

•

.

•

McGhee had actually been active in Conservative politics for some
time .

In 186 9 he was at Nashville when the legislature elected a United

States senator.

He was apparently an energetic supporter of former Presi-

dent Andrew Johnson, for he sent a telegram to Thomas A. R. Nelson urging
Nelson to use his influence with a member to vote for Johnson for the
senate . 12 In 1872 he was the chairman of the second congressional

7The election was the first held under the new constitution o f
1870 , but the governor and legislators did not take office until almost
a year later.
1870 .

8Press and Herald, November l , 1870 ; Chronicle , November l ,
9Press and Herald, October
13 , 1870.
10Ibid.

, October 16, 1870 .

ll

ibid. ' October 20 , 1870.

12McGhee to Nelson, October 19 , 1869, Nelson Papers .
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district's Democratic committee. 1 3

He declined to stand for Congress

himself but suggested to Nelson that if he should

run ,

the legislature

would give him a district which would be easy to carry. 14

McGhee prob-

ably participated in the gerrymandering of the second district to dilute
1
the Republicans 9 strength . 5

In 1870, however, he was conspicuously

absent from the C onservative convention and rallies .

16

There were several good reasons why McGhee was anxious to be
elected to the thirty-seventh general assembly and why Knoxvillians of
·both parties were glad to have him represent the county .

Radical Repub-

licanism had been good to East Tennessee ; it had showered the bounty of
the state on the railroads which radiated from Knoxville, and it had
made East Tennessee Universi ty the beneficiary of the Morrill Act .
Knoxvillians (and of course McGhee especially) were extremely interested
in the future of the area's railroads�-a future which could be a ffected
for good or ill by the attitude of the state government .

State aid to

the railroads was dead, but it remained an important political issue,

lJ
1

Press

�

Herald, August J, 1 872 .

�cGhee to Nelson, December 4, 1871, Nelson Papers .
l
5As a C onservative member of the legislature, representing a
county in the second congressional district, McGhee was probably active
in gerrymandering the district so that it stretched from Sevier C ounty
on the North Carolina line deep into Middle Tennessee. The district
vaguely resembled a batt.ering ram, and it was said that it was so con
structed in order to "butt" the incumbent Republican congressman, Horace
Maynard, from office . Instead, Maynard capitalized on the candidacies
of two Democrats and was elected as the member-at-large from the state .
Jacob M. Thornburg, a Republican, was elected from the second district.
Robert H . White, Messages of the Governors of Tennessee (8 vols . ;
Nashville : Tennessee Historical Commission, 1952 to date), VI , 201- 2 .
16

chronicle, September ll, November 8, 18 70 .

l
I

i

\

\

and the prospect of Conservative Middle and West Tennesseans attacking
the East Tennessee railroads which had once seemed to own the Republican
party was naturally disquieting.
Even more vulnerable to the jealousy of politicians from the other
two grand divisions was Knoxville ' s East Tennessee University.
historian of the University has observed :

As the

"The political overturn o f

1869 was fraught with peril for East Tennessee University and came very
l7
near depriving it of the agricultural college endowment . ,.
Leading
Republicans had successfully fought to make the state eligible for a
federal grant and the establishment of a land-grant college .

Then East

Tennesseans like Joseph A. Mabry lobbied the Radical legislature in behalf of the University' s claims to the endowment .

Finally McGhee ' s

friend Ed��rd J . Sanford, a lifelong Republican, guided through the
general assembly

an

act which made East Tennessee Univer�ity the s tate ' s
18 Hardly had the Conservative legislature of
land-grant institution.
1869 convened, before a committee was appointed to investigate whether

the University had complied with the terms of the act which assigned to
it the Morrill endowment .

It was generally understood that Middle and

West Tennesseans in the legislature were determined to obtain a share
of the endowment for institutions in their sections , and at the time
of McGhee ' s election in l87d it appeared likely that they would succeed. 19
What Knoxville needed then was a respected and influential representative , acceptable to the Conservatives , who could bargain and
l7Folmsbee , East Tennessee University,
71.
18
19Ibid.
, 71-72 .
.lli.£ . ' 60- 61.
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negotiate for the welfare of East Tennessee ' s University and railroads .
McGhee must have seemed just the man, and a few days before the election the incumbent Republican representative , Will R. McBath, withdrew
his candidacy with a cryptic statement saying that his friends knew
20
Years later a Republican newspaper charged that the
his reason.
Sanford faction of the party had engineered the withdrawal of McBath,
21
who had been paid $1 , 000 to leave the field to McGhee .
Whether or not
this payment was actually made , it is probable that Sanford and his
followers had a lot to do with clearing the way for McGhee ; this kind
of "trading off" between the parties has been a time- honored Tennessee
22
political tradition.
For McGhee ' s part , the explanation of this brief foray into
public political life is simple .

There were j obs in Nashville which he

could do , and he would do them to benefit his city, his section, his
friends , and his own interest s .

Public office for its own sake held no

attraction for McGhee , and he was probably being entirely candid when he
said :

"I only consented (or desired) to be a member of the Legislature

on account of the interest

I

felt in the Agricultural College fund.

It

was business not political ambition that induced me to desire the seat. 11 2 3
By the time he took office the worst of the crisis was over as
far as the Univers ity was concerned, and it is not possible to determine
how much he was able to help his alma mater in the successful fight to

21
20chronicle , November 4, 1870 .
� . , August 29, 1886 .
22
see for instance , V. 0. Key, Jr. , Southern Politics in State
and Nation (New York : Alfred A . Knopf, 1949) , 78-79, 284.
23
McGhee to Nelson, December 9, 1871 , Nelson Papers .
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keep the Morrill endowment .

He did introduce a resolution, which passed

�he legislature , requesting the state ' s railroads to provide free t rans

�

portation for students travelling to and from the Univers ty. 2

4

This

rna� have been a sop for the benefit of Middle and West Tennesseans who

lived far from Knoxville , and it is unknown whether any of the rail roads
complied with the request .
was obviously sincere .

Still , McGhee ' s devotion to the University

He became a t rustee in 1870 and served unti l

1886 when he moved out o f the state .

During much o f this time he acted

as the secretary-treasurer of the board . 2

5

For a freshman legislator with no previous experience , McGhee
�s extremely active during his term.

He was a member o f two important

committees--Education and Ways and Means .

On the former he was in a

position to support the University ' s cause ; his appointment to Ways and
Only

Means was probably a tribute to his wealth and financial ability.

one other member o f the house introduced more bills during the regular
session of the thirty- seventh general assembly. 2

6

Among the bills which

he sponsored were two designed to benefit Knoxville by simple changes of
name .

One sought to amend the municipal charter by changing the word

"town" t o " city" ; 27 the other was designed to change the name o f the
river that flows past Knoxville from "Holston" to "Tennessee . 11 2

8

It was

generally thought that this change would facilitate �he expenditure of

2�blic Act s , 1871 , Ch. LXIII ,

2

R5 .

5
2 The University £f Tenne ssee Record , I , No . 4 (June , 1898 ) ,

6
2 House Journal , 187 1 , pp . 487-50 .
J
8
2 Ibid . , 146 .

7
2 Ibid. , 157 .

2

51 .
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federal funds for river improvement in the vicinity of Knoxville . 29
McGhee ' s river bill passed the house but died in the senate ; his attempt
to legislate Knoxville from a town to a city failed to pass either
house . JO
A more important and successful venture in the area of local
legislation was McGhee ' s bill to establish a separate criminal court
district for Knox County. Jl This may have been--as he claimed--an
attempt to make the courts operate more swiftly and efficiently. 3 2 On
the other hand, it had the effect of removing a Republican district
attorney from · the Knox County courts.

I f this act was intended to in-

jure the Republicans it failed, for Jacob M. Thornburgh, the district
attorney, was elected to the United States House of Representatives at
the next election, and the Republicans chose a district attorney for the
new Knox County criminal court . 33 Another McGhee bill suspected of
being inspired by partisanship was one which prov�ded for the publish
ing of the opinions of the state supreme court . 34 Although the bill was
endorsed by all the justices , the Knoxville Chronicle saw it as "a fu.rther attempt to feed from the public crib a few partisan sheets.
We do not suppose , " the Chronicle remarked, "that

Mr.

•

McGhee has any

29Montgomery, "Nomenclature of the Upper Tennessee , " 52-5J .
JO� Journal , 1871, p. 511 .
JlPublic
� ' 1871 , Ch. LIV, 47-49 .
3 2Press � Herald, December 10 , 1871 .
33chronicle , August J , November 9 , 1872.
34Press � Herald, October 16 , 1871.
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interest in legislating money into the pockets of the Press � Herald.
" If not , it added, let him frame the bill to prevent fraud. 35
McGhee did introduce a proposal to change the method of selecting the
public printer ( presumably to remove it from partisanship ) but neither
this bill nor the one for publishing supreme court decisions was
passed. 3 6
Though the promotion of the University and of his home town were
important to McGhee , legislation affecting railroads must have consumed
much of his attention while he served in Nashville .

His bill making it

a misdemeanor for railway engineers to fail to stop before crossing the
line of another railroad was probably an attempt to give the force of
law to a company regulation. 37 The bill passed without many votes
against it , but there was opposition in the senate from Henry R. Gibson,
a Republican who represented a district adjoining Knox County. 38 Whatever Gibson' s objection to this particular bill may have been, he was a
persistent opponent of legislation favored by the railroads .

Certain

Republicans , Gibson among them, seem to have seized upon railroad baiting as a means of recouping the party' s popularity.

After all , the

Republicans ' Reconstruction romance with the railroads had contributed
·to the party ' s fall from power, and it must have been galling to witness
the railroad men' s influence on the now ascendant Democrats .

35Chronicle , October 17 , 1871.
3 6House Journal , 1871, pp. 504, 508 .
37Public Acts , 1871 , Ch. XLVI , 42 .
3 8senate Journal , 1871 , p. 245 .

Gibson
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attacked ttan Act to authorise the Railroad Commissioners to perfect
their sales , " which was framed to guarantee the titles to the railroads
foreclosed by the state and subsequently sold to private parties such
as McGhee and his associates.

He noted that "the Bill was the special

darling of the railroad lobby who used every effort to secure its passage , employing their wiles and artifices unblushingly on the very
floor of the Senate during the debates . " 39 Gibson was something of a
maverick in his attacks upon the corporations , but even the Chronicle ' s
Nashville correspondent , who may in fact have been Gibson himself,
Joined in decrying the influence of the railroad lobby:
When I look around the Senate and the House and see the lobby
at work , I can only exclaim, "May God help the taxpayers ! "
The influence of the lobby is almost irresistable . Mr. This
and Mr. That , Col. So and Col. Thus , General Which and General
What , are always on hand, working cunningly and ceaselessly ,
and before a member knows it he is convinced or committed. 40
Some Republicans relished the opportunity to emphasize the railroads ' hold upon the Democrats , and there was undeniable evidence that
such influence existed.

When the new administration took office , C olonel

Edmund W. Cole , president of the Nashville , Chattanooga, and St . Louis ,
entertained in honor of Governor Brown, and the Nashville Republican
Banner reported that "all the State officers , many members of the Legiswere present . 11 4l East Tennessee
lature and prominent Citizens
Republicans might have made a good deal more of this issue had they been
able to distinguish between the railroads and the railroad

40

managers .

Chronicle , November 17 , 1871.

41Republican Banner, October 14, 1871 .
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But in the 1870 ' s the progress-bearing railroad was such an object of
veneration for both parties in Tennessee that few politicians or newspapers had the heart consistently to attack the men who cont rolled the
railroad companies .
When a vigorous assault was loosed upon McGhee and his friends ,
it came not from the Republicans , nor out of any reformist movement ,
but from a disgruntled Democratic newspaper which was serving the interests of other railroad men.

The occasion for the attack was the

introduction of a bill to require solvent railroads to pay their interest
on state bonds in cash rather than in past due state bond coupons . 42 In
the eyes of the Memphis Daily Appe al this was a deliberate attempt to
force the Memphis and Charleston Railroad into bankruptcy, and this may
have been what McGhee actually had in mind.

The East Tennessee , Vi�inia,

and Georgia, in which he was heavily interested, was seeking cont rol of
the M.

&

C. which ran westward to Memphis from near Chattanooga where it

connected with the East Tennessee .
M.

&

Major Moses Wicks , president of the

C . , seems to have been determined to hold his road out of the com-

bination--hence , McGhee ' s bill and the Appeal ' s violent reaction to it .
Wicks had already made good use of the Appeal in a campaign to liquidate
the M.

&

C . ' s debt to the state .

He paid the newspaper $7 , 000 to attack

the validity of Tennessee bonds , thus driving down the price and enabling
Wicks to buy them cheaply to retire the debt . 43 Whether he had to pay
the paper to attack McGhee is not known.
42�
Journal , 1871, p . lll .
43Thomas Harrison Baker, The Memphis Commercial Appeal (Baton
Rouge : Louisiana State University Press , 1971) , 125-26.
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The Appe al opened its campaign by praising McGhee as "The most
potent of all the agents at Nashville .
wields .

•

He deserves the power he

He is shrewd, adroit , generous , and, in business transactions ,

trustworthy. " :But , it continued, "He absolutely persuaded himself that
his own, and the interests of the tax-payers of Tennessee are identical
with those of Tom Scott .

If these men, 11 it added, "achieve their plans

how long before there will be little McGhees enough, members of the
General Assembly of Tennessee , not only to define the rates of taxation
as Wall Street dictates but to convene and adjourn the body of law-givers
in accordance with the behest of Tom Scott? 11 44 The Appe al went on to recall Reconstruction, when "McGhee ' s roads reigned at Nashville" and his
New York ring ruined the credit of Tennessee . 4.5 The attacks on "McGhee ' s
conspiracy against the people" became ever more personal .

"The devil on

the mountain offering bribes to our Savior was the impersonation of no
diviner majesty than this of Charles McGhee . " Worse still , he had an
"He sits by Governor :Brown, sleeping
11 46
and waking, and fills a place on the floor of the House .
unholy influence over the governor:

•

•

•

These editorials , with their accusat1ons that East Tennessee ' s
railroads had nearly bankrupted the state, brought Knoxville ' s news
papers into the fight .

The Democratic Press and Herald was indignant ;

47

the Republican Chronicle , though amused at the opposition' s internal
feuding, also came to McGhee ' s defense :
4

�emphis Daily Appeal , October 2.5, 1871. Scott was president of
the Pennsylvania Railroad and a power in the Southern Rai lway Security
Company.
46
4.51Ei£. , October 27 , 1871 .
Ibid. , October 28, 1871.
47 Press and Herald, October 27 , 1871 .
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The Memphis Appeal of Wednesday, devotes well nigh its entire
issue to the benefit of our worthy Representative in the Legis
lature , Hon. C . M. McGhee , and Tom Scott , the Railroad King of
Pennsylvania , and takes occasion to give Governor Brown a
severe dig undei the fifth rib . The Appe al finds fault with
McGhee because he is willing that Scott come in here with his
capital , take charge of and build certain railroads in East
Tennessee , and says Governor Brown has "unconsciously fallen
into the bands of thel3e xemorselel3s railway speculators . " We
have read the editorial , and have come to the conclusion that
Mr. McGhee may be guilty of the charges contained therein,
and yet not be a serious enemy to the prosperity of the State
or his immediate constituents . 48
Other ne�spapers also took McGhee ' s part , the Nashville Republican Banner
remarking that "There is no longer any room for doubt about the Memphis
Appeal ' s insanity. " 49 The Nashville Union and American said that the
attacks had brought to McGhee ' s side his fellow Democrats , "who have
read these attacks with astonishment and seen with pleasure the patience
50 McGhee s patience must have worn thin,
with which he has borne them. ,.
1

however, because the controversy brought him to the brink of a duel
with Wicks .

Only a public letter from Isham G. Harris and J . B . Cooke ,

which said that the. "personal difficulty" between the two men had re
sulted from a misunderstanding, quieted the bitter feud. 5l
What finally settled the affair was an agreement that the Southern
Railway Security Company, which controlled the East Tennessee , should

48 chronicle , October 27 , 1871 .
49Republican Banne r, October 28 , 1871.
50
Nashville � and American, October 31, 1871.
5lPress and Herald , October 29 , 1871 .
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lease the Memphis and Charleston. 52 The

Appea l

did an abiq.pt flip-flop

gave its blesSing to the union, which it asserted would guarantee
the prosperity of Memphis . S 3 The newspapers of the state were sur
prised but amused, S4 and the Press and Herald was jubilant over the

and

Appeal ' s

the

humiliation. "Great Scott , " read the headline which described

Appe a l ' s

about face :

At the opening of the present session of the General Assembly,
or soon thereafter, it will.,be remembered, an unlocked for
outbreak in the office of the Memphis Appea l startled even
the sleeping echoes of the war in Western Tennessee , and
about the halls of legislation in Nashville . The alarming
discovery was made that Tom Scott , the insatiate gobbler of
railroads and purchaser of Legislatures, had foisted an agent ,
in the mild- mannered personage of the very amiable and ex
cellent gentleman from Knox--Col. Ghas. M. McGhee--into the
General Assembly of Tennessee , with the view of buying up the
members , debauching the Governor, pocketing the Treasury, and
stripping the down trodden and poverty stricken people of the
State even to "the last axe and the last hoe and the last
plow, " through the cruel process of taxation, under the
meretricious plea of "State Credit . " All this , Tom Scott ,
through "Charley McGhee"--the blue-eyed charmer of se.d.uctive glfUlces--reinforced by all the "+ittle McGhees"--was
expecteO.. to accomplish ere the, "well meaning" Governor and
the "simple minded" verdants of the Legislature., " fresh from
the people , " as they were , could' be ,aroused to an appreciation
1o f the peril to which their unsophi$ticated virtue was exposed.
The_ apprehensions of the Appea l were terrible and truly "orful
to kontemplate . "
I

The receipt of intelligence at Nashville , on Friday evening,
that Tom Scott--the veritable head-devil of the imaginary
legion of diabolical railroad consp} rators--had actually
S 2 This lease was announced in December, 1871 , and was legally
concluded on March , 1872 . Harrison, Legal History, 751 ; John F. Stover,
� Railroads of theS �' 1865-1900 (Chapel Hill : University of North
Carolina Press, 1955 ) , 116 .
S 3Daily Appe al , December 11 , 1871 .
S 4aepublican Banner and Union � American, December 10 , 1871 .
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"gobbled up" the Memphis and Cbarleston Rai lroad , of
which the well-armed Appeal bas been the unblanching
champion and stalwart protector, was the occasion of no
55
little excitement and merriment
•

•

.

.

There was merriment in the legislature too whe re Representative
Boyd M. Cheatham of Robert son County introduced the following reso lution :
Whereas , Information bas been received by this General
As sembly through the medium of the Memphis papers that
financial arrangements have been successfully consumated
by which the Memphis & Charleston R. R. and its appurten
ances (including, of course , the Memphis Appea l ) and other
valuable and important public institutions , have passed
into the hands , or under the control of "Tom Scott , " and
as the time is near at hand when, under the admirable
financial provisions of the Cons titution of Tennessee ,
the per diem of the members will cease , therefore .
Resolved , That the Speaker of the House be requested to
telegraph said Tom Scott at once , info�ng him of the
state of affairs and ascertaining from him if he bas any
other financial business or legislation to bring before
the General Assembly. I f he has not then we do adjourn
on Friday next at 12 M. 56
The Pre ss � Herald reported that Repre sentative Farrington Snipes of
Madison County moved that the resolution be referred to a special committee of one , "to consist of the Hon. Repre sentative from Knox.
When the report of the committee comes in, let the Appea l , as in duty
now bound , once more shout "Great Scott , " and let all the "little
McGhees" cry "Amen! "

S7

SS
Daily Appea l , December 10 , 1871.
57

Ibid.
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2.
The McGhee-Wicks controversy, while i t dramatized an unfolding
struggle for control of important railroads , was actually a sideshow
to the main event .

And, although McGhee ' s term in the legislature

served to emphasize the close relationship of business and politics ,
his business activities in the 1870 ' s were far more important than his
political ones.

Likewise , his alliance with the group of Northern

capitalists who bought the Knoxville and Kentucky in 1871 was merely
one event in the revolution that was taking place among Southern railroads ; far more crucial was his role in the conversion of the East
Tennessee , Virginia , and Georgia from two short local roads into a
regional system.
McGhee ' s interest in the E . T. & V. and the E. T . & G. seems to
date from about the time of his temporary retirement from the affairs
of the Knoxville and Kentucky.

On June 1) , 1867 ( five months before his

resignation from the presidency of the K. an.d·K. ) , McGhee and five
others�-Thomas H. Callaway, John R. Branner, Richard T. Wilson, Joseph
Jaques , and R. C . Jackson-- formed a partnership to purchase stock in the
two railroads . S8 Their company was capitalized at $200 , 000 , with each
member to hold an equal part .

McGhee , Branner, and Callaway were

authorized to buy the stock , which, though belonging to the partnership ,
would be listed on the books of the railroad companies in the names of
the individual partners .

The intent of the partnership seems to have

58
copy of agreement in Miscellaneous Manuscripts , McClung
Collection.
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been t o prevent competitive bidding for shares in the railroads and to
insure that the stock would be voted in a block at the companies ' annual
meetings . �

9

The latter objective was e specially important because in

March, 186 7 , the legislature had revised the charter of the

E. T.

to permit the vot·ing of holdings in excess of five hundred shares .

& V.

60

It thus became possible for the railroads to be cont rolled by persons
with large blocs

of stock , and control was obviously what the partners

were after.
In 1868 the partners had enough stock to dominate the election of
directors , and Callaway, Jaques , and McGhee joined Branne r on the board
of the

E. T.

& V.

61

A year later they were ready to push for consolida-

tion o f the com�anies .

Branner died in February, 1869 , and Callaway

(already president of the
president of the

E. T .

E. T.

& v.

62

& G . ) was elected to succeed him as

The roads were therefore under the same

management , and on Nbvember 2 9 , stockholders of both companies voted to

consolidate under the title East Tennessee , Virginia , and Georgia Rail
6
road Company. 3

The partnership was apparently dis solved after the

death of Callaway in August , 18 7 0 , and Wilson was e lected to succeed

6
him in the post which he would hold until 188o . 4

Only a few weeks be-

fore Callaway died , McGhee exchanged his four-thousand-acre plantati on
60

Harrison, Legal History, 665- 6 6 .

61

East Tennessee and Virginia Rail Road Company, Annual Report ,
1868 , p . 5 .
62

6

Ibid . , 1869 , pp. 6-8 .

63

Ibid. , 8- 1 3 .

�st Tennes see, Virginia , and Georgia Railroad Company, Annual
Report , 18 7 0 , pp . 4-5 ; Stover, Railroads of the South, 115.
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on the Little Tennessee for Callaway ' s large bloc of railroad stock in
what was one of the most profitable trades of his life .

65

The exchange

sympolized McGhee ' s break with his Old South past and e stablished the
foundation for his fortune and for his career in the New South.
McGhee was now the company' s largest single stockholder, and with
Wilson , Jaques , and Jackson he controlled the East Tennessee .

66

On

October 1 4 , 187 1 , they sold their stock at par value to the Southern
Railway Security Company under an agreement by which the vendors received
their payment in cash and Southern Security stoqk .

67

McGhee probably got

over a thousand shares of stock and about $5 0 , 000 in cash at the outset.
The remainder o f his East Tennessee stock was to be turned over in installments upon the payment of five Southern Security notes to mature at
six , nine , twelve , fifteen, and eighteen-month intervals .

68

Wilson became

6
a director of Southern Security 9 while R. H. Richards of Atlanta and

65

Press and Herald , August 2 3 , 1870 ; Worth S . Ray, Tennessee
Cousins , ! History of Tennessee People (Baltimore : Genealogical Publish
ing Company, 19 60 , 1966) , 404. When this writer first examined the Mc
Ghee Pa�ers in 19 68 , he saw a copy of the agreement with Callaway. This
�uscript was missing, however, in September, 19 70 (after the papers had
been reorganized ) , and cannot be located as of January, 19 74 .
66

·E T . v. &: G. ' ; Annual Report , 1871 , pp. 3 2- 5 8 . McGhee owned
3 , 045 l/4 shares out of a total of approximately 19 � 000 . In September,
1871 , the four partners owned a total o f 8 , 101 3/4 shares , and they
probably cohtrolled enough other shares to make a niaj ority.
..

67
Agreement between Joseph Jaques and Southern Railway Security
Company, October 14 , 187 1 , Joseph Jaques Papers , McClung Collection.
68

69

These details are based on the Jaques agreement .

c . K. Brown , "The l;)outhern Railway Security C ompany, An Early
Instance of the Holding Company, 11 North Carolina Historical Review, VI
', ( 1 9 2 9 ) ' 161 .
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Morris K. Jesup , a New York banker, joined the board of the East Tennes
see , probably to represent the interests of Southern Security. 7

0

The · agreement with Southern Security was profitable t o McGhee and
his associates personally, but it was more important to them for its long
term e ffect .

Actually an alliance between the Southern roads cont rolled

by Southern Security and the East Tennessee , the deal was sealed by the
private financial arrangement with McGhee and the others which amounted
to a bonus for their goodwill toward Southern Security and its other
railroads .

It is clear that Southern Security was much more than a

front for what one historian has called "the Southern ambitions o f the
Pennsylvania Railroad. 11 7

1

To be sure , Thomas A. Scott and his company

were deeply involved in Southern Security; Scott seems t o have envisioned the holding company as the means of putting together a great
Southern line which would connect the Penns ylvania with hi s pro jected
Texas and Pacific Railroad.

In other words , he saw it as the vital link

7
in a transcontinental system. 2

But Southern Security was also the

creation of the Baltimore capitalists , William Thompson Walters and
Benjamin Franklin Newcomer, who were interested in eastern North Carolina lines which were not on Scott ' s route to the Pacific.

Henry Bradley

Plant of Augusta , Georgia , was heavily interested in the Southern Expre ss .

7 0E. T . V. & G . , Annual Report , 18 , pp .
73
7 lStover, Railroads £! � S outh,
99 .

4-5.

72This hypothesis is based on Brown, "The Southern Railway S ecurity
Company" ; C . Vann Woodward , Reunion and Reaction (Boston : Little , Brown,
1966 ) , 68- 100 ; and Julius Grodinsky, Transcontinental Railway Strategy,
1869-� (Philadelphia : University o f Pennsylvania Press , 1 96 2) , 1 7- 27 .
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Company, which had no particular connection with the Pennsylvania.
wise , Morris

Like-

K. Jesup , a New York banker , was not identified with the

Pennsylvania; but like Plant , Newcomer , and Walters he would have a life
long interest in the railroads of the seaboard South. 7 3

Thus Southern

Security was not simply the Pennsylvania Railroad's holding company ; it
was "a pooling of the interests of a number of capitalists who had al
ready invested heavily in Southern railroads. "74
•

McGhee and Wilson saw Southern Security as the means by which

they would try to expand the East Tennessee into an important system in
the South.

The holding company's control of the Richmond and Danville

offered the East Tennessee another connection to the North .

Acting for

the East Tennessee , the two capitalists bought the Cincinnati , Cumberland Gap , and Charleston , which had been foreclosed because of its in
ability to repay its debt to the state of Tennessee. 7 S

The C . C. G. & C.

ran from Morristown on the line of the East Tennessee to Paint Rock on
the North Carolina border where it was supposed to connect with the

7 3The importance of the Baltimore interest in Southern Security
was emphasized by the Baltimore Gazette , November 1 , 18 1 , in a long
7
7
article quoted by the Press and Herald , November 1 9 , 18 1. The Gazette
7
stressed the role of Walters and maintained that the combination of
Southern railroads was basically independent of the Pennsylvania.
Stover in Railroads of the South ignores this possibility. Brown in
"Southern Railway Security Company" states that while the Baltimore
group was probably independent of the Pennsylvania Railroad , its influ
ence in Southern Security was secondary to that of the Pennsylvania. Of
Southern Security's seven directors , however , Walters , Plant , Jesup , and
Wilson had no connection with the Pennsylvania. A strong argument can
therefore be made that Southern Security was more an alliance of men
interested in Southern railroads than a front for the Pennsylvania's
"Southern Ambitions. "
7�rown, "Southern Railway Security Company , " 1 63.
7SHarrison , Legal History,

0 - 10.
7 4
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uncompleted Western North Carolina Railroad.

McGhee and Wilson bought

the title to the latter road with a view to completing it and establishing a major eastern outlet for the East Tennessee .

Such a line

would mean traffic with the Carolinas , and it would also provide a con
nection with the Richmond and Danville . 76 In 1871 the East Tennessee ' s
only northern outlet was at Bristol where the railroad was dependent
upon the Atlantic , Mississippi , and Ohio for transportation to the north
and east ; a connection with the Richmond and Danville would offer an
alternative to this route and would greatly increase the leverage of
the East Tennessee in traffic negotiations with the A . M. & 0 .
Equally important t o the East Tennessee was the security of its
western flank which depended upon a connection at Chattanooga with the
Memphis and Charleston.

This was the reason for the East Tennessee ' s

attempt to control the M. & C .

McGhee and Wilson might have accomplished

this easily, had not Wicks resisted it and set off a commotion in the
Memphis Appe al .

As it was , he raised the alarm and probably delayed by

several months the lease of the M. & C . to Southern Security.

The Wicks

Appea l assault on "Great [ Tom] Scott and all the little McGhees" was the
opening shot of the conflict provoked by McGhee ' s and Wilson ' s ambitious
alliance with Southern Security.

In this conflict Wicks was for a time

the ally of the colorful and combative ex-Confederate general , William
Mahone , president of the Atlantic , Mississippi , and Ohio .
That there was bad blood between Wilson and McGhee and the general
as early as 1868 is shown by a letter in the Mahone papers in which

86
Wilson wrote to Callaway about the possibility of removing Mahone from
his presidency. 77 Wilson was interested in replacing Mahone with Joseph
Jaques , who , before becoming vice president of the East Tennessee , was
in charge of the salt works at Saltville , Virginia. 78 How the letter
came into Mahone s hands is not known, but it must have further em1

bittered

him

against the men who were about to turn his southwestern

flank and who he felt had betrayed

him

.

Mahone maintained that in late

June of 1871 he had agreed to pay McGhee and Wilson $1 , 000 , 000 for
10 , 000 shares of East Tennessee stock.

During August , he said, the

three men had consulted about "the progress of

my

negotiations and the

programme for the new organization of their Road which was to follow
under

my

purchase [ . ] " On August 24, Wilson had written a friend that

"we have seen Mahone and he has not got his money yet .

We leave for

Knoxville and shall stop over in Philadelphia to see Scott . " On September 28 Mahone and Wicks met in New York
of the sale to Scot t .

and

the latter reported rumors

Mahone sent Wicks to see Wilson; Wicks reported

back that "the negotiations with Scott was not closed. " Then

Mahone

offered " to take the entire stock of the Company (which might be offered
for sale ) at par $100 .
This proposition was made to Wilson (in his official capa
city as President to be submitted to his shareholders) on
Saturday Sept 30th or Monday Oct 2d. Wilson ' s reply to Wicks
was : "There is no use to submit any such proposition to the

77Wilson to Callaway, October 29 , 1868 , William Mahone Papers ,
Duke University Library, Durham, N. C .
78Ibid. ; Press and Herald, June 1 , 1871.
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stockholders , McGhee Jaques Jackson and myself hold a
majority and we have sold to Scott . " 7 9
Mahone was furious and decided to make an open fight , attempting
!

to arouse public opinion against what he called "the Ring. "

;

"It would

seem, " he wrote Wicks , "that there is no contentment to their craw, how
much do they want? Exterminate them or expel them from your state , " he
advised, "or you will be everlastingly mined in moral as well as in
substance . We can beat them yet if we only will do it . 11 80 Wicks , however, made his peace with McGhee and Wilson.

The M. & C . was leased to

Southern Security in March, 1872 , and the little general was left almost
alone to fight "the Ring. " 81
Mahone ' s natural allies ( such as they were ) consisted of a few
dissatisfied stockholders in the East Tennessee and residents of Bristol ,
where the East Tennessee met Mahone ' s road.

The Bristol News , reporting

rumors of the sale to Southern Security, was alarmed at the prospect :
They [McGhee and Wilson] are said to have sold to that Cor
poration their own stock at par, stipulating that they are to
be kept in office for the consideration that the Memphis and
Charleston road be cut off from its connection, and Mahone
from his Western connections , thus destroying the through
business of both lines and converting them into mere local
roads . Nay, More ! They were offered par for the entire
stock of the road, thus saving all the stockholders and pre
serving the whole interests of both States, but they refused
and left the large minority bound hand and foot . We wish
we could pronounce these only rumors . Alas they seem well
authenticated. We wish it only could astound the people to

79
Mahone to Abram Fulkerson, September l , 1872 ; Memorandum,
Letterbook 1 9 , p . 378, Mahone Papers .
80
Mahone to Wicks , October 30 , 1871 , ibid.
81Harr�son,
� History, 751 .
0

88
whom we speak. :But it will strike them with a dismay which
we hope will cause them to arise in their legislative might
to save themselves from a plot that implies their ruin. 82
Knoxville and Morristown newspapers , however, were delighted by the sale ,
predicting that it would significantly enhance the prosperity of those
towns and speed the development of all the surrounding country. 83
Mahone took the battle to the East Tennessee ' s annual meeting in
November, 1872.

Here the stockholders were apparently unimpressed by

his offer to buy all the shares at par, and a resolution commending the
company' s directors and officers was passed by a share vote of 15 , 346 3/4
to 599 3/4. 84 Though Mahone steadfastly maintained that he had made an
agreement to buy the McGhee and Wilson stock at par, he attacked the two
85
for having made a sale to Southern Security on these iO.emt'rcal terms .
This inconsistency was perhaps not lost on the East Tennessee ' s minority
holders who refused to support his attempts to unseat the McGhee-Wilson
regime .
De feated at the stockholders meeting, Mahone carried the battle
A suit was brought against McGhee , Wilson, and other
86
directors and officers by several owners of East Tennessee share s .
into the courts .

Mahone was in close communication with the plaintiff' s attorney, James T .
Shields , and i t is clear that the action was designed to win for Mahone
82:Bristol News , as quoted in Press and Herald, October 14, 187 1 .
8 3 Ibid. ;
Chronicle , October 27 , 1871 ; Morristown Gazette , as
quoted in�ss and Herald, November 4, 1871 .
8
� . T . V . & G. , Annual Report , 1872 , p . 6 .
85
Mahone t o Fulkerson, September 1 , 1872, Mahone Papers .
86
neaderick v. Wilson, 67 Tennessee ( 1874) 108-41 .

89
8
in the courts what could not be won in a vote of the stockholders . 7
The suit asked that the sale to Southern Security be set aside , and ,
failing this , that McGhee , Wilson , Jaq_ues , and Jackson "be held to
account to the stockholders from whom they purchased [ shares] for all
88
In addition
profits made and realized by said purchase and sale . "
it was urged that the acquisition of the Western North Carolina Railroad
should be set aside because the East Tennessee's charter did not permit
8
the purchase of railroads outside Tennessee . 9
While this suit made its way through the courts , Mahone considered an attack on the political front .

He seriously entertained a

proposal by Rolfe Saunders of Knoxville to set up a newspaper to expose
the "Evil Doers who have held high carnival in their monetary triumphs
of greed and gain
"90 Working through Shields and N. L. York and
•

•

•

•

Abram Fulkerson , lawyers of Bristol , Mahone expressed himself as ready
l
to subsidize a paper for this purpose . 9 Saunders went so far as to
visit former President Andrew Johnson at Greeneville to discuss the
project :
I told him that in politics it would be eminently independ
ent , upon a Constitutional , Conservative platform. Then I
advised with him as to the policy , in carrying out the plans
we discussed , of making everything bend to the material
interests of East Tennessee , bursting "rings" &c. of the
87

Shields to Mahone , September 11 , 1873 , Mahone Papers .
88
89
neaderick y. Wilson , 111-12 .
Ibid. , 130.
9 °saunders to Mahone , April 23 , 1873 , Mahone Papers .
9 �hone to N. L York , June 19 , 1873 , ibid.

90
probability & necessity of taking the people ' s side in the
railroad fight ; and he said it would be the strong side &
the one to win. 92
But despite Johnson' s interest and moral support the newspaper never progressed beyond the talking stage , perhaps because of the way in which
the law suit was decided.

The first judge who heard it decided against

the Mahone party, and it was appealed to the Tennessee supreme court .
In September, 1874, the justices ruled against all the petitions except the one which asked the dissolution of the Western North Carolina
purchase .

On that point the court agreed that the East Tennessee had
no right to buy an out-of- state railroad, and the sale was voided. 93
Thus Mahone did postpone the nightmare of a diversion of the East
Tennessee ' s traffic to the Richmond and Danville .
The decision was a victory of sorts for Mahone , but not a real
defeat for McGhee and Wilson.

By the time the purchase of the Western

North Carolina was annulled, the nation was gripped by a business de
pression and Southern Security was in dissolution. 94 It is not likely
that the connection with the Richmond and Danville could have been made
under the circumstances .

Actually Mahone may have over-reacted to the

threat of the East Tennessee ' s diversion into North Carolina, for this
route · was simply inferior to that over the Atlantic , Mississippi and
Ohio , later the Norfolk and Western. 95 The East Tennessee did not get

92 saunders to "Gentlemen, " May 24, 1873 , ibid.
93Deaderick y. Wilson, 132-33 ·
9

4:arown,

"Southern Railway Security Company, " 164-69 .

95Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 174, 214.

91
its Carolina connection until 1881 , and even then the old route through
Virginia remained the East Tennessee ' s principal outlet to the ports and
96
cities of the North and East .
In fact , when the old Southern Security
alliance was resurrected in 1887 as the Richmond and West Point Terminal
system, McGhee would fight against an interruption of the East Tennes
see ' s traffic over the Norfolk and Western. 97
Neither McGhee and Wilson nor the East Tennessee were firmly
wedded to Southern Security, and there must have been little dismay in
East Tennessee when the holding company fell apart . 98 Mahone may have
been correct when in 187 3 he observed that Southern Security was in a
state of disintegration, and that "I suspect that Wilson is waiting for
and helping to this end , when they will pocket what has been paid on
account & repossess themselves of the stock they undertook to selL " 99
Something like this must have happened because at some time between
1873 and 1876 Southern Security divested itself of the East Tennessee
100
sto·ck.
This may have occurred in the spring of 1874 when the holding
company' s lease of the Memphis & Charleston was terminated by mutual
consent .

By this time , however, the East Tennessee had taken over the

96Harrison, Legal History, 709-10.
97Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 214- 15 .
98R. T . Wilson t o Joseph Jaques , July 0 , 1872 , Jaques Papers .
3
This letter reinforces the view that Wilson, McGhee , Jaques , and the
East Tennessee were accustomed to taking action independently o f
Southern Security.
99Mahone to York, September 19 , 1873 , Mahone Papers .
100
Brown, "Southern Railway Security Company, " 169.

92
management

of the M. & C .

Wilson became president o f the latter road
in October, 1874, and it remained a satellite of the East Tennessee . 101
The collapse of Southern Security, then, did not disturb the
dominance of McGhee and Wil son in the East Tennessee .

While depression

raged and the Pennsylvania Railroad was forced by its shareholders to
give up its interest in the holding company, 102 the East Tennessee remained solvent .

The same economic contraction which destroyed Southern

Security forced Mahone ' s railroad into receivership and removed him from
its affairs forever, 103 which must have been a relief to the East Tennessee ' s managers .

McGhee and Wilson came out of the Southern Security

affair with their fortunes augmented and with the strength of their
railroad certainly increased.

They had made valuable iriendships with

some Northern capitalists ( especially the non-Pennsylvanians , Jesup,
Newcomer, and Walters ) who continued to take an interest in the East
Tennessee.

They had gained control of the Memphis and Charleston and

were more deeply entrenched in the East Tennessee , an embryonic system
which now stretched from the Virginia border through four states to the
Mi
. . . RlVer.
"
104
SSlSSlppl

101Stover, Railroads of the South, 116- 17.
102Brown, "Southern Railway Security Company, " 164-67 .
103 stover, Railroads of the South, 1
3 8-39·
10�or a map of the East Tennessee system, see Figure 1 .
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Figure 1 .

Map o f the East Tennessee , Virginia,

Georgia Railroad and its connections , circa 1890 .
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McGhee' s financial operations in the decade after the Civil War
made him one of Tennessee' s richest men.
is difficult to establish precisely .

Just how rich he was, however,

In 1868 a Knoxville newspaper pub

lished the names and income s of the town' s wealthiest citizens.

105

This

information was derived from the federal income tax rolls and wa s probably an indication if not a positive gauge of the wealth of these individuals.

On

this scale McGhee ranked seventh with an income of $6, 578. 61.

The largest income reported was $13, 929 . 15, earned by a lawyer, Oliver
Perry Temple .

McGhee was still in the pork packing business in 1868,

106

and he was president and a principal stockholder of the People' s Bank of
Knoxville.

107

Beside s these and his railroad interests, he was active in

real estate and was developing a new manufacturing and residential area,
called McGhee' s Addition, ad jacent to the terminal of the Knoxville and
Kentucky Railroad.

108

During the next few years he certainly made large

amounts of money through his speculation in Tennessee bond s and rai lroad
stock.
By 1872 he was ready to build a mansion to house his growing family
and perhaps to symbolize his standing as one of the city's richest men.
l05
Knoxville Daily Herald, May 24, 1868 .
106
Ibid . , December 14, 1867, February 23, 1868; Pres s and Herald,
December 1�875.
l07
Rule, Standard History of Knoxville, 253.
108

Daily Herald, April 9, 1868 . This area is northwest of the
central business district and i s presently in the angle formed by Inter
state highways 40 and 75.
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The house was Italianate in style , had fourteen large rooms , and was
described as a "palatial mansion. 11 109 It sat on the crest of a hill a
few blocks from Knoxville ' s business district , and the yard and gardens
covered a full city block.

Though he grew much richer during the next

thirty years , McGhee was apparently not tempted to build even more impressive houses .

For years he did maintain a roomy but not ostentatious

country home on a farm several miles east of the city, but , with the
exception of his residence in New York hotels and his visits to various
resort s , the mansion that he built in 1872 remained his home for the
rest of his life .

Here his five daughters grew up , and here he and his

wife entertained on a scale that was considered lavish by Knoxville ' s
standards .

When President Rutherford Hayes toured the South in 1877 he

stopped at Knoxville where McGhee gave the principal entertainment at
hi s horne . 110 Six hundred people were invited to the reception and many
more came to troop through the house , meet the president , and wander
through the grounds which were "ablaze with gas light s . "

In the garden

a platform accommodated as many as a hundred dancing couples ; the band
played far into the night during what was called 11the most recherche
.
ent erta�nmen
�n
.
t ever g�ven
. Knoxv�. ll e . 11 111
What made this splendor and luxury possible was , o f course , MeGhee s connection with the growing East Tenness,e e , Virginia , and Georgia
1

and his close association with Richard Wilson and Joseph Ja�ues .
they formed the triumvirate which controlled that railroad.

Together

In 1872

l09Press and Herald, June 2, 1872 . The house still stands at
SOS Locust Street although it has been extensively remodeled.
111 Ibid.
110ch
. l e , September 22 , 1877.
ron�c
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Wilson was president , McGhee was vice president , and Jaques was vice
. tendent 112 The cooperation of each was
presl" dent and genera 1 superln
•

essential to the maintenance of control , and no one realized this more
acutely than Wilson, who operated in New York where he could observe
the habits of Wall Street ' s wolves , as well as the activities of its
bulls and bears .

Ever watchful for signs of trouble , Wilson was worried

when he heard of a development which threatened the unity of the tri
umvirate . His letter11 3 on this subject to Jaques reveals much about
the relationship of the three men :
I see from a notice published in the papers a new bank is to
be had. I am heartily glad of it , and hope you may make it
the means of contributing to the business int erests of East
Tenn. I see however that Charley and .myself are left out in
the cold. So far as I am c oncerned, this wouldent [ sic] make
any difference , but will it be the case with Charley? Wont
their [ sic] be conflict of interest and danger of severing
the close-relations hitherto existing[ ? ]
I fear there will. �
Now you know we have stood by each
other, and if anything' occurred likely to make a breach in the
Cabinet , other members not so directly e ffected [ sic] have sug
gested plans of harmony and the result has been in all our
undertakings we have had more or less success [ . ] Every day of
my life brings more forcibly to my mind the great merit of
united action and without any intimation from McGhee as to
whether such a thing would suit him or not , allow me to suggest to you in confidence , whether or not it wouldent be well
to try and merge his bank into yours and increase your capital ,
so that you could establish agencies from Bristol to Memphis [ . ]
The business of the line of road which we shall be able to con
trol if we stick together, would of itself, be a good basis to
start to bank on. McGhee , if he quits politics would be a most
admirable man to place at the head of the bank [ ; ] he has quali
fications for a thing of that kind of considerable merit , and with
the aid of counsel which he could receive from a properly
•

•

112E. T . V. & G . , Annual Report , 1872 , p . 2 .
ll 3Wilson to Jaques , July 30, 187 2, Jaques Papers .
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organized board w�uld make a success of it and let me say to
you just here that it is not every man who is fit to manage
a bank. If you can so arrange matters- -and knowing your
ability as well as I do in the capacity of a compromise man
I believe you can get up a plan which will not be likely to
clash with any one's interest[ . ]

-

Jaques may have taken Wilson's advice and made room in the new
East Tennessee National Bank for McGhee, but the suggestion of merging
the two banks under the latter's presidency was not carried out .
thre.e men continued to

run

114

The

the railroad until 1876 when Jaques retired

as vice president and superintendent though he remained on the board of
directors.

McGhee then assumed Jaques' duties and for the next seven

years he was active in the direct management of the East Tennessee.

115

As vice president and superintendent he oversaw the day- to-day operation
of the East Tennessee and its satellites, leaving most of the financial
management to Wilson who in turn relied heavily on the advice of Walters
and Jesup, two of the Northern ·directors.

116

In his new capacity, McGhee had to face labor difficulties during
a business recession in 1877 which touched off strikes across the nation.
He won the praise of newspapers and working men when he ordered the wages
of Memphis and Charleston shop employees restored to their pre-recession
11
�cGhee is listed in Knoxville city directories as president of
the People's Bank until 1884. In 1887 he appears in the city directory
as a member of the board of the East Tennessee National Bank.
ll 5
E . T V & G. , Annual Report, 1876- 18 79; according to H. V.
Poor's Manual of the Railroads of the United States, 1880-1884 . McGhee
remained as vice president of the East Tennessee until 188 3 . He was a
director of the East Tennessee until the company was absorbed by the
Southern Railway in 1895 .
.

.

116
see, for example, Wilson to Walters, October 28, 1879, and to
McGhee, October J l, 1879, McGhee Papers.
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levels.

His old critic the Memphis Appeal observed that "Had the

officers and employees of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad acted in the
same spirit as has characterized Vice President McGhee and the employees
of the Charleston road , in all probability the country would have been
spared the dreadful drama which has not yet closed. 11

117

Later, in a

newspaper interview, McGhee said that he would have to cut wages if
busine ss worsened, and he complained. of the difficulty of being a rail
road

manager

during hard time s .

118

He had answers , however, for the cur-

rent troubles :
Remonetize silver; build the Southern Pacific Railroad ; re
lieve the Mexican Government of that part of her territory
which is so distant f�om the seat of government as to render
neither its control pleasant or its possession desirable , and
we will not
hear of any more trouble with labor. We do
not need more territory
but as this joins us , it would
be better, perhaps , to take it . ll9
•

•

•

o

o

•

Whatever these simplistic solutions may have been worth, they do
not do justice to McGhee ' s skill as an execu�ive in difficult time s .
During the years 1871-80 when McGhee , Wilson, and Jaque s controlled the
East Tennessee , other companies whose lines comprised half of the rail
road mileage in the South went into receivershipo

120

Beset by recession

and yellow fever epidemics which paralyzed trade along much of its route ,
the East Tennessee remained solvent and even
121
o "
d�v� dends .

managed

to pay several

At the same time , the partners were able t o think of

ll7
As quoted in Knoxville Tribune , July 29 , 1877- The "dreadful
drama" refers to the violent national labor trouble of 1877 .
118
120
121

Ibid. , August 28 , 1877 .

119

Ibid .

stover, Railroads of the South, 124- 25 .

E. T . V. & G. , Annual Report , 1876- 1879 .
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expansion .

They negotiated for the East Tennessee a new twenty-year

lease of the Memphis and Charleston and proceeded to arrange for the
repayment of the latter road 1 s debt to the state.

McGhee and Wilson

personally agreed to buy one half of the bonds floated for this pur
1
pose, and the M. & C . was at last freed from the state debt . 22

At

the same time they engaged in negotiations with the L. & N . for a connection between that railroad and the Knoxville and Ohio at the Kentucky
1
state line , 2 3

and they urged the governor of North Carolina to complete

the Western North Carolina Railroad to a junction with the Morristown
1 4
branch of the East Tennessee. 2

Though neither of these projects bore

fruit until after 1880 they were important elements in the partners'
strategy during the l870 1 s .
Another evidence of their ambitions for the East Tennessee was
their interest in a southern expansion in Georgia and Alabama.

In 1879

McGhee proposed the purchase of the franchise of the bank�pt Georgia and
Western which would provide the East Tennessee a means of entering Atlanta
1 5
independent of its Dalton connection with the Western and Atlantic . 2
Perhaps because of Wilson's conservatism the East Tennessee lost the
1 6
opportunity and the franchise went to the L. & N . 2

Shortly thereafter,

1

22Harrison, � History, 756- 58 ; Commercial and Financial
Chronicle, XXIV (1877) , 565, 614.
1 3
2 Wilson to William Ernst, July

23

, 1880, McGhee Papers .

1 4
2 wilson to Zebulon Vance, November 17, 1877, ibid.

1 5
2 Wilson to McGhee, October 31, 1879, ibid .
1 6
2 wilson to McGhee, December 16, 1879, ibid .
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however, the partners acquired the Selma , Rome , and Dalton , which
stretched 236 miles from north Georgia into central Alabama and gave
the East Tennessee a substantial branch in the direction of New
Orleans .

127

Simultaneously they began to move toward buying the Macon

and Brunswick , a railroad which in a few years would add to the East
·

T ennessee a l 1ne
.
. t o the port o f B runsw1c k
across the s t at e o f Georg1a

•

128

In the midst of this expansion, a change occurred which had great
significance for both McGhee and the East Tennessee .

Richard T . Wilson

resigned the presidency on May 27 , 1880, and though it was said that he
would continue as " financial agent and

mana

ging director of the road , "

he left the board of directors in November and within a year had with
drawn completely from the East Tennessee .

129

Elected president in Wil-

son 1 s stead was Edmund W. Cole who had been just ousted as head of the
Nashville , Chattanooga, and Saint Louis by the managers of the L. & N.

l30

There is no ready explanation of why Wilson stepped down or what brought
about the termination of his connection with the East Tennessee .

Per-

haps , as one historian has guessed, he found the pre sidency "an intolerable burden. 11

He may also have found that his conservatism put

him

of tune with the times and with some of the company' s stockholders .

out

131

127
Wilson bought the Selma , Rome , and ' Dalton .in ' l880 on behalf
of a syndicate and sold it a year later at a profit to 'the East Tennes
see . Harrison, Legal History, 807- 12.
·

128
Papers .

Ibid . , 840-52 ; Wilson to McGhee , February 3 , 1880 , McGhee

129

commercial and Financial Chronicle , XXX ( 1880 ) , 567 ; Poor,
Manual of Rai lroads , 188 1 , p . 449 .
l30
Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 119 .

l3l

ibid. , 119-22.
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Whatever the reasons for the dissolution of the old partnership , the
business and personal relationship between McGhee and Wilson remained
close .

McGhee , however, remained as vice president and a director,

and when his connection with the company took

him

to New York to live

and involved him in diverse enterprise s , his int erest remained focused
on the East Tennessee for the rest of its corporate life .

With the

passing of Wilson from the company, the Commercial and Financial Chronicle
praised his management and that of McGhee during the troubled decade of
the seventies :
Under Mr. Wilson ' s administration the property was placed in
a high state of efficiency and the indebtedness very much
reduced. It is proper to state t�t the results mentioned
were achieved, not through any stock jobbing manipulations
but wholly through good business management . l32
The accession of Cole to the presidency is almost as imponderable
as the abdication of Wilson, but the difference in the men ' s styles was
immediately apparent . Cole had a reputation as a flashy and expansive
operator. 1 33 During the eighteen months of his presidency he completed
the purchase of the Knoxville and Ohio , the Macon and Brunswick , and the
Selma, Rome , and Dalton, and undertook several other improvements and
extensions of the East Tennessee .

In May, 188 1 , he revealed the formu-

lation of a syndicate to convert the East Tennessee into a huge southern
system.

Although Cole made the announcement it is not certain that he

was the architect of the developments that brought a new group of

1 3 2 commercial and Financial Chronicle , XXXI I I ( 1881 ) , 553 .
l33Except where otherwise noted, the following discussion of the
reorganization of the East Tennessee , Virginia, and Georgia is based on
Maury Klein rs masterful study, . Great · Rl.cbmond Terminal , 119-45 .
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l
Northern capitalists into the East Tenne sse e . 34

Some time in

1880 o r

1881 a group o f New York investors came together to e stablish a major
east-west railroad , the New York, Chicago , and Saint Louis , familiarly
known as the "Nickel Plate . "

Soon thereafter the same group became

involved in the East Tenne ssee .
Three men were the kingpins of the syndicate .

George I . Seney,

president of the Metropolitan Bank of New York City, enjoyed a reputation as a sound and conservative financier, but he was soon to be
transformed into a reckless plunger and spe culator.

Samuel Thomas and

Calvin Sellars Brice were Ohioans whose successes in railroad , indust rial ,
and real estate venture s made them powers in New York financial circles .
An iron manufacturer who rose to brigadier general in the Union army,
Thomas was a Republican.

Brice was a lawyer whose remarkable career in

business did not deter him from serving as chai rman of the Democratic
National Committee in

1888 and United States Senator from Ohio , 1891- 97·

Both Brice and Thomas "pursued the simple principle that politics existed
l
primarily for the protection of personal financial interests11 3.5

__

a

philosophy which they shared with McGhee who became their close friend
and busines s associat e .

lJ

�lein notes in � . , 120 , no . 12 , the assumption that Cole
brought the Seney syndicate into the East Tenne.ssee is based on circum
stantial evidence . In view o f Cole ' s swift departure from the East
Tenne ssee in 1882 , it might be assumed that McGhee (who remained a
power in the company) had a closer relationship with the Seney syndi
cate than Cole did . McGhee ' s papers in the period 1881-8.5 are very
sparse , and there is no evidence in them to shed light on this question .
l 5
J Ibid. , 3 1 .

10 3
As quickly as he had come into the East Tennessee , E. W. Cole
left it .

Maury Klein , in his searching analysis of the railroads that

made up the Richmond Terminal system, reasons that "The liaison between
Cole and the Seney syndicate [ was] never entirely comfortable .

•

•

11

Cole he characterizes as "an individualistic empire builder, " who
thought primarily in terms of the system itself and its needs .
The syndicate , however, regarded the company as but one
of many interests and weighed its demands carefully in the
balance with the claims of other projects. Neither had any
strong personal or regional loyalty to the system but Cole
could devote himself more completely to its welfare . In
that sense his ties to the East Tennessee were largely per
sonal while those of the syndicate were almost purely finan
cial . l 3 6
The departure of Cole and the subsequent

mana

gerial changes , Klein ar-

gue s , "crystalized a growing separation of financial and ope rational
control. 11 1 3 7
All of which may be true , though it does not explain how McGhee ,
who had strong regional , financial , and personal interests in the East
Tennessee , weathered the transition.

In fact no explanation is possible

except that McGhee seems to have developed a Darwinian ability to evolve
and adapt to new circumstances .

Through the many changes which the

company underwent between 186 7 and 1882 , McGhee alone retained his influence and position.

His old partners , Jackson and Jaques , his long

time "twin, " Wilson, and finally his recent associate , Cole--all dropped
out one by one leaving McGhee as the single personal link between the
company' s past and its future .

But if by 1882 he had already demon-

strated a remarkable tenacity and an ability to survive the changes

l 3 6Ibid. , 126.

13 7 Ibid. , 127 .
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which were affecting southern railroads , the next decade would prove
him a prodigy in this regard.
Under the Seney syndicate the transformation of the East Tennessee proceeded at a dizzying pace .

The company' s stock was listed on the

New York Stock Exchange , making it possible for the
in quick lucrative transactional speculations .

managers

to engage

Samuel Thomas succeeded

Cole as president , McGhee assumed the title of first vice president ,
and Henry Fink, a professional railroad
vice president and general

manager.

man,

was brought in as second

The Seney syndicate sold its Nickel

Plate investment for a good profit and deepened its interest in the East
Tenne ssee ; soon McGhee and his Knoxville friend and protege , E. J . Sanford, were the only Tennesseans on a board of directors dominated by
New Yorkers . 1 38
The new infusion of Yankee capital made acquisitions possible and
opened the prospect of further expansion, all , however, at a heavy price
to the East Tennessee .

On

February 2) , 188 1 , the company was mortgaged

for $10 , 000 , 000 by its new masters , but by June these bonds were considered insufficient to continue the expansion, and a new $22 , 000 , 000
issue replaced the earlier mortgage .

At the same time a second mortgage

issue of income bonds worth $16 , )00 , 000 was authorized, and finally in
March, 188 3 , an additional $2 , 000 , 000 of bonds covering extensions and a
new Atlanta terminal were floated. l39 "Float" is perhaps the exact term,
l38E. W. Cole was re-elected to the board in 188 along with Mc
3
Ghee and Sanford. In 1884 Cole was dropped, leaving the two Knoxvillians
as the only Tennesseans on the board of directors .
l 39
Harrison,
History, 677-80 .
�

lOS
for by this time it was becoming apparent that these financial exertions
°
represented a heavy watering of securities. 14 The East Tennessee simply
could not stand such a heavy burden of fixed interest charges .

In order

to meet these costs and make the mortgages appear bearable , capital
expenditures , improvements , and even good maintenance were sacrificed.
�here is no evidence that McGhee objected to these policies which in the
If he

normal course of administration he must have helped to implement .

did have reservations he probably suppressed them, realizing that he did
not have the power to alter the course set by the Seney syndicate .
The money panic o f May, 1884, precipitated a crisis for the East
Tennessee .

George Seney' s Metropolitan Bank suspended payment , leaving

the East Tennessee bereft of its maj or source of credit .

Without the

timely loans from the bank, the - railroad was unable to pay its fixed
charges of interest and bond retirement .

In his exposed position Seney

could not help the East Tennessee , so Brice , Thomas , McGhee , and several
other directors subscribed at face value an issue of $1 , 200 , 000 in 6 percent debenture bonds ; the cash from these bonds eased the East Tennessee ' s immediate crisis and forestalled the company' s bankruptcy.

The

prompt action by the directors was , as the Commercial and Financial
C:hronicle remarked, "uniq_ue in this respect--it happening so seldom
that members will apply their own resources to sustain the property with
which they are identified. " l4l The subscribers , led by Brice and Thomas ,
140
Henry Clews , a contemporary financial analyst , condemned this
watering of securities in T enty-Eight Years in Wall Street (New York :
Irvine Publishing Co. , 1887 ' 164.
141commercial and Financial Chronicle ,
XXXIX ( 1884) , 168-69 , as
q_uoted in Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 13.5 .

)
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now began to emerge as a faction opposed to Seney' s continued domination of the East Tennessee .

:By their "unique" and generous response

to the company' s difficulties they

managed

to separate themselves , in

the public mind at least , from the ruinous and somewhat shady Seney
policies.

Though they may have been equally culpable with Seney, the

:Brice-Thomas faction now seemed a respectable alternative to the discredited New York banker.
Early in 1885 the East Tennessee ' s management entered into bankruptcy proceedings and secured the appointment of Henry Fink, the company' s general
same

manager,

management

as receiver.

Thus the road remained under the

even in bankruptcy, but at the annual stockholder� '

meeting at Knoxville in November, George Seney made his move to oust
the :Brice-Thomas faction from the company.

Seney' s attorney appeared

with enough proxies to control the election of directors , whe reupon
:Brice

managed ,

by citing a technicality, to have the meeting adjourned

until March, 1886 .

Warfare between the factions was now open, and the

:Brice-Thomas group hastened to consolidate its position.

Aboard "ele-

gant" pul lman cars :Brice , Thomas , McGhee , and their allies proceeded to
Huntsville , Alabama , for the annual meeting of the Memphis and Charlest on. 142 There they made sure of their control of that vital subsidiary
of the East Tennessee by electing a board which included McGhee and two
of his sons-in-law, Calvin M. McClung and David Shelby Williams .

142 chronicle , November 12 , 1885 .

The
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new board then made McGhee and Brice president and vice president of
the M. & c . 143
Though Seney controlled a majo�ity of the East Tennessee ' s common stock, the Brice-Thomas faction had more consols , or first mortgage
bonds .

In the fight to reorganize the company the bonds were a far

more important weapon than the stock, and the bondholders therefore
selected a reorganization committee composed of McGhee ; Robert Fleming,
a Scottish investor representing foreign bondholder&; Frederick P. Ol
cott ,

president of the Central Trust Company af New York ; George

Warren Smith of the Kountze Brothers brokerage firm ; E. W. Corlies ,
vice president o f the Bank o f America ; and Frederick D . Tappen, president of the Gallatin National Bank.

McGhee 1 s membership on this com-

mittee of financiers demonstrated his importance in the Brice-Thomas
faction ; it also indicated that the plan drawn by the committee would
likely be favorable to the faction which he represented.
The Olcott plan, as it was called, was in fact tailor-made for
the Brice-Thomas offensive against Seney.

It combinea "a masterpiece

of partisan calculation" with a thoroughgoing reform of the bloated
financial structure of the East Tennessee .

To the detriment of Seney,

the plan called for a drastic sacrifice of the company' s equity which
was represented by the capital stock.

Income bondholders were also to ,

be forced to accept second preferred stock in lieu of their bonds .

The

consol , or first mortgage holders , however, would receive some new bonds
as well as potentially valuable first preferred stock .

l43Poor,
Manual of Railroads , 1886, p . 188 .

For good measure
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the h6lders of first :preferred were allowed to elect a majority of the
company' s board for five years , or until two consecutive S percent dividents were :paid on their stock.
The Olcott plan won the praise of disinterested observers and was
rapidly accepted by the first mortgage holders .

The owners of income

bonds , however, brought a suit to block the sale of the railroad and its
reorganization under the Olcott plan which demanded a heavy sacrifice
on their part .

The legal action came before McGhee ' s close friend, United

States Circuit Judge Howell Jackson, who held against the plaintiffs and
ordered that the sale should continue . 144 The last obstacle to the reorganization was thus removed, and the victor,y o f the Brice-Thomas faction was assured.
In the reorganization of the East Tennessee , McGhee achieved a
:personal as well as a financial triumph.

He was now virtually a full

partner with Brice and Thomas in the group which now controlled the East
Tennessee .

His role in these affairs was now too important to permit him

to continue to live in Knoxville , and in the fall of 1886 he moved to New
York where he had spent much of his time during the preceding year.

In-

stalled in living quarters at the Murray Hill Hotel , he carried on business at number 10 Wall Street in the building where Brice and Thomas also

l44
Jackson had just been appointed to fill a vacancy on the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals caused by the death of Judge John Baxter of
Knoxville . On April ll, 1886 , A . J . Ricks , clerk of the Circuit Court
for the northern district of Ohio , wrote to McGhee asking him to urge
Jackson ' s appointment . "I know you are intimate with the Senator, "
wrote Ricks , "and have influence with the President . Can you not use
your influence to induce Mr. Jackson to take this o ffice?" McGhee
Papers .
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had offices.

The syndicate controlled 60 , 000 of the East Tennessee ' s

110 , 000 first preferred shares , and McGhee ' s portion was about 6 , 000
shares . 145 The partners now had the power to deliver in a neat bundle
the controlling interest of the East Tennessee to anyone who would
care to pay for it .
They were in an enviable situation because at least two other
railroad companies were deeply interested in having the East Tennessee .
The Norfolk and Western had long enjoyed profitable connections with� the
East Tennessee ; their combined lines formed one of the great transregional systems .

The alliance between the two , called the Virginia ,

Tennessee , and Georgia Air Line , provided an important commercial route
linking the North and the South. 146 East of the Appalachians , and almost parallel to the East Tennessee , were the group of lines under the
control of the Richmond and Danville Railroad.

The Danville was the pre-

eminent property of a polding company, the Richmond and West Point Terminal .

The boards of directors of the Danville and the Terminal largely

overlapped, and together they constituted a system which was in direct
l47 On the question
competition with the East Tennessee at many points .
of whether the East Tennessee should be merged with its longtime ally or
its natural enemy McGhee had a definite preference :

he hoped to see his

l45Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 173 ; manuscript stock ledger,
McGhee Papers .
l46Joseph
T . Lambie , From Mine to Market , the History of Coal
Transportation gn the Norfolk and Western Railway-r:New York : New York
University Press , 1954) , lll-12 .
l47Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 86- 114, 174-75.

no
company go to the Norfolk and Western.

148

The Air Line route , he felt ,

was far too valuable and well established to be interrupted.

Moreover,

the N. & W. was strongly interested in developing the resources along it s
line .

It had found its way into the rich coal and coke producing area

of southwestern Virginia and West Virginia, and it was doing a booming
business in transporting these valuable products .

The development of

such local resources always appealed to McGhee , who had large invest
ments in Tennessee coal and iron enterprises. l49 Another factor which
inclined

him

toward the N. & W. was the friendship which he had formed

with Robert Fleming and Jacob Schiff.

He had gotten to know them well

during the reorganizations of the East Tennessee and the Texas and
Pacific.

Both the British investor and the senior partner of Kuhn,

Loeb were powers in the Norfolk and Western and were involved in the
negotiations for the purchase of the syndicate ' s shares of East Tennessee
first preferred. 150
During December, 1886 , and January, 1887 , the bargaining went on.
First the N. & W. seemed likely to buy the stock , then the Terminal secured an option for 63 , 000 shares which expired on January 6 .

Next ,

Robert Fleming secured an option on 22 , 000 shares for the N. & W. and
received from McGhee an agreement for his 6 , 000.
Schiff, and the other N. & W.

managers

On January 9 Fleming,

formed a syndicate to buy 55 , 000

l48McGhee to C . S . Brice , January 19, 1887 , McGhee Papers .
l49McGhee 1 s reasons for preferring the Norfolk and Western were
fully explained in a letter to John H. Inman, June 3 0 , 1887 , ibid.
l50 1ambie , From Mine to Market , 116 .
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shares to be paid for with a new issue of 90 , 000 N. & W. first preferred and $1 , 000 , 000 in the company' s notes. With the deal almost
clinched, Schiff' s legal counsel hesitated to approve the purchase plan,
and the management of the N. & W. also may have had reservations about
it . l) l Whatever the reason for it , the delay was fatal to the deal ;
the Terminal took the plunge and purchased 6) , 000 East Tennessee first
preferred in exchange for $ 4 , 000 , 000 in cash and ) 0 , 000 shares of
Terminal common stock. 15 2 Henceforth the fate of the East Tennessee
would be linked to that of the new giant of the railroad world--the
great Richmond and West Point Terminal.

l) l ibid. , 11)-1 7 .
l5 2Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 1 .
75

CHAPTER IV
RISE

AND

FALL: McGHEE

AND

THE GREAT RICHMOND TERMINAL

"Ten Millions! " read the headline of an 1 88 7 story by a correspondent of the Philadelphia Press which sketched the careers of
"Southern Rich Men. " Reprinted in t;tle Knoxville Tribune , the article
received a front page location for it described McGhee as "the wealthiest of them, and probably the best known in the east.

•

•

II

Although

the story probably overestimated his wealth and contained other factual
errors , it gave an interesting and lifelike sketch of the Southern
millionaire :
Mr. McGhee in appearance is peculiar enough to be noticeable
anywhere . He is over 6 feet tall , very slender, and of a
peculiar aggressive movement in his stride , which makes him
seem always very full of important business. His nose is
Roman, his eyebrows large and bushy, his cheekbones promi
nent and his countenance sunburned and sallow. He wears a
moustache and goatee slowly becoming gray, and has light
brown hair, which is beginning to show a few streaks of the
sand color. In Tennessee , whatever may be his concessions
to fashion in New York, he wears a plain gray suit , neat but
not noticeably good, and a big, comfortable soft hat , of the
style common down here below the Ohio. He spends a great
deal of time in New York in connection with his railroad
enterprises but is still very often at home , and regards
himself always as a Tennessean. l
McGhee often affirmed by word and deed the cont ention that he remained a Tennessean at heart , but in the late 1 880 ' s his visits home
were few and far between. His time was mostly spent in New York City
where he kept a vigil over the stock market and was in close touch with
1Tribune , May
phia Press .

24,

1 88 7 , quoting an undated item in the Philadel
ll 2

I

11 3
other financiers. According to a statement of his securities holdings
as of February 2 5 , 1 888 , much of his fortune was invested in the stocks
and bonds of railroads subject to the manipulation of their New York
masters . 2 Although his holdings of East Tennessee stocks and bonds
were relatively small after the sale of the first preferred stock of
the Richmond Terminal , he retained an active interest in the company.
He remained president of the Memphis and Charleston, and he was gradually drawn more deeply into Banville and Terminal affairs .
McGhee philosophically accepted the disappointment of his hopes
for the sale of the East Tennessee to the Norfolk and Western. Helping
to reconcile him to the Terminal was the fact that he and his friends
had made a large profit on the sale and that they had entered a large
corporation whose stock offered excellent opportunities for lucrative
transactional profits. 3 Balancing this was the nagging fear that the
new situation might injure the East Tennessee itself and thus retard
the development of Knoxville and its tributary territory where McGhee
had many large investments . He probably agreed, however, with his
friend Sanford who wrote that after all he himself had not "moved to
Knoxville for the purpose of o rnamenting it. " 4
Shortly after the sale McGhee put on a good face and told another Tennessee business associate that

"I

do not think

my

influence

on the East Tenn system will be materially lessened by reason of the
2 Letterbook, February, 1888-February, 1 88 9 , p. 2 , McGhee Papers.
4
3Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 1 7 - 75 .
4
4sanford to McGhee , December 10 , 1 88 6 , McGhee Papers.
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change , nor do I think Knoxville or Chattanooga will be to the slight
est extent injured. 11 .5 These two propositions were firmly linked in
his mind. He saw himself as the only member of the East Tennessee
board who had the power or the desire to protect the interests of his
native state--a position he was determined to maintain under this newest regime .
Perhaps because of his independence and devotion to the East
Tennessee , or because he was linked to the

mana

gers of the Norfolk and

Western, some parties in the Terminal tried at the outset to remove him
from the East Tennessee board. In a letter to Brice he declined to be
driven out :
Having been elected by the stockholders of the East Tenn
company a Director for the current year, I shall discharge
the duties of the position and as at present advised will
not resign no matter who may control the stock.
The representations made by parties interested in secur
ing my resignation to the effect that I was interested in
in [ sic] the securities of the Norfolk and Western Road and
therefore not a proper person to remafn in the Directory
of the East Tenn Co should that Company pass under the con
trol of the Terminal Co are entirely devoid of truth as I
do not own a dollar of the securities of the Norfolk and
Western Company.
I preferred that the Norfolk and Western Company should
dominate the East Tenn. system. They had the opportunity
to do so , failed for want of prompt action at thg critical
moment and I have no relation with that Company.
The lot of the unifiers on the Terminal board--those who wanted
to subordinate the individual systems to the whole--would have been
.5McGhee to Hiram s. Chamberlin, January 28 , 1887, ibid.
6

McGhee to Brice , January 18 , 1887 , ibid.
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easier had McGhee resigned. 7 Instead he remained to fight tenaciously
for the East Tennessee within the Terminal combination. To uphold the
interests of the East Tennessee he appealed to the Tennessee-born New

York investment banker, John Hamilton Inman , a leading Terminal director:
"Let me beg of you to take this matter under careful consideration and
endeavor to use ever [ sic] means possible

•

•

•

to prevent a conflict

that would result in a serious loss to the East Tenn and the
Memphis & Charleston Roads. 11 8 The Terminal , he explained, had bought
•

•

•

the East Tennessee stock in order to divert traffic to the Richmond &
Danville ; but "any effort to divert the traffic now possessed by the
Norfolk & Western road, forceably, will result in a large loss to the
business of the East Tenn and the M & C roads .

II

Furthermore , the

Danville did not have the steam shipping facilities at West Point , Vir
ginia, to handle the increased traffic . 9 He wrote the general manager
of the Memphis & Charleston that while it did not matter whether the
traffi·c went to the Norfolk or the Danville , "it is our duty to prevent
any loss of business to the Memphis & Charleston R. R. Co. " The M. & C . ,
he said sternly, "is under the control of the Board of Directors and the
Officers by them e lected, and I shall. not recognize the right of the
officers of any other company to direct its operations, as long as I am
its President . 11 10
7 The struggle over unification of �erminal properties is dis
cussed in Klein, � Richmond Terminal , 1 8 4-88 .
8McGhee to Inman , June 0, 88 , McGhee Papers .
3 1 7
10McGhee to E . B. Thomas , August , 188 , ibid.
7
4
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McGhee stopped short of declaring open war and leading a secession of the East Tenne ssee from the Terminal .

He wrote Robert Fleming

that "I would be willing to serve on the board of the East Tenn. C o .
t o protect its interests against all comers and goers , but would not
be willing to undertake the work of organizing a party . 11

11

He recog-

nized that only Brice and Thomas , through their influence in Terminal
affairs , could guarantee protection to the East Tennessee .
him that they would protect the company,

12

They promised

and , perhaps to symbolize the

promise , McGhee was elected to the boards of both the Danville and the
Terminal in December, 188 7 .

13

As long as the Terminal lasted, he , Brice ,

and Thomas maintained the autonomy of the East Tennessee within the
framework of the larger combination.

They also used the East Tenne ssee

as a power base in the incessant factional fighting which afflicted the
Terminal .
The histor,y of the Richmond and West Point Terminal Railway and
Warehouse Company was marked by open warfare between factions fighting
for control.

14

It was created in 1880 as a ho lding company to enable

the Danville to own and lease roads which did not connect with that
company' s line s .

Through the early 1880 ' s i t was used by the Danville

to facilitate a rapid expansion , and soon both companies were listed on

1

1McGhee to Fleming, August 5 , 1887 , ibid.

12
McGhee to Fleming, August 11 , 1887 , ibid.
lJ
R. Brooke to McGhee , December 14 and 2 1 , 1887 , ibid.
l4
For a detailed histor,y of the Terminal , 1881- 1886 , see Klein ,
Great Richmond Terminal , 90-114.
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the New York Exchange , where their stocks fell prey to parties of spe cu
lators .

Brice and Thomas , for instance , had been in and out of the

Terminal ' s affairs before the East Tennessee sale was made .

In 1886

the Danville and the Terminal were convulsed by another power struggle
when William P. Clyde attempted to strip the Terminal of its proper
ties for the benefit of the Danville .

Stockholders of the Terminal

counterattacked , gained control of the Danville , and ousted Clyde just
before the East Tennessee acquisition was consummat ed.
C lyde ' s successor as most influential man in the Terminal was
Alfred M. Sully, a New York investment banker, who hoped to integrate
the Terminal properties but found himself powerle ss to overcome the
aggressive factions which had elevated him to the presidency.

In the

spring of 1888 a group of investors in the Georgia Central , an ally o f
the Terminal system, began an offensive to get rid of Sully a s well as
of the East Tennessee faction.

Sully quickly resigned and was replaced

by John Inman, but the Brice-Thomas faction, with the help of Inman and
his friends , put down the Georgia Central rebellion and emerged as an
even more powerful force within the Terminal .

This victory, however ,

was bought at a great price t o the Terminal and all i t s constituent
companie s .

I t would appear that Inman ' s terms for hi s support o f the

Brice-Thomas group included the Terminal ' s purchase of a controlling
interest in the Georgia Central .

Over a period of nine months from

October , 1888 , to June , 1889 , the Terminal directory made several unani
mous decisions which led to the acquisition of the Georgia Central
through the purchase of securities from a syndicate in which Inman was
a participant .

As the historian of the Richmond Terminal put it :

"In

118
completing the transaction Inman unquestionably exposed himself to
charges of conf1ict of interest

•

•

.

•

11 15 While not involved in Inman ' s

syndicate , McGhee was present and voting at the board meetings which
ratified the Georgia Central purchase .
transaction that was , in a

16

Thus he acquiesced in the

mann

e r of speaking, the beginning of the

end for both John Inman and the Richmond Terminal .
Control of the Georgia Central cost the Terminal over $8 , 000 , 000 ,
or far more than the new acquisition was worth.

17

The deal , so profit

able to Inman and his cronies , greatly increased the liabilities of the
Terminal .

When a day of reckoning finally arrived these liabilities

had much to do with dragging the entire Terminal system into bankruptcy.
Although the Georgia Central affair represented the classic case
of conflict of interest in the history of the Terminal , it is by no means
the only such case .

A much smaller, though not the less questionable ,

transaction , involving the purchase and later the resale to the East
Tennessee of an insignificant little line called the Tennes see and Ohio ,
was arranged by McGhee and his close associates in 1888 and 1889 .
This company had been chartered in the palmy days of antebellum
railroad enthusiasm as the Rogersville and Jefferson "for the purpose of
establishing a communication by railroad between Rogersville and the mos t
eligible point on the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. "

Later the

charter was amended to permit the company to push its road on to the

l5
17

Ibid. , 207 .
Ibid. , 205-6 .

16

Ibid. , 210 .
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Moccasin Gap in the Cumberland Mountains on the Virginia state line .
Several years of successful lobbying for state aid provided funds to
build the line from near Morristown to the Holston River by 1 8 60 . The
war wrecked the railroad, but the famous generosity of the post-war
Radical gove�ent provided money for rebuilding and completing the
line to Rogersville . With only sixteen miles of track, the company
was one of the first to default on its payment of interest to the state ,
and in 18 7 1 the Rogersville and Jefferson which had cost the state
$ 3 8 5 , 000 was sold to the East Tennessee for $ 2 3 , 000. Even this little
company was a bargain at the price , although its bridge over the Holstan River was found to be unsafe . Obligated under the terms of the
sale to operate the line, the East Tennessee had no desire to make
costly improvements ; it therefore "sold" the Rogersville and Jefferson
to a

dummy

in 18 73 so as to escape rebuilding the Holston bridge. For·

four years the East Tennessee operated the line north of the river with
horsepower, and in 18 77 it conveyed the company to Horace M. Aiken for
$10 , 000. Aiken busied himself for ten years in rehabilitating the road,
I

which he reorganized under the title of the Tennessee and Ohio Railroad
Company. 18
By 18 77 the coal fields of eastern Kentucky and southwestern Virginia were beginning to boom, and the Norfolk and Western and the Louisville and Nashville were considering expansions into that very area
towards which the Tennessee and Ohio pointed. 19 At McGhee ' s request
18Harrison, Legal History, 9 1 -21.
4
l 9La.m.bie , From Mine to Market , 210-28 ; Maury Klein, History of the
Louisville � Nashville Railroad (New York : The Macmillan Company, 19 7�
2 76-8 3 .

1 20

Sanford sbunded out Aiken about selling the road2 0 and got an offer of
a twenty-day option to purchase- at $115 , 000. 2 1 He strongly recommended
that it be bought : "In my opinion that ' s the road to build to the Cokeing · [ sic] coals

•

•

11 He added that "I

•

would like to make some

money and not loose [ sic] any by doing so--a sentiment I think you will
share with me. 11 22 McGhee apparently took the matter up with :Brice and
Thomas but action was deferred for the time being. 2 3 A year later the
T . & 0 . looked like an even better investment , and McGhee again asked
Sanford to look into the matter. "If bought , " he said, "it would all
have to be done in your name. See about it and I think we will buy it
this time . 11 24 McGhee was aware that he and the other New York directors
would have to avoid

any

public involvement in the purchase in order to

keep the price down and escape a conflict of interest charge when the
road was sold later to the East Tennessee. Under Aiken' s management the
- T. & 0 . was making from $10, 000 to $15 , 000 a year and his aSking price
was $15 0 , 000 . 2 5 Sanford bargained him down to $115 , 000, and then after
more negotiations closed the deal at $100, 000. 26 :Besides McGhee and
Sanford, three other directors of the East Tennessee--probably Thomas ,
2 0McGhee to Sanford, June 1 , 188 7 , McGhee Papers.
3
2 1 Sanford to McGhee , June.. 1 , 188 7 , ibid.
22 Ibid.
3
2 �cGhee to Sanford, June 1 6 , 188 7 , ibid.
2 �cGhee to Sanford, August 18 , 1888 , ibid.
25sanford to McGhee , August 2 , 1888 , ibid.
4
26sanford to McGhee , August 2 8 , October 1 7 , 1888 , ibid.
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Brice , and the investment banker, John G. Moore--were parties to the
purchase .

27

At McGhee ' s direction Sanford reorganize� the company with a dummy
28
board of Knoxville directors and had hims elf elected r:>resl'derit.

McChee

advised him to continue the management of the road as it had been in the
past , " spending no more money than is absolutely necessary and make as
large net earnings as you can.

We will lay no more rails than required

to keep the road in a safe condition.

It will all come out right in the

end , " he added, "but will not perhaps be as speedy as you might wish. 11

29

The partners kept the Tennes see and Ohio for almost a year and in Julyf
188 9 , sold the property to the East Tennessee for $320 , 000 in East Tennes
see extension bonds . J

O

This price represented a profit to the sellers

of approximately 220 percent , while it meant a fairly sizeable increase
in the debt of the East Tennessee .

The T . & 0. might have been a po-

tentially valuable addition to the East Tennessee if it had been completed into the coal lands of southwest Virginia.

Apparently McGhee and

his cohorts expected that the extension would be made , and in 1890 President Samuel Thomas of the East Tennessee recommended that this be done .
But as the legal hi storian of the Southern Railway laconically

27
McGhee to Sanford , October 2 7 , 188 8 , ibid.
28
McGhee to Sanford, October 18 , 1888 , ibid .
-·

29
McGhee to Sanford , October 27 , 1888 , ibid.
30

sanford to McGhee , July 20 , 188 9 , ibid. ; Harrison , �
Histo!;;Y , 921.
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put it , ":Before these plans could be carried out bankruptcy overtook the
East Tennessee , Virginia and Georgia. "

3l

The purchase of the T . & 0 . cont ributed to the East Tennessee ' s
bankruptcy, and the sale is the refore indefensible from any standpoint .
It would appear that McGhee and his friends used the threat of the Norfolk and Western ' s possible entrance into East Tennes see as a justification for the purchase .
ville & Nashville or

Sanford was ready to swear tba t "if the Louis-

any

other Road or person had been willing to give

more for the Road than the East Term Va &
sold it to them. 11

32

Ga

gave for it I would have

Such a sale , however, would have been inimical

to the interest of the East Tennessee , of which Sanford was a director,
and in fact the partners intended all along to sell the T . & 0 . to the
East Tennessee . 33

The exorbitant pro fit which they made helped to load

the East Tennessee with debt ; for if the T. & 0. cont inued to earn as
much as $15 , 000 a year this was not even enough to meet the interest on
the bonds which were paid for it .

34

McGhee ' s T. & 0. deal , like Inman ' s

Georgia Central transaction, was symbolic of the Richmond Terminal ' s
weakne s s .

The holding company ' s board o f directors was filled with men

3l
llli . , 922 .
32 sanford to McGhee , October 10 , 188 9 , McGhee Papers .
33
At the time the road was bought from Aiken , McGhee was obvi
ously planning to sell it to the East Tennessee , for he wrote that "We
will have to take extension bonds in payment . " McGhee to Sanford ,
October 19 , 1888 , ibid.
34
The East Tennessee ' s first extension bonds paid 5 percent in
annual interest . Thus the interest alone on the $320 , 000 paid for the
T. & 0. amounted to $16 , 000 per year.
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who did not hesitate to use their positions to realize opportunistic
personal profits .

Even when they were seemingly dedicated t o the

interests of a particular railroad ( as McGhee sometimes was to the East
Tennessee ) the urge for personal gain at the expense of the company was
too strong to resist .

If McGhee was willing to foist the T . & 0 . upon

his own East Tennessee , what might he do to the Terminal which commanded
none of his personal loyalty?
The stresses within the Terminal ' s far flung system led to one
last attempt to sell the East Tennessee to the Norfolk and Western.
Again McGhee seems to have been one of those who tried to arrange the
sale .

Attempts to switch the East Tennessee ' s traffic to the Richmond

and Danville had been largely unsuccesful , thanks to McGhee ' s stubbo rn
opposition, and the Terminal was quite willing t o divest itself o f the
property.

The Norfolk ' s managers , however, were too cautious to take

hold of the East Tennessee , and the last negotiations ended

in

the fall

of 1888)5
But though the Terminal could not rid itself of the East Tennessee ,
it

found this railroad steadily slipping from its grasp.

The first pre-

ferred shares which the Terminal had purchased in 188 7 could control the

East Tennessee for only five years at most . 3 6

Late

in 1888 a plan was

formed to lease the East Tennessee to the Terminal for ninety-nine years .

J5See Frederick J . Kimball to McGhee , August 4, 1888 , and McGhee
to John H. Inman, August 3 , 1888 , ibid.
3 6By the terms of the reor��zation plan o f 188 the first pre
6
ferred holders could elect a majority o f the board of directors for five
years or until dividends of 5 percent on this stock were paid in two
consecutive years .
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Having been disappointed a second time in his attempt s to form an alliance with the Norfolk and Western, McGhee fell in with the lease plan,
one highly questionable because it flagrantly violated the rights o f the
second preferred and common stock owners who sued to prevent it .
Ghee promptly went to work to effect the lease .

37

Me-

He wrote almost identi-

cal letters to Sanford and Major Daniel A . Carpenter, an old friend and
business associate in Knoxville , setting forth his opinions :
For fear that our friends there , who like myself, are
interested in the future of Knoxville may feel that the
lease of the East Tenne ssee Road to the Richmond & Dan
vill� will interfere with the future growth of our City,
I write you for the purpose of giving my views of the
situation.
In the first place the headquarters of the East Tennes
see will remain at Knoxville as at pre.sent . In the next
place if the Danville succeeds in controling [ sic] the East
Tennessee through the lease and thus outing [ sic] off
the Norfolk & Western, that road will unque stionably build
down from Bristol and make a connection with the Knoxville
& Cumberland Gap road or they will extend -their Mountain
Branch on in the direction of Cumberland Gap , reaching
Knoxville over the Powell ' s Valley road. They can extend
down the Holston Valley and make a connection with the
Powell ' s Valley road and get a line to Knoxville some
38
fifteen or twenty miles shorter than the East Tennessee .
He urged Sanford to show the letter to William Rule , editor of the Republican Knoxville Journal , and suggested that Carpenter show it to the
editor of the Democratic Knoxville Tribune .

He admonished the men, how

ever, to "be careful to keep my name out of it . "

37

39

Both newspapers

Harrison , Legal Histo;r, 685- 86 .

38
McGhee to Sanford and McGhee to Carpenter, November
McGhee. Papers .
39

Ibid .

;L ,

. 1888 ,

12.5
responded with editorials in favor of the lease , and Sanford planted
"an interview with a prominent iron

man

of Middle Tennessee" in the

Cincinnati Commercial Gazette which was reprinted in Knoxville .

4°

In spite of the se effort s the lease was invalidated by Chancellor Henry
R. Gibson, who had proven his hostility to railroad corporations in the
1870 ' s when he and McGhee were serving in the Tennessee legislature .
Gibson held that the East Tennessee and the Richffiond and Danville were
in fact competing lines and that the lease would effect a restraint to
commerce .

41

The Terminal unsuccessfully attempted to appeal the deci-

sion to a federal court , and on December 7 , 1888 , the East Tennessee
was returned to the control of its old officers .

42

If anything, the failure of the lease strengthened the hand of
the Brice-Thomas group within the Terminal .

Their cooperation was

essential if the Terminal was to keep its costly and tenuous hold on
the East Tennes see .

McGhee , too , now loomed much larger in Terminal

affairs ; with Inman and George Scot t , president of the Richmond and
Danville , he was empowered to cast the Terminal ' s vote in the stock
holders meetings of all the constituent companies .

43

When he was out

of New York Thomas kept him informed of Wall Street matters , 44 and Inman

4°

sanford to McGhee , November 19 , 1888 , enclosing .plippings from
these newspapers , ibid.
4l
Knoxville Journal , November 2.5 , 1888 .
42
Harrison, � History, 686 .
Papers .

43
A . J . Rauh to McGhee , April 20 and November 14, 1889 , McGhee
44
see , for instance , Thomas to McGhee , March 4 and 12 , 1889 , ibid.
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solicited his· advice about important questions of policy.

45

Late in

1889 relations between Inman and Scott deteriorated, and McGhee attempted
to reconcile the two .

46

Scott resigned , however, and McGhee was offered

the presidency of the Richmond and Danville , a position which he de
clined at the urging of his family.

47

The offer was a high compliment

to his diplomatic skill , and it demonstrated the regard in which he was
held by his associates .

Had he accepted the post a t the head of the key

company in the Terminal structure it would have been the crowning honor
of his career, but it is improbable that he could have saved the system
from the destruction towards which it was heading.

Instead , Inman be-

came president of the Danville , and it was he who bore the brunt of the
storm which soon broke over the Terminal .
In the spring of 1889 McGhee took an eight thousand mile journey
through the South and West.

48

After the train which bore his private car

left Washington, D. C . , he travelled for days over tbe tracks of comparlies of which he was a director.

The East Tennessee ' s lines could

carry him from Bristol on the Tennessee-Virginia border almost to New
Orlearts .

At the Crescent City began the Texas and Pacific Railroad ,

in w'hich'" he was heavily interested, and over which he could travel all
the way to El Paso before swinging north to visit the ranches in

45

Inman to McGhee , April 14, May 23 , November 8 , 1888 , June 26
and November 8, 1889 ; McGhee to Inman , May 24 , June 6, August 8, 188 8 ,
October 5 , 26 , November 7 , December 23 , 188 9 , and January ll , 1890 ,

�·

46

c . M. McClung to McGhee , November 30 , 188 9 , ibid.

48
w. T. Walters to McGhee , May 2, 188 9 , ibid.

47

Ibid.
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Colora:do and Wyoming owned by his Western !Jnion Beef Company. Truly
McGhee was at the apex of his career; the companies with which he was
associated were prosperous and still expanding. The year 1889 was a
great one for the East Tennessee , which earned more than it ever had
before , and the Richmond Terminal was about to acquire enough additional
miles of track to become the nation' s second largest system. 49 The
South was enjoying an unprecedented boom. 50 Real estate in Knoxville
commanded unheard of prices , 5 1 and the Knoxville Woolen Mills Company
earned an 18 percent return on its capital stock in 1888-8 9 . 5 2

The expansion and prosperity of the late eighties concealed the
weaknesses of the Terminal. As long as business boomed, the giant systern could stay ahead of its mounting expenses , but the end of the boom
meant the exposure of the Terminal ' s frailties. In the fall of 1 890
Baring Brothers , a British banking house with large investments in the
United States and ' South America, was financially embarrassed and turned
to the

Bank

of England for funds to meet its obligations. The resulting

"Baring Panic" caused a drastic decline of American rail securities on
the London market and disturbed the money market in the United States . 53
49Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 23 2 , 3 00.
5 °c . Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1§11-1lli. (Baton
Rouge : Louisiana State University Press , 195 1�7- 3 9 ·
) lSee , for instance , D. A. Carpenter t o McGhee , Februar,y 18 ,
188 9 , McGhee Papers .
5 2R. P. Gettys to McGhee , July 8 , 188 9 , ibid.
53Dorothy R. Adler, British Investment in American Railways
(Charlottesville : University Press of Virginia, 19 7 0), 1 60- 6 1.
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The contraction of credit seems to have hit the South especially hard ;
by 1891 the region was already suffering from the depression which would
affect the entire nation in 1893 .

54

The Memphis and Charle ston was among the first of the Terminal ' s
The

properties to feel the effect of the souring economic situation.

last six months of 1890 showed a decline of $5 , 406 . 82 in net earnings
below the figures for the latter half of 1889 .

55

As president of the

railroad McGhee was responsible for arranging its financial affairs .
Realizing that the M. & C . could not meet its January, 1891 , interes t
payments from money on

hand ,

he applied t o John Inman for help .

"The

Memphis & Charleston, " he wrote on December 3 , 1890 , "will have to
borrow over $100 , 000 to meet its interest charge s

•

•

•

and unless the

East Tennessee Company will furnish it , we will have a great deal o f
trouble . "

56

On the same day McGhee urged the M. & C . ' s financial agent s

to ask the banking house which collected most of the interest to allow
a short extension of time for the payment .

57

When this failed to pro-

duce the desired results , the agent s announced that they could not advance the needed cash, and McGhee transferred the M. & C . ' s account to
5B
another firm.
Meanwhil � he continued to scramble to fund the January
54
Woodward , Origins of the New South, 264- 65 .
55
Memphis and Charleston Let terbook, February, 1889-February,
1892 , p. 734, McGhee Papers .
56
McGhee to Inman , December 3 , 1890 , ibid.
57
McGhee to Walston H. Brown & Bros . , ibid.
58

walston H. Brown & Bros . to McGhee , December 12 , 1890 ; McGhee
to Walston H. Brown, Bros . , December 13 , 1890 , ibid.
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coupons , arranging for the railroad to borrow $50 , 000 from a Memphis
bank and dunning the East Tennessee for payment of traffic balances
owed to the M. & c .
Ea. s t

59

Finally he sought to borrow $21 , 393 - 37 from the

60
. .
T ennessee t o mee t the rema1.n1.ng de f1.c1.
. .t
•

On the moming of

December 30 he argued with Thomas who re fused to let the East Tennes see
advance this sum.

The cool tone of a note which he sent later in the

day shows that the M. & C . ' s financial crisis had strained the relationship between the two men :
I confess to some surprise at the spirit of your conversation
this A . M. Your position in the matter was not what I had
been led to expect from our former conversations . You had
agreed that the East Tennessee Company would advance $50 , 000
if I could get up the balance . Having succeeded in getting
up all the money required except about $20 , 000 , I was not
prepared for the spirit in which you met my inquiry of this
morning.
I will advance the required amount and relieve the East
Tennessee Company of a compliance with any part of the obli
gation you assumed for it . If not asking too much will you
kindly use your influence to have the East Tennessee Company
pay freight balances to the Memphis & Charle ston Company.
I hope the request will not give you additional offense . 6l
As busines s conditions in the South worsened during 1891 , the
M. & C . continued to lose money.

The June interest payment was made

only after the company borrowed $120 , 000 which was guaranteed by the
East Tennessee ; with a floating debt of $300 , 000 , the M. & C . had
out of credit .

62

run

Although he looked for an improvement of general

59
McGhee to H. C . Wilton, December 2, 1890 ; McGhee to Henry, Fink ,
December 19 , 1890 , ibid.
60
McGhee to Thomas, December 2 9 , 1890 , ibid.
61
McGhee to Thomas , December 30 , 1890 , ibid.
62
McGhee to Milton Humes , June 18 , 1891 , ibid.
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business conditions , McGhee advised a friend in Tennessee that "Conservatism should now be the watch-word.
enterprises in which

I

am interested

I

•

To all manufacturing

am giving the above counsel. " 6 3

By the summe r of 1 8 91 the Terminal ' s difficulties became common
gossip in New York, and on August 8 , the New York Herald brought the
embarrassing details into public view by publishing a lengthy financial analysis of the system. The examination of the Terminal ' s structure revealed that none of the constituent companies were earning
enough to pay their large dividends and that the East Tennessee was
only making expenses . 64 Responding to the charges , Inman blithely
asserted that "there is no portion of the system

•

•

•

which is not

earning its fixed charges, " and added that "Each of these companies
owns securities of unquestionable value largely in excess of its out
standing indebtedness . 11 6S Despite these protestations , the Terminal
failed to produce convincing evidence of its solvency. The charges
were in fact all too true and talk about the Terminal ' s troubles con
tinued in the newspapers. 66 W. T . Walters , McGhee ' s old Baltimore
friend, wondered about the

many

Terminal rumors and feared for the

safety of his East Tennessee consols . McGhee reassured him about the
bonds but added a cryptic note about the Terminal ' s troubles : "Not
6 �cGhee' to D. S . Williams , June 2 6 , 1891 , ibid.
64Klei� Great Richmond Terminal ,
2 3)- 3 9 ·
6STribune , August ll , 1 891.
66Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 23 6� 3 8.
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prepared to write much about Terminal .

•

•

•

Statement in the papers

not far wrong. 1 1 67
Which newspaper statement he meant is not clear, but McGhee must
have known that the Terminal 1 s situation was precarious .

He lacked any

real commitment to the far flung system, and like Brice and Thomas he was
deeply interested only in the East Tennessee .

He had no choice but to

await developments and hope that when the dust had settled around the
Terminal he would find his own position unchanged or perhaps enhanced.
In January, 1892 , he wrote his son-in- law that he remained on good terms
with Inman, and that his influence in the Terminal had increased.

68

This , in the face of an apparent struggle between the Inman and BriceThomas factions , would seem to emphasize McGhee ' s position as a conciliator of the various parties which were trying to ride the whirlwind now
sweeping through the Terminal .

69

All of this commotion around the great holding company began to
attract other partie s .

Sometime in the late

winter of 1892 Inman

67
McGhee to Walters , September 1) , 1891 , McGhee Papers .
68
McGhee to C . M. McClung, January 18 , 1892 , ibid.
69
As Klein states in Great Richmond Terminal , 237-40 , relations
between Inman and the Brice-Thomas group seemed to deteriorate during
the fall of 1891 . On December 2 , L. F. Brown in the New York office of
the Terminal wrote Charles H. Hudson, General Supe rintendent of the
East Tennessee , that the "R. & D . folks through Mr. Inman --;
[ were .
trying] t o elect such a Terminal Board as will enable the Inman crowd
to elect their directors when the E. T . annual meeting is held. " He
felt sure that this was "another effort to get control of the E . T .
Board , and the management o f the E . T . properties , t o the exclusion o f
the present men. " Charles H. Hudson Papers , McClung Collection. The
Inman effort was unsuccessful , but it is remarkable that McGhee re
tained his close relationship with Inman as well as Brice and Thomas .
•

•
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began to slip , while at least two powerful outside groups began to move
in on the Terminal .

A syndicate headed by Walter G. Oakman of New

York ' s First National Bank was showing

a

strong interest , while William

P. Clyde , a former Terminal president , began to make another bid for
contro1.

70

At this crucial moment McGhee apparently decided to with-

draw at least temporarily from the struggle .

In mid-February he le ft

for the South where he remained until late April.

He received daily

letters or telegrams from his secretary Charles T . Leonhardt in New
York and in this way remained abreast of the unfolding developments in
the Terminal situation.

71

He was in Hot Springs , Arkansas , when a major

reshuffling of the , officers and directors took place .

Inman resigned

as president to be succeeded by Oakman , and Thomas journeyed to Knox
ville to brief McGhee fully on the situation. 72

At about this time

Brice , Thomas , and McGhee began to concentrate increasingly on maintaining their control in the East Tennessee .
As matters turned out this meant McGhee ' s further withdrawal
from the Terminal and a reimmersion in East Tennessee affairs .

The

William C lyde faction was about to gain control of the holding company,
but John Inman had not given up hope for a comeback.

From his summe r

home at Stockbridge , Massachusett s , he wrote McGhee urging

him

to re-

main on the Terminal board :

70
Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 245-58 .
7

�emphis and Charleston Letterbook , February, 1892-0ctober,
1894, McGhee Papers .
72
Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 254 ; Leonhardt to McGhee ,
March 30 , 1892 , McGhee Papers .
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My desire to have you " stay in, " is of course partly self

ish, as I think you might be in position to render me some
service . Among other things , I would like to know their
" line of atta ck , " and you might get this for me by " rurming
with the hound s . "

I may not be in city for several days-- should you have
to decide before I see you, you can only use your judgment ,
but I would like you to remain, at least for a time . 73
McGhee ' s judgment , however, was to get o ff the board .

He was one of

only four directors renominated by the C lyde faction, but when over
whelmingly re-elected on September 15 , 1892 , he declined to serve .

74

The prolonged infighting over the Terminal , together with the worsening business conditions in the South, threw the holding company and its
subsidiaries into bankruptcy in the summer of 1892 .
Fink , an experienced railroad
Tennessee .

75

man,

McGhee

and

Henry

were named co- receivers of the East

Fink wrote that the appointments had "given great satis-

faction to Officers , Agts & Employees of the Co. as well as to the
people

•

•

•

•

11 76

McGhee ' s son- in- law, Calvin Morgan McC lung, observed

that "The whole town [ of Knoxville ] seemed greatly pleased over the
East Tenn. going into the hands of yourself and

Mr.

Fink.

They felt it

was in home hands and that the property and Knoxville ' s int erest would
be looked after. "

73
7

Inman

�lein,

to

77

McGhee , September 17 , 1892 , ibid.

Great Richmond Terminal , 261 .

75
McGhee and Fink were also co- receivers of the Memphis and
Charleston, ibid. , 256.
76

Fink to McGhee , June 26 , 1892 , McGhee Papers .

77
McClung to McGhee , July 6 , 1892 , ibid"
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For the last time McGhee shouldered responsibility for the East
Tennessee . In spite of the favorable response to his and Fink' s
appointment , he soon realized that their task would be extremely difficult . Returning from a trip over the East Tennessee line s , Fink reported :
I find conditions in the South very bad, worse than I had
expected. We will have a short cotton crop again in Ala
bama and on the line of the Mem. -Ch. The people are poor
and cannot travel or buy goods, and we must look £or further
reductions in our revenue . And at the same time we are un
able to carry any farther, the so-called "economy. " In fact
we will have to make extra ordinary expenditures to make up
for past economies . 7 8
McGhee predicted that eventually the East Tennessee would undergo a
drastic reorganization, 7 9 but in the meantime he threw himself into the
business of keeping the railroad going. He generally refused to interfere in the operations of the company, leaving this phase almost entirely to Fink and the hired employees of the road. This involved

fending off a hoard of placeseekers who had some claim to his influence . 80

Occasionally he intervened to correct a situation in which he had some
personal interest or knowledge . He ordered, for instance , the removal
of a rural sidetrack from one location to another so that more farmers
could be served. 8 1 The fact that the new siding made one of his own
7 8Fink to McGhee , August 2 6 , 1892 , ibid.
7 9McGhee to Fink, August 1 8 , 1 8 92 , ibid.
80see , for instance , McGhee ' s letters to Frank S . White , July 8 ,
Herbert J . Lowry, July 1 8 , Arthur H. Henley, July 2 0 , and John Eo
Helms , July 26 , 1 8 92 , ibid.
8 �cGhee to Fink, August 1 8 , 1 8 92 , ibido
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farms more valuable was also a consideration in this rare example of
intervention.

In the main he restricted himself to the financial

man-

agement of the company ' s affairs in New York, and while he must have
enjoyed this last fling at administering the East Tennessee , he had no
illusions about how long it would last .
am

that "I

By the summe r of 1893 he felt

to a great extent a back number in railroad circles as I do

not give attention enough to railroad affairs to be able to influence
to any great extent the active men operating them.
any meetings and do not come in contact with them. 11

I do not attend
82

As evidence of his determination to stay out of the complicated
tangle of the Terminal , he did not exert himself to accede to Circuit
Judge Howell E. Jackson ' s plea that McGhee advise him in confidence on
the "terribly complicated" details of a suit involving the Georgia
Centra1 .

83

This case was of great importance to the Terminal , and pre-

sumably McGhee might have been able to have significantly influenced
the decision.

He wrote Jackson, however, that he was indisposed and

could not come to Nashville to confer with him on the "complicated and
troublesome matter. 11

84

The bankruptcy of the Terminal was rapidly resolving itself in
a way which few could have foreseen two years earlier;

for in 1893 the

depression which already distressed the South spread to the rest of the
nation.

McGhee was perplexed by this prolonged economic situation.
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McGhee to John A . Grant , July 14, 1893 , ibid.
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Jackson to McGhee , June 16 , 1893 , ibid.
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Ibid. , Jime' 22, 1893 "
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"I have gone through several panics , " he wrote , "but I do not think I
have ever known so much disturbance among the business interests through
out the country as there is at present . "

85

The depression was not the

result of a "Wall Street panic , 11 he felt , because Wall Street speculators had not really been too badly hurt by the decline in prices of
securitie s .

New York banks had shown "the utmost liberality" toward

their correspondent s in the hinterland .

Still he was unable to ex-

plain or predict business conditions :
It seems in the present to be impossible to judge as to cause
and effect as we used to be able to do . The world is now so
intimately connected in its business relations and the rapid
ity of communication one to the other is such that a given
cause here is prevented of having its anticipated effect by
some disturbance or counteracting cause which is created
elsewhere . 86
McGhee ' s world was changing, and the inexplicable depre ssion of
the nineties was speeding the trans formation.

McGhee and his associates

had created some thing new when they put togethe r the massive Richmond
Terminal .

Truly one of the first gigantic corporations which would be-

come the symbols of American economic life , the Terminal was anything
but a monolithic structure .

The various railroad companies which com-

prised it continued to lead lives of their own.

McGhee ' s stubborn and

successful resistance to the subordination of the East Tennessee to the
Richmond and Danville illustrates the continued ind!'Jpendence of the individual companies .

Moreover, Inman ' s Georgia Company deal and McGhee ' s

Tennessee and Ohio transaction show how the opportunistic masters of the

S5
McGhee to Isham G. Harris , July 17 , 1893 , ibid.
86

Ibid.
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Terminal used their power to achieve pe�onal profits .
many

There were too

such individuals and factions who satisfied themselves at Terminal ' s

expense .

Having created the great railroad combine , McGhee and the

others were unable to make it function properly, but they were likewise
powerless to dismember the monster and return to a simpler time .

The

thrust toward the great corporation was a sign of the times and could
not be resisted ; the Terminal would die , but it would be reborn as a
truly monolithic corporation.
The trans formation of the Terminal into the Southern Railway was
the accomplishment of the great banking house , Drexel , Morgan & Co. ,
working through its railroad specialist Samuel Spencer who would become
the Southern' s first chief executive .

The reorganization was also an

important contribution to the formidable reputation of J . P. Morgan who
conceived a plan which mastered the complexities of the Terminal situation.

In addition, Morgan "provided funds for the reorganization, helped

support the market , arranged for the necessary loans , and most important ,
restored public confidence in the Terminal properties

•

•

•

•

11

87

By the

summer of 1893 the various factions had accepted the plan and bad de
posi't ed their securities with Drexel , Morgan.

88

Spencer was named co-

receiver of the East Tennessee and the other Terminal propertie s , and
McGhee as usual accepted the inevitable with good grace .

His attitude

toward the new regime is illustrated in the letter which he wrote to
the East Tennessee ' s general counsel :

87
Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 277 .

SS

ibid. , 280 .

1 38
As I telegraphed you to-day, Drexel , Morgan & Company have
now deposited with them a majority of the securities of the
East Tennessee road. Mr. Spencer is connected with that
firm and I regard it entirely proper that they should have
a representative of their large interest in the receivership.
The reorganization proposed by Drexel, Morgan & Co. , is
a very comprehensive one and makes adequate provision for
the future wants of the property.
Experience teaches us that in order to encourage the
development of the tributary country continual expenditures
must be made by railroads and from time to time additions
to the equipment is rendered necessary to take care of the
increasing business. Ample provisions are made for this in
the plan of Drexel , Morgan & Co. That feature of it com
mends the plan to me as a security holder and especially
is it acceptable to me , in view of the large interests of
various character which I hold in the East Tennes�ee.
As the sale of the property is necessa� to a reorgani.
zation I hope now soon it may take place . 0 �
The sale of the East Tennessee to Southern Railway, however, did
not take place until the summe r of 18 94 . During the year' s interval
McGhee worked with Spencer as co-receiver and apParently developed. a
good relationship with

him.

McGhee had a financial and personal in-

terest in making the transition a smooth one , and, as he had done when
the East Tennessee was bought by the Terminal , he wrote letters to
Knoxville urging a peaceful acquiescence :
The Southern Railway Company has bought the Richmond & Dan
ville R 1 y. and will buy the East Tenn. Va. & Ga . R 1 y. Thus
the East Tenn. will be absorbed and will not exist and the
Southern Railway will extend from Washington to Brunswick.
There are five directors in the new Company, and none of
our people are in it .
had a talk with Genl. Thomas upon the subject and I
told him I thought he ought to be in the directory, in view
of his large interest in the property and that his going
I

8 9McGhee to W. H. Henderson, July 1 , 1 8 9 , McGhee Papers.
7
3

139
into it would not indicate that any others of the old party
should go in as he had the largest interest , and that I
had a very smal l one . That with the East Tenn. Va. & Ga.
out of existence the aroma was gone and that I cared nothing
whatever for a connection with the Southern Railway Company,
and that I did not feel the slightest disappointment in not
being put into the Board . I said to him I felt sure Sanford
would fee l very differently about it , and that he would be
very much mortified if he was left out entirely and not put
in something. I said further that I hoped he would be re
tained at least as a director in the Knoxville & Ohio .
The position of a director in a railroad has long ago to
me lost any degree of importance and I have not the slightest
regrets in severing my connection with it entirely.
I fear howevef., it wil l result in the loss of some popula
tion to Knoxvil le : for good sense and economy dictates that
the very expensive and wel l filled offices there should be
to a considerable extent decimated.

The auditors office wil l probably be removed to Washington
or elsewhere .
I should prefer that you would not b e at all active in
talking about these changes or in criticizing the action of
the Southern Railway Company, as I still have some interest
in it and my personal relations with the management are very
pleasant and cordial . 90

Though this candid letter to a son- in- law showed a realistic
understanding of the changes which would take place , McGhee was careful to be less frank with other Knoxvillians .

"The sale of the Road

will not disturb any of you , " he wrote to one , "nor will Knoxville
feel it in any way. 11
be harder to pacify.

9l

He was correct in thinking that Sanford would

McGhee ' s old associate wrote that "Spencer may

know more about the Southern Rail Road than every one else connected
with it but if he does he dont look that way. "

He was furious that

90
McGhee to C . M. McClung, June 2 2 , 1894 , ibid.
9

�cGhee

to W. B. Jackson, June 26 , 1894, ibid.

McGhee was to be left out of the directorate and felt sure that he
himself would also· lo se his seat on the subsidiary Knoxville and
Ohio .

Sanford was determined to exact a high price for his K. & 0 .

stock i f he went t o the "waste basket . 1 1

92

Tactfully McGhee com-

miserated with him and assured him that he would be retained on the
0.

K. &

board.

As for McGhee 1 s being left off the Southern board ,

that would " relieve me of hundreds of applications for help that have
been very troublesome to me . "

He urged cooperation with the Southern

and advised that "You will have a large influence that can be exerted
for the good of the reorganized company and for the benefit of our
joint interest s . "

93

Sanford remained obdurate , however, especially in the matter of
the Knoxville and Ohio stock.

The Southern inherited from the East

Tennessee a majority holding in this subsidiary road ; the remaining
shares were owned by the city o f Knoxville , Knox County, and various
individuals .
them
coax

•.

94

McGhee , Sanford , and Thomas owned 1 , 433 shares between

Sanford wanted a large sum for this stock and McGhee had to

him

into letting the Southern have it at fifty dollars per share ,

or one-half the par value .

He warned Sanford that should they ask more

for the stock Spencer "would probably feel that we were tr,ying to
him ,

squeeze

92

and in view of our large interests dependent upon his

sanford to McGhee , June 23 , 1894, ibid .

93
McGhee to Sanford, June 26 , 1894, ibid.
9

�emorandum of Agreement , Letterbook , October, 1894-May, 1897 ,
p . 339 , ibid. Available information doe s not indicate the total number
of shares in the K. & 0.

favor, we cannot afford to do that . 11

9.5

The deal was finally closed

with the Southern paying fifty for the stock but also purchasing some
notes which McGhee and Sanford held against another railroad , the
Nashville , Athens , and Tellico .

As McGhee remarked , "This is a poor

sale for the stock but a first rate one for the
very much gratified at closing it up . 1 1

•

•

•

debt and I am

96

There would be no deals with the Southern like the sale of the
Tennessee and Ohio to the East Tennessee , but McGhee and Sanford found
that the new regime would make certain concessions to its friends .
McGhee , for instance , was still privileged to use a private Southern
Railway car, and his numerous interests in enterprises along the route
of the Southern could not have suffered from his " cordial" relationship with Spencer.

In return, he and Sanford made themselves useful

to the giant corporation by using their considerable influence in
Tennessee in its behalf..

Sometimes this took the form of simply fur

nishing political intelligence ,

97

but the Southern' s purchase of the

Knoxville and Knox County interest in the K. & 0 . provides a neat ex
ample of how that " large influence" could be "exerted for the good of
the reorganized company.

II

At the same time that they were selling their own K. & 0 . stock
to the Southern, McGhee and Sanford were arranging for the acquisition
9.5McGhee to
Sanford, May 27 , 189.5 , ibid.
96
McGhee to Sanford , July 24, 189.5 , �·
97
McGhee to Spencer, July 12 , 189.5 , ibid.
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of the

t:i ty1 s

and coUll.ty1 s share s .

With the development o f a large coal

hauling business the· K. & 0 . had become a profitable little railroad ,
but the managers of the East Tennes see and later of the Southern had
no desire to pay out this surplus in dividends o

Rather, they tried to

disguise the profits by spending heavily on equipment ; in this way they
hoped to persuade the minority holders , especially the city of Knoxville and the county of Knox, that their stock was of little value and
might be sold at a low price.

98

The general public suspicion of large
In that

Ia.i.lroad companies , however, prevented such a sale until 1895 -

year the popular feeling against the Southern Railway was cleverly used
as a lever

to

obtain the city and county stock.

This was made possible by the appearance a.t Knoxville of a
Co lonel Albert E.

nated

as

the

Ohio

Boone

who

proposed to build a railroad to be desig-

River , Jellico , . Knoxville , and Tidewater, also called

the Black Diamond line .

The ne1.v railroad was pro je cted as a rival o f

the Southern and was supposed t o

run

from the coal field.s

on

the

Tennessee-Kentucky border through Knoxville and into the Carolinas .
Boone

loudly

and Knox

proclaimed that

it

would s.imul taneously " relieve Knoxville

Col.LTJ.ty from the death grip the Southern Railway has upon her

future prosperity" and " strike a death blow to the coal BalXll.l s . "

99

San:rord re ferred to Boone ' s company as the "Wind Railroad , " but he saw
in it a good possibility of getting the K. & 0 . stock.

100

98
McGhee to Spencer, July 23 , 1895 , ibid.
99
Journal , June 10 , 1895 .
100
Sanford to Spencer, May 11, 1895 , McGhee Papers .

At

McGhee ' s

143
suggestion, Spencer authorized Sanford to handle the matter for the
Southern.

101

their K. &

0.

It was proposed that the city and county should swap
stock for shares in Boone ' s Black Diamond line , and though

Sanford called this proposal a "dead fraud" he recognized that it would
1 1 probably be the means of having the City and County divest themselves
of their K. & 0 . stock, which is a desirable thing to do
. t t- o b e the on1 y way t o ge t possessJ.on o .f'
.

�

�
.

102
t 11
•

•

•

•

believing

Sanford made alli-

ances with some of the local men who were promoting Boone 1 s railroad.
Some money spent in the right places secured a re ferendum on the ques.

tion o f making an exchange of the stocks , and a campaign of picnics and
speeches by Boone persuaded the voters to approve the swap .

103

A few

weeks after the Boone group got the stock Sanford was able to buy it
at thirty dollars a share .

104

He sent it on to McGhee together with

a report of how he had accompl�shed this coup :
Had it not been for a couple of pools being for.med by citi
zens here to buy up this stock and hold it as a matter of
speculation for the future , I could have gotten it at quite
a sum less , but these combinations had to be broken up and
it has cost money to do it . I have not appeared in the
matter at all myself, having worked entirely through others ,
as one of the great "bugaboos " was that it should not be sold
to you, I or the Southern and at present , no one here knows
who the purchaser is . Of course there are many rumors asso
ciating us all with it , but they know nothing. l05
101
102
103

JO, 18 95 .

Spencer to Sanford, May 7 , 1895 , ibid.
sanford to Spencer, May 11 , 1895 , ibid.
Sanford to Spencer, June 24, 1895 , ill.<!· ; Journal , June 10 ,

104
Sanford to McGhee , July 22 , 1895 , McGhee Papers .

l05

Ibid.
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0.

Thus did Knoxville and Knox County give up their K. &
to the "bugaboo" Southern Railway.

stock

In exchange , the two governments

received shares in Boone ' s vaunted Black Diamond line , a dream rail
10 6
road which in the end was never built .
While this incident shows a particularly ruthless side of MeGhee 1 s relationship with the Southern Railway, it is worth noting that
his personal relationship with Spencer occasionally enabled

him

to

accomplish something in the direction of humanizing the policies of
the corporation.

When, as McGhee had privately predicted, the Southern

began to close some of its Knoxville offices he was moved to intercede
with Spencer for an old friend :
I want to make a personal appeal to you for old man Campbell ,
who has been bookkeeper in the Treasurer ' s office at Knox
ville for the past twenty years . Mr. Campbell is seventy
five years of age and has two sisters entirely dependent upon
his salary for support . He is well preserved and is as
thoroughly competent as he ever was for the discharge of his
duties.
This is no ordinary request but a personal appeal made to
you in the strongest possible terms , and I hope you will be
able to find a place for him where he may be able to earn a
support . l07
Fearing that Spencer might have forgotten about Robert Campbell, Mehim

Ghee wrote again asking

to "pardon me for coming to you again in

this matter, but I feel a very deep interest in
older

Mr .

Campbell.

man

He i s an

than I am , but we once went to school together and I am
greatly attached to him 1 1 108 As usual , McGhee was extremely sensitive
.

106KnOXVl. 11 e Journal and Tribune , March 10, 1902 .
107McGhee t o Spencer, October 14, 1895 , McGhee Papers.
108McGhee to Spencer, October 24, 1895 , ibid.

14.5
to the claims of personal friendship , and he took pains to protect an
old friend who looked to him for help ; in this case he was successful
and "old man Caltlipbell" was retained by the Southern .

l09

After thirty years of deep involvement in the East Tennessee , Mc
Ghee found himself in 189.5 a "back number, " as he described it , in the
affairs of Southern railroads .

For three more years , until its eventual

absorption by the Southern Railway, he remained president and receiver
of the Memphis and Charleston, but these jobs took little of his time
or interest . · He may have felt relief as he gave up the heavy responsi
bility for directing the course of the East Tenne ssee ' s future , but he
also must have felt a pang of los s .

His personal fortune s had risen

with those of the East Tennessee ; his association with the railroad
had taken
career.

him

to New York and had opened to him a larger financial

For a time he had played a role in the life of a truly

mamm

o th

railroad combine .
But Charles McGhee was not likely to become sentimental about
a corporation, even one so important to his life as the East Tennessee .
That railroad had served its purpose ; it had brought him large sums of
money and great power.

He was a busines sman, a financier, a capitalist ,

and profits were the objective of his career.

With the demise of the

East Tennessee he would seek these profits in other areas .

The move to

New York led him to take a hand in diverse enterprises , and it enabled
him

to attract Northern capital for some of his Sout�er.n investments .

Long before the East Tennessee disappeared he was deeply involved in

l09

Spencer to McGhee , October 2.5 , 189.5 , ibid.
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a variety of other corporations , syndicate s , and schemes . Although
McGhee may be remembered chiefly for his part in the complex corporate
history of the East Tennesse e , the history of these other enterprise s ,
large and small , perhaps reveal even more about McGhee the man and the
financier.

CHAPTER V
INVESTMENTS IN THE WEST :

TEXAS AND PACIFIC RAILROAD

AND AMERICAN CATTLE TRUST

By the late 1880 ' s New York City had become the financial center
of the United States .

There was money, of course , in Boston, Philadel-

phia, and Chicago , as well as in the smaller and newer cities which were
provincial capitals of trade and finance , but it was in New York that the
greatest business decisions were made , affecting the economic life o f the
l

country.

When the East Tennessee system became important enough to

attract the attention of Northern capitalist s , when it was big enough to
require large sums of additional capital , it became essentially a New
York corporation, even though its o fficial headquarters remained at Knoxville .

At some time in the mid-eighties McGhee decided to move to New

York where the future of the company would be decided.

2

He plunged into

the activity surrounding the East Tennessee ' s reorganization in 1885-86 ,
and he remained a power in its structure until the company disappeared
in 1895 .

1

Actually New York had become the nation 1 s most important money
market before the C ivil War, but by 1880 New York inves tment bankers were
playing an active part in managing the enterprises which they financed.
See Fritz Redlich, History o f American Business Leaders , ! Series o f
Studies ( 2 vols . ; Ann Arbor : Edwards Brothers , Inc . , 1940 ; New York :
Hafner Publishing Co. , 1951 ) , II , pt . 2 , pp . 360-65 .

�y the summer of 1886 McGhee
hardt , were living in New York. His
divided their time between New York,
From 1886 until at least 1898 McGhee
147

and his secretary, Charles T . Leon
wife and youngest daughter, Eleanor,
Knoxville , and various resorts .
spent most of his time in New York .

148
Although the East Tennessee and the Richmond Terminal absorbed
much of his attention during the years , he was alive to the

many

tunities for profit making which his new situation afforded him.

opporHis

association with Thomas , Brice, John G. Moore , and other directors of
the Richmond Terminal and the East Tenne ssee led him into varied speculations .

He soon resumed his close relationship with his old friend

Wilson, and he made new friendships with such men as Robert Fleming,
the British investor who was often in New York,

3

and Colonel Oliver H.

Payne , the Standard Oil magnate who had himself jus t moved to the city
from Ohio .

4

It is apparent that these friendships were based on personal

regard as well as on business interest , and though McGhee ' s corre spondence
is usually strictly serious and businesslike there are occasional notes
which reveal an affectionate comradeship .

At the end of a long business

letter, for instance , Fleming added this paragraph :
I hear the weather is very hot s o that you who have the in
stincts of a salamander will feel happy. I fancy I see you
now in a rocking chair with a cigar between your fingers on
the veranda of the Oriental intent apparently on the ups and
downs of the Atlantic but really perhaps on the ups and downs
of Wall Street . I should like very much to have the seven
S
league boots that would place me by your side this afternoon.
That these friendships were important to McGhee is shown by a telegram he
once sent to Payne who was summering in Massachusett s :
several days since .

"Arrived here

Am very lonely when will you be here?"

6

3
Adler, British Investment in American Railways , 147-48 .

4nictionary

of American Biography, XIV, 32 9-30 .

SFleming to McGhee , June 8 , 1889 . All manuscript citations are to
the McGhee Papers unle ss otherwise noted.
6
McGhee to Payne , July 10 , 1893 .
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Besides the pleasure of these congenial associations , New York
offered much more to the Tennessean. Here he could easily raise
$200 , 000 in cash by offering some of his securities as collateral. 7 He
could al!'JO play an insider' s stock market game , as he did during a twoweek period when he realized a $10, 000 profit in a speculation in Chicago
Gas stock. 8 Most of his time was occupied with the affairs of enterprises
whose need for capital had made them the concern of New York financiers.
Usually these were Tennessee companies in which McGhee had a substantial
personal and financial interest , as in the case of the East Tennessee ,
Virginia, and Georgia. But on two occasions he became deeply involved
in deciding the destinies of companies which operated outside of Tennes�
see or the Southeast. In one case he acted to save a sizeable investment ;
in the other he became involved primarily because of a family relationship.
l.
The collapse of the Texas and Pacific Railroad into bankruptcy
late in 1885 9 brought McGhee into the affairs of a company which lay outside the traditional geographic area of his interest. Heretofore he had
been actively involved only with the railroads of the South, east of the
Mississippi--in fact those lines which made up or connected with the East
7McGhee to Central Trust Company, November 30 , 1888 .
8Memorandum of Chicago Gas speculation, Letterbook, February, 18 92 0ctober, 18 95 , p. 8 75 .
9Commercial and Financial Chronicle , XLI ( 188 ) , 7 14.
5
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Tennessee system.

The Texas and Pacific, however, began in New Orleans

and stretched for almost a thousand miles to El Paso , constituting a
large link in the southern transcontinental system. McGhee' s initial
interest in this road must have been the result of a heavy investment
in the company' s bonds , probably made prior to the Texas and Pacific s
1

receivership in December, 1885. At

rate, he owned almost $500 , 000
of the company' s bonds three years later, 10 and it was this large holdany

ing which was endangered by the reorganization plan advanced

in

behalf

of Jay Gould in 1886 .
The Texas and Pacific had a troubled history even before its difficulties of the late eighties. Envisioned as the South' s tie to the
Pacific coast , the line was enthusiastically promoted by such Southern
leaders as Jefferson Davis. 11 After the Civil War the road across Texas
became the special project of Thomas A. Scott of the Pennsylvania Railroad.
Scott ' s vision of lucrative government grants and the impatience of
Southerners for the Pacific link had something to do , as C. Vann Woodward relates in Reunion and Reaction, with the famous Wormley House bargain and the succession of Hayes to the presidency in 1877 . The Southerners , so the story goes, sold out Samuel J. Tilden, in exchange for
federal support of the Texas and Pacific , and indeed Scott did receive
a federal charter and the land grants from the state of Texas .

Scott' s

10Letterbook, February 1888-February, 1889, p. 2 . A listing of
4
his securities at that time is in the Appendix.
1 lwoodward, Reunion and Reaction, 70.
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rival , Collis P. Huntington, who was building his Southern Pacific
line east from California , prevented the Texas and Pacific from acquiring further government assistance , and in 1880 Scott sold his stock
to Jay Gould and Russell Sage .

Under the supe rvision o f General Gren-

ville M. Dodge , Gould ' s Texas and Pacific was extended west from Fort
Worth to Sierra Blanca just ninety miles short of El Paso.

Late in 1881

Gould and Huntington entered into an agreement which gave the Texas and
Pacific the right to use the track o f the Southern Pacific from Sierra
Blanca to El Paso .

12

By the time of its bankruptcy in 188.5 , the Texas and Pacific
spanned the Lone Star state and consisted of 1 , .500 miles of track .
of Fort Worth, however, the line traversed

many

West

miles of country "almo st

uninhabited except by hostile Indians , prairie dogs and coyotes where
even water had to be transported long distances and the local territory
l
could not supply the needs of man or beast . " J

0bservers noted the poten-

tial value of the prope rty, but the immediate problem of low traffic on
its western, or Rio , division was clear.

In addition , the charge was

made that much of the line was poorly built and maintained, leading some
�· �

to contemptuously characterize the railroad as "two streaks of rust ,
with the New Orleans division half the time under water. 1 1

12

14

Ibid. , especially 7.5- 7 6 , 79- 8 1 , and 23.5-37 ·

l3

s . G. Reed, ! History o f Texas Railroads (Houston :
Publishing C o . , 1941 ) , 36.5 .
14

commercial and Financial Chronicle , XLI ( 188.5 ) , 714.

St . C lair

The forcing of Texas and Pacific into bankruptcy by its creditor,
the Missouri Pacific , was widely viewed as a maneuver by Jay Gould to
tighten his grip on the former road. 15 After all , Gould controlled the
Missouri Pacific , and this company' s claim of $1, 800 , 000 was unsubstantiated except on the books of these two Gould enterprises. As the
Commercial and Financial Chronicle of New York observed :
Some of the same parties who were most prominent in the road
at the beginning, and who reaped large profits , are yet con
nected with the company, and will now appear asking the bond
holders to forego their interest for an indefinite time, and
the stockholders to pay an assessment , in order to practically
rebuild the [Rio and New Orleans] divisions . l 6
Moreover, the Chronicle saw "the hand of Gould" in the plan of reorganization advanced by a group of Philadelphia holders of middle divi
sion bonds under the chairmanship of General Isaac Wistar. 1 7 This plan
was highly favorable to Gould ' s interests , and the Wistar committee
appears to have been the "Wizard ' s" stalking-horse for the capture of
\ 18 Simply described, the Wistar plan proposed to rethe Texas road.
deem the Missouri Pacific debt by issuing enough stock in the Texas
and Pacific to give Gould an undisputed majority. The road' s Rio
l5 Ibid. , XLII (188 ) , 1 .
1 6Ibid. , XLI (188 ) , 7 14 .
6 6
5
l 7 Ibid. , XLII (188 ) , 1 . Wistar in his Autobiograp�y (New York :
6 6
Harper and Brothers , 19 37 ) , 492 - 95 , says that his committee turned to
Gould only after the rival New York committee began to fight the Phila
delphia, or Wistar, plan. Wistar' s "irregular efforts of memory" do
not seem plausible because as early as January, 188 6 , the Chronicle
warned of the influence of Gould over the Wistar group. The New York
committee , of which McGhee was a member, was not formed until April ,
188 6 .
18 Julius Grodinsky, Jay Gould: His Business Career, 18 7-1892
6
(Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, 195 7 ) , 441-46 .
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division bondholders were then expected to submit to a "massacre " of
their securities in a drastic scaling down of interest .

19

A reorgani-

zation along these lines would give Gould control of the Texas and
Pacific which would be more valuable because of the reduction of its
fixed charges.

20

Despite the strong position of Gould and his cohorts and the
famous financier' s reputation as a dangerous adversary, several groups
of bondholders were stirred to action.

Among the earlie st of those to

organize for self de fense was a group of New Yorkers who held Rio division bonds .

Meeting at the offices of A . M. Kidder & C o . on April 19 ,

188 6 , these bondholders appointed a committee consisting of McGhee ,
William C . Hill of A . M. Kidder, and Isaac L. Rice , a rai lroad promoter
and a director of Richmond Terminal . 21
began to organize .

22

Soon other concerned parties

Robert Fleming wrote to his friend McGhee :

Please do not let us give up the battle without putting on
our armour.
I am willing if I can trust to your help to run out with
all the Bonds on this side pledged to support me & you. I
can with the assistance of our mutual friends make the thing
go through but it can only be through joint and undivided
action. 23
By the middle of August , 1886 , a merging of the important interests
opposed to the Wistar plan had occurred , and the Wistar group had been
l9
20
21
22
23

Commercial and Financial Chronicle , XLII ( 1886 ) , .5.50 .
Ibid . ; Grodinsky, Jay Gould, 442-43 .
commercial and Financial Chronicle , XLII ( 1886 ) , .519 .
Ibid. , 632 ; XLIII ( 1886 ) , 12.
Fleming to McGhee , July 26 , 1886 .
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forced to form a compromise reorganization committee , representative of
a broad spectrum of Texas and Pacific security holders .

24

McGhee and

Fleming were members along with Wistar, William D. Winsor, John Marko e ,
and J . N. Hutchinson of Philadelphia , and Meyer Lehman of New York.

The

plan advanced by this consolidated committee was more favorable to the
various bondholders but was nevertheless a compromise with the Gould
intere st .

It was agreed that the Mis souri Pacific should have $6 , 500 , 000

of Te±as and Pacific stock , but the importance of the se shares was
diluted by increasing the total of Texas and Pacific shares from
$32 , 000 , 000 to $40 , 000 , 000 .

25

The problem of a plan and a committee

for the reorganization of the Texas and Pacific was not settled , but
the que stion remained of how the railroad was to be

run

until reorgani-

zation was completed.

Even more crucial was the future of the company

after reorganization.

Would it revert to the pre-bankruptcy status

guo , i . e . , full control by Jay Gould, or would the Texas and Pacific
emerge under an "independent" management unbeholdi:m to Gould?
McGhee was intimately concerned with these question, both as a
member of the reorganization committee and a large bondholder and as a
personal friend of Governor John C . Brown, the Texas and Pacific receiver
who hoped to become president of the reorganized company.

The friendly

relationship between the two went back to the early 1870 ' s when Brown
was the Conservative redeemer governor of Tennessee and McGhee was a
prominent legislator.

At that time McGhee was accused of manipulating

24
commercial and Financial Chronicle , XLII ( 1886 ) , 133 , 181 .
25

Ibid .

1.5 5
the governor and legislature in the interest of Thomas Scott and the
Southern Railway Security Company, and Brown was called a pawn of some
Tennessee railroad interest s .

26

After Brown completed his two terms as

governor, Scott made him a vice president of Texas and Pacific , and
during the Gould regime from 1880 to 188.5 he was the company ' s chie f
solicitor.

27

When Brown became receiver in 188.5 it was apparently at

the urging of General Wistar and his group who probably promised him the
presidency later.

28

While Wistar and Gould appear to have been allies

in the initial struggle over reorganization, the alliance was not based
on an identity of interests.

Wistar and his Philadelphia group wanted

to protect the middle division bonds and to do so were willing to cooperate with Gould, who of course want ed to strengthen his hold upon the
Texas and Pacific .

Having a friendly Brown as receiver gave the Wistar

faction leverage in dealing with Gould or any other partie s .

29

Once the

safety of the middle bonds was secured, however, Wistar and his friends
were not particularly interested in championing the cause of the former
Tennessee governor.
Be fore the reorganization compromise was reached , Brown urged MeGhee to get together with Wistar and recommended the latter as "a very

26
27
28

See above , Cha�t er III .
Dictionary of American Biograp�y, III , 13.5-36 .
Brown to McGhee , October 20 , 1887 .

29
Wistar 1 s comm�t tee was the first organized group of Texas and
Pacific creditors . Tfierefore it was able to exercise "the very im
portant right to name the Judicial Receiver, and thus control future
proceedings , both legal and financial . " Wistar, AutobiographY, 493 .
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good man and a very reasonable man when you have got at him properly. 1 1

30

Later, when Gould began to apply pressure to have him removed, Brown
spoke of "the gentlemen who over-persuaded me to take the position I
now occupy

•

•

•

will not have comple ted their contract with me when

the road passes out of the hands of the Receivers .

,.

3l

If Brown

did have an agreement with Wistar he found in time that he could expect
little support from the Philadelphia general .
more to McGhee for aid and reassurance .

He thus turned more and

McGhee , for his part , was not

only fond of Brown but desired to see the Texas and Pacific under an
independent management , or the kind of leadership which he believed
Brown could provide .

While he admitted that Brown was not really a

railroad man , he felt that the receiver was perhaps uniquely familiar
with the Texas and Pacific and its problems .

32

The committee toyed with several plans for reconstituting the ad
ministration of the company.

Fleming favored having an active man with

railroad experience in New York as chairman of the board while the pre si
dent should reside in Dallas .

Under such a plan the president , who would

be on the scene in Texas , would be more a general manager than chie f execu
tive . 33

Eventually, however, all the plans for an independent management

hinged on Brown, who in his position as receiver was for more than two
years subj ected to pressure from several directions .

Part of his troubles

3°
Brown to McGhee , August 3, 1886 .
3l

ibid. , October 20, 1887 .

32
McGhee to Brown and to Fleming, both August 8 , 1887 .
33

Ibid.

1 57
arose from the undisguised hostility of Gould who lost no opportunity to
undermine him. Brown had left his post as general solicitor in the hope
of becoming president , and thus Gould " felt that one of his men [Brown]
had failed to go back to his old place and had set himself up against
his wishes. 1 1 3 4 The powerful financier thought :Brown disloyal and correctly reasoned that he was the instrument of those who wanted an independent management . Brown' s difficulties were further complicated by
the disappointingly small earnings of the Texas and Pacific and by the
fact that Fleming doubted his ability. 35
McGhee , who had no illusions about Brown' s exposed position, defended the receiver and at the same time constantly urged him to reduce
expenses. 3 6 He realistically outlined to :Brown the problem as he saw it :
While I shall , if I see any hope of accomplishing it , exert
my utmost efforts to secure an independent management , it
really seems to me that Gould occupies the position with
reference to railroads that Crockett did to the Coon : "If
that is you I come down. " Everyone seems to assume that
there is no use in resisting his wishes. If he cannot con
trol he will exert his utmost to demonstrate that an injury
has resulted in consequence of opposition to him. 37
Despite this gloomy (and apparently accurate ) analysis , McGhee labored to
save :Brown and to establish an independent Texas and Pacific . "I have no
3�cGhee to Fleming, June 1 7 , 188 9 .
35McGhee to Brown, January 5 , July 26 , and McGhee to Fleming,
July 27 , 1888 .
3 6see , for example , McGhee to Brown, July 26 , October 29 , Decem
ber 2 0 , and McGhee to W. T . Walters , April 1 6 , 1888 .
37McGhee to Brown, October 15 , 188 7 . McGhee alludes here to the
famous Tennessee frontiersman, David Crockett , who had such a reputation
as a marksman that raccoons voluntarily gave themselves up at his approach.
See :Benjamin A. Botkin (ed. ) , b Treasu;r of American Folklore (New York :
Crown Publishers , 1 944 ) , 25 .
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doubt , " wrote Fleming, "that your prodding of Brown
and as I

am

getting a little tired of

able all the time I hereby hand

my

is doing good

profession of being disagree-

mantle over to you. " But , he added,
wryly, "I'm afraid you won ' t wear it much. 11 3 8 Nevertheless , McGhee
my

pushed Brown so hard that at one time the receiver threatened to re
sign. 3 9·
In addition to securing the presidency for Brown, McGhee and his
group were interested in a voice on the company' s board of directors .
Both Fleming and McGhee were named to the board at the annual meeting in
May, 1888 , but they wanted a place on the board' s executive committee as
well. 40 Apparently J. N. Hutchinson of the Philadelphia group offered
,
to resign to make a place for McGhee but later refused to do so . 41 MeGhee and his friends were incensed at what they considered a breach of
faith by the Philadelphian. 42 "The way in which these Phila. men have
imposed themselves upon us , " wrote Fleming, "is a shame and disgrace .
If they won' t retire of their own accord we must make a public agita
tion. 11 43 Instead of making their outrage public , however, McGhee and
Fleming complained to Gould, who apologized profusely and promised to
3 8Fleming to McGhee , September ll , 1888.
3 9Brown to McGhee , July 2 8 , 1888 .
4°commercial and Financial Chronicle ,
4�cGhee to Wistar, April 1 6 , 1888 .

42McGhee to Hutchinson, July 2 1 , 1888.
43Fleming to McGhee , August 7, 1888 .
I�
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rectify the situation when he could.

44

"In the meantime , " McGhee ob-

served , "I am quite sure that I shall be consulted by the Gould people
with reference to all matters connected with the Texas and Pacific . "
This incident thus led to closer ties between McGhee and Gould.

46

45

Al-

though he still supported Brown ' s claim to the presidency, McGhee became more reconciled to Gould ' s control of the road .

The failure of the

Texas cotton crop in the fall of 1888 and the result ing decline of the
railroad ' s freight revenue further weakened Brown ' s position.

47

The low

earnings led to a fall in the price of Texas and Pacific securities which
alan:ned the owners and in McGhee ' s opinion "paralyzed" any opposition to
Gould ' s domination of the property.

48

Writing to his friend W. T. Walters ,

the Baltimore capitalist , McGhee observed that Gould would accept no responsibility for Brown ' s administration :
As you know, Mr. Gould desired to retain the presidency him
self but an independent administration was demanded by the
C ommittee and reluctantly agreed to by him. Whether he is
so operating Missouri Pacific in connection with Texas and
Pacific as to convince us that we made a mistake in puting
[ sic] Brown in the presidency, is a question I am unable to
decide . The annual meeting occurs in March, and I take it
that Mr. Gould will secure a sufficient number of proxies to
elect such a Board as he may wish. The class of securities
which I hold in the property give me not very much concern

44
Gould to Fleming, July 24 , 1888 .
45
McGhee to Fleming, September 2 2 , 1888 .
46

see Gould to McGhee , Septembee 4 , 188 8 .

47
McGhee to Fleming, December 20 , 1888 .
48
McGhee to Brown, February 5 , 188 9 .
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as they are bound to be good in any event . Still , however,
I am looking after the affairs of the Company with some
degree of interest. 49
In reply Walters advised :
Get rid of Brown--this is the only way to treat him , nothing
can be made of him--and his experience in Texas Pacific has
made him every day worth less--and from this time out he will
be good for nothing except a "walking gentleman. "
A fool like Brown is often worse than somebody who would
steal a moderate amount--Brown hasn ' t sense enough to steal .
Stopping at a big Hotel and walking up and down Broadway will
henceforth be his ambition.
Turn the rascal out , but throw the fool out .

5°

There is no indication that McGhee ever turned against Brown , but
the attitudes of Walters and Fleming, as well as the hostility of Gould ,
must have convinced him that Brown ' s days as pre sident o f the Texas and
Pacific were numbered.
consideration.

At the same time , Gould was showing McGhee marked

George Gould, son of the "Wizard, " sent him confidential

information on the road ' s earnings and expenses as soon as these were re
ceived in the New York office ,

51

and Jay himself urged McGhee ' s appoint-

ment to the company ' s executive committee .
McGhee as "a practical railroad man

•

•

•

Writing to Wistar he described
[ whose] advice and cooperation
. . 52

would be of great service to .. the Company.
alized that Brown had become a liability and

McGhee must have re-

that his own interests could

49
McGhee to Walters , January 16 , 1889.
50
Walters to McGhee , January 20 , 1889.
51

George Gould to McGhee , January 7, 188 9 .
president of Texas and Pacific .
52

Jay Gould to Wistar, January 24, 188 9 .

George Gould was vice

161

no longer be served by a defense of the fomer Tennessee governor. Perhaps for this reason he did not attend the annual meeting in March,

1889 ,

but instead set out on a tour o f examination over the company' s lines. 53
Before leaving Knoxville , however, he wrote George Gould to approve the
appointment of an experienced railroad

man

to the post of second vice

president in charge of operationso "This no doubt will be perfectly
satisfactory to Gov. Brown as it will leave him at liberty to give more
especial attention to the legal , political and financial requirements of
the property. " 54 In fact , Brown resigned within a few weeks to return to
his native state and the presidency of the Tennessee Coal , Iron and
Railroad Company. 55
Brown' s retirement from the Texas and Pacific marked the end of
attempts to establish an independent management free of Gould control.
As if by magic the company' s performance began to improve when Jay Gould
succeeded Brown as chief executive . 5 6 McGhee ' s prediction that the road
would not prosper until Gould wanted it to was fulfilled, and his relations with both Jay and George Gould continued to be good. From time to
time he offered suggestions on the road ' s management , 57 and he remained a
5 �cGhee to Brown, February 5 , 1889 .
5 �cGhee to George Gould, March 18 , 1889 .
55Brown to McGhee , April 2 , 188 9 .

5 6walters to McGhee , May 1 3 , Fleming to McGhee , June 8 , and
McGhee to Fleming June 17 , 1889 .
57McGhee to Jay Gould, May 2 3 and to George Gould, June 1 2 ,
and January 18 , 1891 .

1889
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director of the Texas and Pacific until 1903 .
little to do with the company after 188 9 .

59

58

But in the main he had

He and his friends had

thwarted Gould in his initial attempt to ruin the company in order to
rule it .

Having accomplished thi s , McGhee had no wish to dominate the

Texas and Pacific himself; he was content to let the Goulds take over from
Brown , as long as they took reasonable care to protect hi s investment .
From his seat on the board he could make sure that his bonds remained
safe .

For McGhee , this objective was the essential one , more important

to him than any dream of power, prestige , or glory.
If his Texas and Pacific experience is a clear illustration of how
McGhee acted to protect an endangered investment , the story of his involvement in the American Cattle Trust is an example of how personal relationships entangled him in complex busine ss affairs .

On January 7 , 1880 , his

eldest daughter, Margaret , married George White Baxter, son of John Baxter of Knoxville , judge of the United States court of appeals for the
sixth circuit .

60

Baxter had graduated from West Point in 1877 and had

been sent West with the Third Cavalry.

In 1881 he resigned from the army

and entered the cattle busine ss at a time when ranching was beginning to
boom.

Becoming active in Democratic politics , he was appointed territorial

58

He is listed as a director in Poor ' s Manual of Railroads until
the edition of 1903 .
59

There are few letters in the McGhee Papers relating to Texas and
Pacific after 1889 . McGhee , however, apparently retained much of his in
vestment in the company. When his granddaughter' s estate was settled in
1971 , there were still Texas and Pacific bonds in the trust which McGhee
had established for her. Interview with William Ros s McNabb , July 28 ,
1974.
60
McC lung, McClung Genealogy, 37 .
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governor of Wyoming by President Cleveland in 1 88 6 but was forced to resign within a few weeks when it was revealed that he had enclosed government land in the process of fencing 2 8 , 000 acres which he had bought from
the Union Pacific Railroad. 6 1 Fresh from this political disappointment
the restless and ambitious Baxter was attracted by a proposal which seemed
to promise financial success . In a short time he linked his fortunes to
the American Cattle Trust and soon managed to interest his father-in-law
in the scheme . Although the enterprise was an exciting one at the beginning, Baxter and McGhee ' s initial involvement was casual ; neither man
realized how important it would become to them during the next decade .
2.
One of the striking characteristics of the economic development
of the United States in the last quarter of the nineteenth century was
the tendency toward combination. 62 Railroad pools , Standard Oil , and the
proliferation of trusts in

many

other areas of industry are testimony to

the strong desire of some American businessmen to integrate production
and distribution or to check competition. A manifestation of this trend
in the range cattle industry may be seen in the form of the American
Cattle Trust and its successor, the Western Union Beef Company. 63 Just
61National Cyclopedia of American Bi ograp4y , XXIII, 1 76 .
62Edward C . Kirkland discusses this trend in Industry Comes of
Age : Business , Labor, and Public Policy, 1 8 60-1§21. (New York : Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1 96 1 ) , 199- 2 1) .
63The first published study of the American Cattle Trust was
Gene M. Gressley' s "The American Cattle Trust : A Study in Prote st , "
Pacific Historical Review, XXX (1 96 1 ) , 6 1- 77 · The McGhee Papers (which

1 64
as many of the "trusts" which attempted to embrace such products as lead,
cordage , and tinware failed to achieve the conspicuous success of Standard
Oil , so the American Cattle Trust failed to integrate cattle production,
meat packing, and distribution, or to stabilize the price of cattle at a
level favorable to the rancher. 64 Nevertheless, the history of the cattle
trust and the corporation which succeeded it provide an insight into the
machinations of businessmen as they struggled with the economic vicissitudes which afflicted the range cattle industry in the years between
188 6 and 18 9 8 . 65
were unavailable to Gressley at the time of his study) reveal substantial
additions to the factual content of the trust story. In addition, the
author disagrees with Gressley' s interpretations in several respects.
These differences will become evident in the course of this chapter.
6�ot all trusts were successful. For ins tance , see Kirkland,
Industry Comes of Age , 214-1 5 .
65The boom and bust of the range cattle industry is analyzed in
several standard accounts : James Sauk Brisbin, The Beef Bonanza : or How
to Get Rich .£!! the Plains (Philadelphia-: J. B. Lippincott & Co . , 188 5);
Edward Everett Dale , The Range Cattle Industry, Ranching gn the Great
Plains , 18 65-12£2 (Norman : University of Oklahoma Press, 1 9 3 0); Maurice
Frink, W. Turren ine Jackson, and Agnes Wright Spring, When � Was King:
Contributions !£ the Western �gg Cattle Industry Stugy (Boulder : Uni
versity of Colorado Press , 1 9 5 6 ; Gene M. Gressley, Bankers and Cattlemen
(New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1966 ) ; Ernest Staples Osgood, The Day of the
Cattleman (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1 929}; Louis
Pelzer, The Cattleman' s Frontier (Glendale , Calif. : The Arthur H. Clark
Co. , 1 9 36')'; and Fred A. Shannon, The Farmer' s Last Frontier: Agriculture,
18 60-1.§.2.1. (New York : Farrar & Rinehart , Inc . , 1 945).
Several monographs provide insight into the problems of cattle
companies during this period : Walt M. Coburn, Pioneer Cattlemen in
Montana : The � of the Circle Q Ranch (Norman: University oiOkla
home Press, 1 96 8 ) ; Harmon Ross Motherhead, The Swan Land and Cattle
Compan.y (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press , 19 71);""'and William M.
Pierce , The Matador Land and Cattle Company (Norman : University of Okla
homa Press , 1 9 64).
The following general discussion is based upon these sources .

16.5
The depression which in 1886 began to grip the cattle business
of the plains states and territories was especially distressing because
it followed a lush period of boom and expansion.

The discovery by

Eastern and British capitalists and adventurers of the opportunities in
cattle raising on the vast ranges of the West had led to the formation
of a great number of cattle companies and the investment of relatively
large amount srof capital .

Ey the early 1880 v s the mania for such inve st-

ments was indeed almost a craze .

All that was necessary, it seemed, was

to turn the beasts loose on the range , and in a year ' s time one could
begin to reap fantastic profits from a herd naturally increased by reproduction and fattened by grazing on the inexhaustible grasses of the
plains .
The subsequent break in cattle price s , beginning in 1884 and continuing for the next two years , demonstrated the uncertainty of these
investments .

The severe winter o f 1886- 1887 which caused greater than

normal losses among many herds was another blow to the optimism of
ranchers and inve stors .

De spite brave denials and predictions of a

rosy future , it was apparent by the spring of 1887 that the busine ss of
cattle raisi ng was not what it had been.

As the ranchers and their

press searched for the origin of their distress
, much attention was
"'
focused on the "beef ring" or the "big four, " the handful of packing
companies centered in Chicago which were the chie f market of the Western
stockgrowers .

66

The discovery of this "monopoly" was at least several

years old , but the hard times on the plains gave the subject a new
66

Gressley, "American Cattle Trust , " 62 , note 9 .
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urgency.

The fact that beef prices to the consumer remained relatively

constant while cattle prices were falling seemed to prove that the "ring"
was conspiring to maintain its profits at the expense of both cattle producers and beef consumers .

In general there was a widespread suspicion

that some one else was now enjoying the money which had once been made in
ranching.

67

As earlier indicated, the ranchers ' hostility toward the packers
and the "middlemen" or cattle brokers was not new.

Local cattle pools

had long sought the advantages of combination by marketing many small
herds as one large unit .

68

The most ambitious attempt to revolutionize

the entire process of turning range cattle into table bee f was attempted
by the fabulous French nobleman , the Marquis de More s , beginning in the
early eightie s .

De Mores visualized a chain of slaughter houses and

re frigerator plants on the plains w�ich would at once compete with the
"big four" and eliminate the long rail journey to the Chicago market .
The Marquis ' companies actually built such a plant at Medora in the
Dakota Territory and later opened a number of meat shops in New York City.
But in 1886 the entire scheme collapsed , perhaps as the result of the mer
curial Frenchman ' s inability to bring hard realism to his striking dream.

69

Just as the Marquis ' New York shops began to close , another great
scheme to save the cattle business was being hatched by a C leveland , Ohio ,

67
69

Ibid. , 61- 64.

68

Pelzer, Cattleman ' s Frontier, 73-84.

The adventure s of the Marquis de Mores are fully related in
D. Jerome Tweten, "The Marquis de Mores and His Dakota Venture , " Journal
of � West , VI ( 1967 ) , 521-34 ·
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merchant with heavy investment s in Western ranche s .
Gillin 1 s

70

Edward M . Mc

concept of a gigantic cattle association, t rust , or corpor-

ation, may be regarded as the ancestor of what was to be the American
Cattle Trust ; but the trust , as it was finally organized, differed in
many particulars from the rather vague ideas propounded by McGillin in
the press and before the International Range Association at Denver in
February, 188 7 .

71

McGillin suggested an "association" of cattle growers ,

capitalized at $100 , 000 , 000 .

This sum was to be raised by the members

who were to mortgage their herds to the association at five dollars a
head, receiving in exchange shares of stock .
the association could raise

" any

On these mortgages , he felt ,

amount" of cash.

Thus McGillin expected

to include in his scheme some 20 , 000 , 000 head which he estimated to be
the approximate range cattle population.

With the capital raised from

the mortgages he proposed to buy and build slaughter houses in Chicago
and at points on the plains .

Also , in some fashion, " the company should

own and control every butcher ' s shop in the United States no matter how
insignificant . "

He expec ted that railroad rates could be cut in half and

commissions to brokers eliminated .

Prices could be regulated and rai sed,

70
McGillin was born in Ireland , immigrated to the United State s ,
and with the backing of H. B . C laflin and Co . o f New York , achieved
initial success as a dry goods merchant in Cleveland , Ohio . He was in
terested in the Fairmount Cattle Company, which operated in Indian
Territory, and in the Harlem Live stock Company of Stratton, Nebraska .
He apparently got into financial difficulty about 1889 and lost his
fortune . McGillin died on November 3 , 1919, in Los Angele s . Gressley,
"American Cattle Trust , " 61 , note 3 ; Baxter to McGhee , June 17 , 1891 .
7l

G:ressley, "American Cattle Trust , " 61-62. An earlier reference
to McGillin ' s plan is in the Northwestern Livestock Journal , December 10 ,
1886 . McGillin ' s speech is reported in ibid. , February 11 , 1887 .
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In short ,

and the stock would become "the best paying in America . "
McGillin dreamed of controlling the entire beef industry

11

from the time

a calf was dropped on the plains until it appeared in the market basket
of the consumer."

72

Here was a concept of int egration and monopoly on

the scale of Standard Oil itself, but the American Cattle Trust was not
to be built on these grandiose proportions , even though McGillin was
heavily interested in

it

and at one time served as its chai rman .

The reaction to the McGillin scheme was mixed.
dimensions of the plan seemed
features were sinister.

73

To some , the

oo great ; to o hers the monopolistic

Nevertheless , several other proposals for

great combinations and revolutionary techniques were forthcoming.

One

of these , the American Beef Pool , proposed by Asa Shinn Mercer, editor
of the Northwestern Livestock Journal , fea u.red a contract between cattle
raisers and the Armour Packing Company.

74

Mercer believed that such an

arrangement would do "an amount of good to the industry that is almo st
beyond calculation.

It reverses , " he wrote , "the usual methods by ere-

ating a sympathetic and close union where be fore has been a pulling
apart . "

75

Although the pool was actually organized in 1887 , it appar-

ently never caught on with the cattle producers .

Another great combina-

tion, the American Meat Company, which will be described in greater

72

Ibid. , December 10 , 1886 , March 18 , 1887 .

73

0riginally the Northwestern Live stock Journal was cool to the
proposal , although it argued that "out of the multiplicity of ideas
thrown off, cr,ystalizations of thought may be found that in the end will
1 carry us safe over. 1 "
December 17 , 1886 .
74

Ibid. , September 16 , 188 7 .
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detail below, was highly touted in the press but came to nothing.

The

only such plan in fact to be converted into a functioning organization
was the concept which became the American Cattle Trust .
If McGillin ' s proposals may be considered the inspiration behind
the trust , the father of the actual organization was undoubtedly Thomas
Sturgis .

76

A rather typical example of the young Easterners who poured

time and money into the range cattle industry, Sturgis was in 1887
president of the Union Cattle Company, a Wyoming corporation capitalized
He had important financial connections in Boston and New

at $300 , 000 .

York and was a recognized leader of the industry in the northern plains .
He was thus perhaps an ideal organizer of a trust which was intended to
hold the confidence of We stern ranchers and Eastern capitalists alike .
Sturgis had the help of his family and Eastern friends , and the support
of some prominent Western cattlemen.

Richard G. Head of New Mexico and

Colorado , the president of the International Range Association, was an
early backer, a trustee , and for some time the trust ' s general range
manager.

John

were Jared

1.

1.

Routt , some time governor of Colorado , was a trustee , as

Brush and John T. Lytle who were respectively the

of the trust ' s Colorado and Texas departments .
managed

managers

The Wyoming department was

in the early months by Francis Warren, entrepreneur , Republican

politician, and future United States Senator from Wyoming.

In charge of

the processing department in Chicago was Nelson Morris , whose Fairbank

76
Gressley, Bankers and Cattlemen, 261-62 , and "American Cattle
Trust , " 6.5-66 ; National QycloPedia of American Biograph,y, XXX , 326-27 .

170
Canning Company was supposed to turn the steers into consumable
beef.

77
In form the cattle t rust was modeled on Standard Oil , a copy o f

whose t rust agreement the Sturgises secured "through influence . "

78

A

self perpetuating board of trustees was given complete control of the
management ,

79

and property was acquired by the issuance of trust certifi-

cates which were exchanged for the stock of companies , or were used to
purchase cattle .

In addition, capital was raised by the sale of cer-

tificates for cash.

The certificates , or shaxe s , bore a par value of one

hundred dollars each but were considered to have an actual value of twenty
five cents on the dollar.

80

Only unencumbered properties were supposed

to be accepted by the trust , but , in fact , several of the companies car
ried mortgages and some were in desperate financial condition.

81

It was

charged with some justification that the trust was "the greatest

77

Gressley, "American Cattle Trust , " 65- 70 . The personnel involved
in the t rust is the subj ect of some confusion. Sturgis was certainly
the first chai rman and Head , Lytle , Routt , and Warren were probably
among the · Western trustees , or directors , at the beginning. The identifi
cation of the first Eastern trustees i s more difficult . Gressley names
Charles F. Smillie , Richard T . Wilson, Jr. , and Samuel Thomas , and indi
cates that they were recruited by Sturgi s . I t would seem that Richard T .
Wilson, Sr. , was involved in the trust from the beginning, but I have
seen no evidence that his son was a t rustee. McGhee ' s friends , Samuel
Thomas and Calvin Brice , appear to have been interested in the trust as
early as 1887 .
78
Gressley, Bankers and Cattlemen, 261 , quoting F. K. Sturgis to
Henry L. Higginson, April 7 , 1887 , Higginson Collection, Baker Library,
Harvard University.
79
McGhee to Winslow, Lanier & Co . , June 15 , 1888 .
80
Baxter to McGhee , April 29, 1887 ; McGhee to Baxter, May 18 , 1887 .
81
Northwestern Livestock Journal , September 16 , 188 7 .
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aggregation of financial cripples now attached to the livestock busi
ne ss of this or any other country. "

82

This criticism struck at the weakest aspect of the combination,
but there were other frailties which were not immediately apparent .
Not the least of these was that the t rust represented varying and sometime s contradictory things to different people .

It appealed to some as

"an attempt to make cattle paper a medium of speculation. "

83

Wbat has

been called "the highly speculative nature " of the stock was a lure to
some investors .

84

To those who were convinced that the only way to

fight monopoly was with monopoly, the trust might have seemed the cattleman ' s solution in the battle with the "Beef Ring. "

Finally, the trust

was the last resort for some practical managers and investors driven to
the wall by the cattle country depression.

As the Anglo- Irish investor,

Horace Plunkett , said , after consulting with the stockholders of the
Frontier Cattle Company on the question of j oining the trust :

"We

agreed that we did not like the scheme but saw no less objectionable way
of liquidating a debt . "

8.5

Beside s these sometimes conflicting ob jec-

tives there were built- in difficultie s which became apparent in time .
For example , the trustees were not answerable to the stockholders or to

82

Ibid. , quoting New Mexico Stock Grower.

83

sir Horace Curzon Plunkett , manuscript diariea, 1881- 1932
(microfilm in Bancroft Library, University of California , Berkeley) ,
April 17 , 1887.
84
Gressley, "American Cattle Trust , " 6 9 .
8.5

P1unkett diary, May 10 , 1887 .
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the public , since among the supposed benefits of the trust organization
was secrecy and the consolidation of managerial power.

86

But the board

was often torn by disagreements which sometimes paralyzed the
and prevented action.

mana

gement

Under these circumstances it is surprising that

the trust lasted as long as it did and that it did not collapse in bankruptcy.

Only the skill and determination of an Eastern financier saved

it from such a disaster at the outset .
Among those who were attracted early to the cattle trust were
Baxter and McGhee .
the young

man

Disappointed for the moment in his political career,

spent the winter of 1886- 1887 in the East .

Even before he

heard of the t rust he was interested in disposing of some of his Wyoming
cattle and land .

He hoped to exchange them for stock in a new company

being organized by Alex Swan, the colorfu.l promoter who had channeled
much British capital into the range cattle busine s s .

87

The financial

embarrassment of Swan, culminating in the collapse of the Swan Land and
Cattle Company in the spring of 188 7 , destroyed this possibility.

88

Then,

after returning to Wyoming, Baxter learned of the trust through hi s
father-in- law ' s friend , Richard T . Wilson, whose Wilson Live stock Company
8
was joining the trust ' s Texas department . 9
At first Sturgis was reluctant to accept Baxter' s relatively
small herd , but he was persuaded when McGhee agreed to buy 2 , 000 shares
86
McGhee to Winslow, Lanier & C o . , June 1) , 1888 .
87
Baxter to McGhee , January 8 , 19 , 2) , 1887 .
88
Baxter to McGhee , April 27 , May 16 , 1887 .
� � � Cattle QQ. �. , 60- 88 .
89
Baxter to McGhee , April 29 , 1887 .

See also Motherhead ,
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of stock at a cost of $50, 00o. 90 McGhee expected that Baxter' s shares
at the end of the year would be "a negotiable security at least. " If

Baxter could sell his land as well , McGhee observed, "you will be foot
loose and can stay in Cheyenne , come to Tennessee or settle where you
like . 11 91 Both men remained optimistic about trust affairs through the
summer, as Sturgis and his cohorts went about the business of accumulating
cattle and land. 92 Sturgis frequently consulted McGhee , and the latter
wrote that "we agreed upon a plan of action which we intend to work out
in the future , if the financial condition of the country will justify
9
any hope of success in that direction. " 3 Sturgis estimated that the
holdings of the trust in mid-September included 350 , 000 head of cattle
and 400, 000 acres of land, as well as Morris ' Chicago establishment . He
wanted to acquire 1 50 , 000 more cattle , "and would want to use $.500, 000
money in addition to the certificates to be used in part paym�nt for increasing the herd to that number. " Two million dollars was required as
working capital for the packing house , making it necessary to raise a
total of $ 2 , 500, 000 to carry out these plans . "For this purpose , " wrote
McGhee , "it is proposed to issue $10 , 000 , 000 Trust Certificates which are
to be taken at 2.5% of their par value which would secure the amount of
money necessary. " It was hoped that with a herd of 500 , 000 head, 100 , 000
9 0McGhee to Baxter, May 7 , 1 8 , 188 7 .
91Ibid. , May 9 , 1 88 .
7
9 �cGhee to Baxter, June 2 7 , July 2 8 , 1 88 7 ; Baxter to McGhee,
June 15 , July 8, 22 , 1 88 7 .
9 �cGhee to Baxter, September 15 , 1 88 7 .
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could be sold each year at an average of
anticipated profit of

$500 , 000

$25

per head. This, with

an

from the packing house , would make an

income of $ J , OOO, OOO annually.
We would have when all this is carried out $40 , 000 , 000 of
Trust Certificates which would have cost the holders 251 on
the dollar. Assuming $500 , 000 for working expense s , errors
in our calculation, and other contingencies we would have a
net income of $2 , 500 , 000 which would be 6% on the par value
of the Certificates, now divide this in half and we have
left J% on the Certificates , or more than 10% on the money
invested.
Selling the new certificates , McGhee realized, might be difficult , but he
retained "great faith in the enterprise if the money can be raised. " 94
It soon became clear, however, that such hopes were wildly optimistic. Sturgis had grossly overestimated the number of cattle owned by the
trust , since the total number never approached the figure of 350 , 000
head. 95 His own Union Cattle Company, which was supposed to be a key
trust property, was in dangerous financial straits . When its true condition became known, McGhee estimated that the company' s debts were over
$200 , 000

greater than its assets. At any rate , when tbe Union' s fall

roundup was over only JO , OOO of the presumed 50 , 000 cattle could be
found. 96 Whether the winter of 1886-1887 had decimated the herd, or
whether the company' s "book count" had been foolishly inflated, this loss
of assets was more than the Union could stand, and in January,
company went into bankruptcy. 9 7

1888 ,

the

94Ibid.

9S rn 1888 the trust owned 118 , 0 5 head. Letterbook, February,
4
February, 1889 , p. SOl ; McGhee to Baxter, November JO, 1887 .
9 6McGhee to Baxter, January S , 1888 .
9 7Baxter to McGhee , January

18 , 1888 .

1888-
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The collapse of the Union Catt le Company caused the first great
crisis of the trust ' s career. Sturgis ' only hope to save his company
had been to incorporate it into the body of the trust before insolvency
overtook it . This , McGhee , who

had

been el.ected a trustee in December,

188 7 , was determined to prevent . 98 With the cooperation of

Wilson and Nelson Morris , McGhee kept t he Union c )mpw.y out
saved the trust by this ac tion. 99 Al tho ugh he was at first
..

Sturgis was perpetrating a

gigantic

that Sturgis acted honestl.y by

his

friend

and

probably

afraid that

sw.i.ndle , MnGhee was J ater convinced

protec ting tn1st

entangled with the Union Company herds. 100

cattle which had become

A t the end of

January the

trust was almost falling apart and McGhee increased greatly his interest
in it s affairs , advancing $1 , 000 to pay
and undertaking to make

drastic change s

e rent on the New York offices
in the ma:nagement . 101 These
t.

changes he hope d to make with the cooperation of Sturgis because McGhee
had serious doubts about the ability and honesty of some of the Western
trustees. Later, he observed that Sturgis "seemed to grasp the situation
but just sat and said or did nothing, like a

in a trance . " It was

man

necessary, therefore , to "combine with the West , " i . e . , the Western trus
tees , to overthrow Sturgis

and

hi.s associates

•

.1°2

98w. C . Lane to McGhee , Jar1uary 4) 1 8 8 8 ;
January 5 , 1888 .
99McGhee to Nelson Morris , May 6 , 1888.
1 00McGhee to Baxter, January 5 , 1888.
lOL_
�cGhee to Sturgis , February l , 1888.
10�cGhee to Wilson, J1me 6 , J 888 .

This was accomplished

McGhee

to Baxter,
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at a trustees ' meeting in New York in May, 1888 .

A complete change

was wrought in the Eastern management : Sturgis was removed as chairman
and his associates, W. C . Lane and Robert Bliss , lost their jobs as
secretary and treasurer. 103 Although McGhee was urged to assume the
chairmanship, 104 he avoided this and was elected secretary and treas

urer. 105 E. M. McGillin, who held approximately 24 , 000 sbaTes of trust
stock, 106 and who in a sense was the originator of the trust idea� be
came chairman in Sturgis ' stead. 10 7 The trustees decided that the Morris
packing plant should be returned, and this was done without financial
loss to the trust . 108 In the West , George Baxter became the Wyoming
manager and was elected president of the North American and Frontier
Cattle companies . 109
McGhee hoped that McGilHn would provide firm coordination o f the
trust ' s western affairs , while he himself administered the New York office
and kept a watchful eye on the treasury. 110 But no sooner was Sturgis
ousted than new difficulties arose. McGillin conceived an intense dislike
for R. G. Head, the general manager in the West , which Head returned with
10�cGhee to Percy R. Pyne , May 1 2 , 1888 .
104wilson to McGhee , March 19 , 22 , 1888 .
l05McGhee to Pyne , May 1 2 , 1888.
106sturgis to McGhee , March 1 , 1888 .
4
l0 7McGhee to Pyne , May 12 , 1888 .
108McGhee to Nelson Morris , May 6 , 1888 .
l 0 9R. G. Head to Baxter, May 2 , 1888 .
4
110McGhee to Wilson, June 26 , 1888 .
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interest . Exactly where the right lay in the McGillin-Head quarrel is
impossible to determine , but relations between the two men soon deterio
rated until they refused to correspond with each other. 111 Head had put
his New Mexico property, the Phoenix

Farm

and Ranch Company, into the

trust , but he retained a majority of the company' s stock which he re
fused to turn over to McGillin. 11 2 Demanding that McGillin be removed,
Head finally refused to allow funds from the sale of cattle to pass into
the trust ' s New York treasury. ll 3 McGhee and the other Eastern trustees,
though they felt that McGillin had been tactless in his treatment of
Head, sternly demanded that the range manager obey the board ' s instruc
tions . 114 The result of the costly feud was ano ther managerial convulsion in which both McGillin and Head ceased their connection with the
trust . McGi11in 1 s trust stock apparently passed into the hands of John
Claflin of the New York mercantile house , H. B. Claflin and Company. 115
A Claflin associate and attorney, Charles

W.

Gould of New York, was made

chairman in January, 1889, though Thomas Sturgis vainly tried to regain
that office . 11 6 The position of general range manager was left unfilled,
111Head to McGhee , August 2 7 , 1888.
11 2Baxter to McGhee , October 9 , 1888 .

ll 3Head to MqGhee , August 7 , 1888 .
11�cGhee to Head, August 1 , 1888 .
3
ll5McGillin seems to have gotten into serious financial difficulty
in late 1888, and as a result H. B. Claflin and Company assumed owner
ship of his shares. See John Claflin to McGhee , November 1 6 , 1888 , and
January 1 , 1889.
11 6McGhee to Claflin, January , 1889.
7
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and the Western management remained divided into three departments
managed by George Baxter, Jared L. Brush, and John T . Lytle . 11 7
By the spring of 1889 the cattle trust was two years old, and
its nature , along with its management , had substantially c hanged. It
had never seriously sought to monopolize cattle production

and

certainly

never came close to this goal. After the return of the packing plant
to Morris, the trust became in reality just a very large cattle company
without pretense of combining the production and processing phases of the
beef industry. Still the dream of such a combination persisted in some
quarters. Rumors of a new beef combine began to circulate in the summe r
of 1888 , 118 and in February of the following year it was reported that a
company controlling over a million acres , 200 , 000 cattle , refrigerated
railroad cars, and a Kansas City packing plant had been organized under
New Mexico laws. 119 The corporation' s officers were said to include
John

H.

Flagler, J.

0.

Moss , and other leaders of the American Cotton

Oil Trust , and the company was rumored to be planning retail outlets

ip

Eastern cities . So great was the scheme that it was referred to as
"The Big Four' s Rival. i• 120 Actually the American Meat Company, as it
was properly called, originally seems to have been the creation of Stephen
Dorsey, New Mexico ranch owner, and a figure in the Star Route mail
frauds . 121 Dorsey approached McGhee with a consolidation proposal and
ll 7 This arrangement prevailed from January, 188 9 , until January,
18QO. See Baxter and Brush to McGhee , February 3 , 1890 .
118New York Times , August 1 6 , 1888 .

120Ibid.
119Ibid. , February 2 , 188 9 .
3
12 �cGhee to Charles Gould, May 9 , 188 9 ; Dictiona;r 2f American
Biography , V, 3 8 7 .
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a tentative agreement was made to sell 60 , 000 shares of cattle t rust
stock to the meat company at twenty- five cents on the dollar, ten cents
being in cash and fifteen in meat company stock.

122

In describing this

agreement to Charles Gould , McGhee pointed out that although the two o f
them and several other trustees controlled enough cattle trust stock t o
personally furnish the 60 , 000 share s , they were honor bound to distribute
the benefit s of the sale among all the shareholders :
I feel quite sure you will agree with me that in occupying
the position of Trustees we are prevented from exercising
the rights of stockholders as we could were we not Trustees .
That is we must look out for the interests of all parties
for whom we are Trustee s .
Now I would just a s soon, and I think a great deal rather,
that the whole thing "upset" as I have no great faith in
Dorsey, as from the representations o f others he is entirely
unre liable in his statements . l2 3
McGhee ' s suspicions were soon ful filled, for in May, 1 88 9 , J. W.
:...
Davis and Company, agents for the meat company, stopped selling its
stock as a result of the withdrawal of Flaglerrand his cotton oil trust
associates from the management .

124

It was rumored that the ":Big Four , "

who used great quantities of cotton oil products , had pressured Flagler
and the others to abandon the meat company.

125

Efforts to reorganize

the scheme under the leadership of former Senator Warren Miller of New
York were not successful , but the cattle trust continued to entertain

122.__
�cGhee to Wilson, May 1 4 , 1 88 9 .
121__
-McGhee t o Gould, May 9 , 1 88 9 .
12

�cGhee

to John G . Moore , May 17 , 1 88 9 .

125
New York Tribune , April 12 , 1 88 9 .

180
the idea of some kind of merger or traffic agree�ent with the meat
company if it should in fact materialize .

126

McGhee even considered

buying the company ' s Kansas City meat packing plant for the trust , but
one of the Western t rustees advised against it , and the purchase was
never made .

127

By the end of 1889 the talk of a great meat company

faded away, and this failure to organize probably marked the end of
efforts to create a completely integrated meat supplier.
Though he often expressed the belief that cattle trust stock
was worth at least 25 percent of its par value ,

128

neither McGhee nor

any others were able to sell shares for as much as twenty- five cents on
the dollar, a not remarkable situation since the trust had never paid
a dividend.

Still , the hope of successful speculation in its shares

remained a major motive of the trust ' s

mana

gers .

Trust shares generally

were considered "glamour stocks" by part of the investing public , and
the cattle trust , because of its name , probably shared in this identi
fication.

129

When the trust ' s shares were first quoted on the New York

l O
Exchange in the summe r of 188 9 , the price ranged as high as nineteen. J
At this time McGhee and another trustee , Samuel Thomas , traded heavily

126
McGhee to J . L. Brush, August 5 , 1889 .
127
Brush to McGhee , August 22 , 188 9 .
128

See , for instance , McGhee ' s letters to Winslow, Lanier & C o . ,
July J , to Brush, July 22 , to Routt , July 31 , and to Dr. G. A . Baxter,
November 8, 1889 .
129
Baxter to McGhee , June 30 , 1889 .
130
McGhee to Fleming, July 15 , 1889 . The trust was not listed by
the New York Stock Exchange , but its shares were quoted. The prices are
reported in the New York Time s , July-August , 188 9 .
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in the shares and over the course of a few days made a profit of over
$5 , 000 apiece .

l)l

It was well that they seized this opportunity, for

neither the cattle trust ' s nor the Western Union Beef' s stock ever again
exceeded nineteen in the quotations , and the shares usually sold for
considerably les s .

132

It was probably the failure of the trust ' s stock to be taken up
by the public in an enthusiastic

mann

e r which led McGhee and others to

consider making it into a corporation.

Public opinion became increasingly

hostile towards trust s , and in 1890 Congress responded by passing the
She rman Act , which was supposed to make such "combination in restraint
of trade" illegal .

The name "trust" had thus outlived its usefulnes s as

a way of making stock a speculative security, and the trustees decided
to create the Western Union Beef Company out of the American Cattle
Trust .

133

McGhee assumed the chai rmanship in January, 1890 , and from

that time on the treasury was handled by Richard T . Wilson ' s firm.

l34

In· o-rder to "assure harmony in the management , " McGhee and Wilson in the

l)l

See McGhee & Thomas in account with J. W. Davis & C o . , trans
action receipts , July, 1889 .
l32

Fluctuations of the prices of American Cattle Trust and Western
Union Beef during the 1890 ' s may be followed in the Commercial and
Financial Chronicle .
l33

on November 8 , 188 9 , McGhee wrote Dr. G. A . Baxter tbat "public
sentiment is so bitterly against trusts that it is impossible to get
anything like the real value for such stocks at present . "
1 34
In May, 1890 , McGhee actually resigned the chai rmanship , but
this may have been a maneuver to encourage C laflin to sell his stock.
Likewise , Wilson may have temporarily surrendered the treasury of the
trust to McGhee in the summe r of 1890 . It is clear, however, that after
the middle of 1890 McGhee and Wilson were in complete control of the
cattle trust and later of the Western Union Beef Company.
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spring of 1890 bought the stock held by John C laflin and the way was
cleared for dissolution into a corporation.

l35

The details of reorganization were handled by William Nelson C romwell, of the New York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell , and by Judge
C . G. Symes of Denver, a large stockhoJd er.

136

By the end of the year

the necessary number of assents from stockholders had been received , and
on January l , 1891 , the trust officially became the Western Union Bee f
Company.

l37

An exchange of shares was made on a one- for- one basis , the

corporation being capitalized at $15 , 000 , 000 with 136 , 000 shares of
issued stock worth $100 per share at par.

138

Ironically, the trust was

really stronger at the time of its demise than it had been since its
founding.

Cattle prices were a little higher in 1889 than in the two

preceding years , and the trust

managed

to make a profit of $ 8 9 , 581 . 48 ,

as compared t o a profit o f only $48 , 188 . 73 during 1887 and 1888 .

139

A dividend would probably have been declared had it not been decided to
change the trust into a corporation.

14°

Payment was there fore postponed

l35
McGhee to Bruce F. Johnson, June 2 , 1890 ; see also , McGhee ' s
sto ck ledger, p . 45 , for the C laflin transaction.
l36
McGhee to Symes , August l , 1890 .
l37
McGhee to Cromwell , December 24, 1890 . Statements of the
American Cattle Trust were through December 31 , 188 9 . Those of the
Western Union Beef Company began on January l , 1890 .
l38
western Union Beef Company Letterbook.
W. U. B. Letterbook.
139

Cited hereafter as

Ibid . , 156-57 .

l40
Although Gre ssley cites a statement of the trust which indi
cates that a 3 percent dividend was paid, I have found no evidence of
a dividend prior to the l/2 of l percent paid by Western Union Beef
in February, 1891 .
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until 1891 when the trust stock was exchanged for Western Union Beef
shares , and the dividend appeared to the credit of that company.

l4l

The officers of the new company were C . M. McGhee , president ;
C . G. Symes , vice president ; C . T. Leonhardt , secretary ; and C . H. Bosher,
of R . T. Wilson and Company, treasurer.

In the West , the northern de-

partment , consisting of Wyoming, Montana , and a feeding station at
Neligh, Nebraska , was managed from Cheyenne by George Baxter.

The Colo-

rado department , composed of Colorado and the Texas panhandle , was

run

by J . L. Brush of Greeley; the Texas department , by John T . Lytle with
headquarters in San Antonio .

142

The company owned 29) , 212 acres , most

of which were located in Texas , "conservatively valued" at $1 , 060 , 36) .
Two thousand acres in Colorado and 2 , 248 acres in Wyoming formed the
core of operations in the states where cattle grazed mostly on the open
government-owned ranges .

The 1 , 448-acre farm in central Nebraska was

used for feeding cattle on grain.

The company usually owned over

100 , 000 cattle and sold from 7 , 000 to 18 , 000 head a year.

143

Typical ly,

the Texas ranches were used as breeding grounds from which the immature
steers and spayed heifers were shipped to the northern ranges where
they were fattened and from which they were marketed.

144

14L - U .
-w.
B . Letterbook , 321 .
l42

In the absence of any complete statement of the officers and
organization , I have based this upon a number of letters in the McGhee
Papers .
143

W. U. B . Letterbook , 279- 80.

l44

Leonhardt to Baxter, ibid . , 344-46 .
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Unlike its predecessor, Western Union Beef was from the outset
under the control of McGhee and Wilson, and the company soon took on
the aspect of a family business. McGhee stepped down to the vice
presidency in 1�92 and was succeeded by Baxter, who continued to manage
the northern department. 14S A year later, Richard Wilson' s nephew was

named general superintendent of the company' s Texas ranches . 146 Finally,
L. Brush was removed, the Colorado and northern departments consoli
dated, and Baxter moved to Denver to oversee both of them. 147 Thus by
J.

1895 all important positions in the company were filled by members of
the two families, or by McGhee ' s and Wilson' s employees . Although
apparently never owning a maj;�ity of the stock, l4B the two financiers
'

were able to exercise complete control . This was possible for several
reasons . The company never demonstrated any great earning capacity and
therefore did not make an attractive target for raiders ; no outsider
would have been tempted to take over such a property when the cattle
industry was still suffering from a depression. A successful challenge
from among the company' s stockholders woul& almost certainly have had to
include men of considerable stature in New York financial circles . MeGhee and Wilson lived at the heart of that financial center, possessed
large amounts of capital and had access to more . It would have taken a
l4SMcGhee to Baxter, ibid. , .
63
146Leonhardt to Frank Boulter, ibid. , 1 9 .
5
+47 Leonhardt to Brush, �. , 3 1 6 -1 7 .
l4BLists of stockholders in ibid. McGhee and Wilson together
never seemed to own more than a quarter of the total shares.

18 5
powerfully connected alliance to have unseated them from control .
Firially, the company was by no means mismanaged. Between 1890 and 18 9 8
it paid a total of 5 3/4 percent dividends on its capital stock, an
amount which was at least 2 3 percent on the original cost of the stock
to the investor, l4 9 a record which compares quite favorably with those
. o f Slffil
. d l5 0
o f cattl e compan1es
. " lar s1ze
. 1n
. thi s per1o
•

The most damaging criticism which can be made of the McGheeWilson control involves the manipulation of stock. As with the trust ,
the managers of the com�any were anxious to boom the price of shares .
George Baxter, who keenly felt his financial dependence on his fatherin-law, constantly hoped to sell his stock at a favorable price and
liquidate his debts . McGhee and Wilson were no doubt more realistic
about such matters , and it was not until 1895 that they seriously considered forming a pool to boost the shares on the market . At that time
Baxter wrote McGhee :
If you think it would help out the scheme you have on hand I
might crowd my beef shipments during July and August . I
think by going at it vigorously that I could ship $1 50 , 000 in
July and $200 , 000 in August , instead of covering the entire
season. It occurred to me that it might help matters to have
the information go out that we were selling as much as that
in one month. l5 l
l49A stockholder who valued his shares at 2 percent of par (the
5
standard valuation at the founding of the cattle trust ) could calculate
his return at four times the declared dividend. For a schedule of
dividends , see ibid. , 3 2 1 , 47 3 ·
l5 0See , for instance , Pierce , Matador Land and Cattle Company , ,
34
7 2 ; Gressley, Bankers and Cattlemen, 8 6 , 2 75 - 76 ; and Motherhead, Swan
Land and Cattle Co . , 182 .
l5 �axter to McGhee , May 10 , 189 .
5

18 6
A month later he offered to sell immature steers in order to increase the company' s '1895 profits . 15 2 Apparently this was done , and a
larger than usual dividend was paid in 1895 , but only at the cost of
paying no dividend in 189 6 . 15 3 Even this seems to have failed to produce a strong market for the stock and neither Baxter, McGhee , nor Wilson
was able to unload a significant portion of his holdings. McGhee and
..·�

Baxter, however, made some profit on 2 , 82 4 shares which they bought at
eight cents on the dollar from John L. Routt of Denver. 154
Not only was Western Union Beef one of the largest cattle companies
in the West , but it maY have been unique for the degree to which it was
managed from the East . A Colorado corporation, it did not maintain a
full time office in Denver until 18 95 . Although the stockholders ' meetings were held in that city as required by the charter, the board of
directors always met in New York. Even after Baxter became president ,
decisions of importance were referred to McGhee and Wilson, who usually
made the final determination. Petty matters as well were often brought
to the New York financiers for decision. N. T . Wilson, for instance , once
asked McGhee s opinion about burning off brush on·· some of the Texas ranch
land, l55 a query which prompted the New Yorker t� compl�in to Baxter that
"Wilson is very fond of shirking responsibility and do not like it. 11 1 5 6
1

Notwithstanding the tight New York control of ope rations , it is clear
that Baxter occupied a key position in the company. He could be relied
l5 3w.

u.

B. Letterbook, 3 21.

l5�cGhee in account with J. W. Davis & Co. , transaction slips ,
July-September, 1895 ; Baxter to McGhee, June 2 , 1895 .
l55w. u. B. Letterbook, 11.
l5 6
3
!hi£ . , 3 12 .
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on to carry out his father- in- law ' s wishes to the letter, but his judgment as a practical cattleman was respected by both McGhee and Richard
Wilson.
:Despite a disinclination 11 to live and die with West ern Union
Beef, 1 1

157

Baxter was often optimistic about the future of the busine s s .

His enthusiasm usually peaked in the early summe r when the grass was lush
and the herds wer� growing fat ,
cattle prices sagged .

l59

158

but it waned as autumn approached and

Like so many other cattlemen, he �ver seemed

to realize that a good growing season commonly meant a glutted market in
the fall .

Similarly, he was unpleasant ly surprised by the periodic bliz

zards or droughts which ruined the best laid plans of stock raisers .

160

The evidence indicates , however, that Baxter was an honest and hard
working manager who did the best that he could in tho se years of hardship .
His most controversial action was his role in the famous Johnson
County war.

161

In this connection Baxter has emerged as a scapegoat for

those 11 cattle barons 11 who , taking the law into their hands , set out to
eliminate the 11 rustlers 11 in the Powder River country of Wyoming.

There

is no evidence that Baxter helped to plan and to finance this expedition

l57

Baxter to McGhee , June 25 , 1891 .

l58

see , for instance , ibid . , April 8 , 1 1 , June 9 , 23 , 1890 ,
May 1 , 11 , 18 , July 21 , 1891 .
l59
160
161

Ibid. , September 18 , 25 , 1890 , September 20, October 6 , 1891.
rbid . , May 27 , 1892 , June 20 , 1894.

The longe st and best ( though not especially scholarly) account
of the Johnson County War is in Helena Huntington Smith, � War .£!! Powder
� (New York : McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966 ) .
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of which he was not a member. This charge , made by Asa Shinn Mercer in
his account , � Banditti of the Plains , 1 6 2 is reinforced by John Clay
in his autobiography, !1Y Life .2!t the Range. 1 6 3 As vice president of the
Wyoming Stockgrowers Association, Baxter would have presided during
Clay' s absence at the meetings (if meetings there were) which hatched
the invasion. Clay, however, who was in Ireland at the time of the war,
published his memoirs more than twenty years after the fact and may have
been interested in disassociating himself from an active role in the
affair. Mercer' s motives in writing his diatribe have been seriously
questioned, and it may be that his account was colored by his rivalry
with Baxter in the Wyoming Democratic party. 1 64 Baxter certainly approved
of the vigilante raid, but if he did plan it , or back it with money, he
apparently did so without McGhee ' s knowledge . 1 6S His financial situation was such that he hardly could have afforded to spend personally
large sums in such an enterprise , and there is no indication that Western
Union 'Beef did so. The company' s board did, however, commend in August ,
1892 , "the able , bold, fearless and self- sacrificing manner in which
1 6 2A. S. Mercer, The Banditti of the Plains ; or, The Cattlemen' s
Invasion of Wyoming in 1892 : The Cro�iMinfamy of the Ages (Cheyenne :
A. S . Mercer, 1894 ; new edition, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1954 ) ' J l- 48 .
1 63 John Clay, !1Y Life .2!t the Range (Chicago : privately printed,
n. d. ; new edition, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 19 6 2 ) , 2 7 1 .
1 64smith, War £g Powder River, 2 2-80.
7
1 6SThat Baxter approved of the invasion is made clear by his letters
in March, April , and May, 189 2 , in the McGhee Payers . The same letters ,
however, strongly indicate that McGhee knew nothing of the affair until
after it took place .
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Geo. W. Baxter has defended and tried to protect by all lawful means the
interests of this Company in serious civil disturbances , which have
occurred in the territory under his management . " 1 66

The charge made by Mercer, 1 67 and enlarged and elaborated by Mari
Sandoz in The Cattlemen, 1 6 8 that Baxter and his foreman stole some of the
company' s cattle is without foundation. According to the Mercer-Sandoz
theory, Baxter ' s theft was found out during the 18 92 round up and he
left Wyoming in disgrace . In fact Baxter remained in the state until
the winter of 1895, and as a mark of the board ' s confidence wa� elected
president of the company in August , 18 92 .
The irony of the Western Union Beef story is that after an eightyear struggle with adversity the company was liquidated at the moment when
the range cattle industry began to recover its prosperity. In the spring
of 189 7 new confidence began to creep back into western cattlemen, and
this proved to be the beginning of a revival which made the industry
generally quite prosperous for another decade . 1 6 9 Unfortunately, the
West�rn Union Beef Company was not to enjoy it . The years of discouragement and blasted hopes had taken their toll, and the prospect of selling
1 66W. U. B. Letterbook, 6 .
4
1 67Mercer, Banditti of the Plains , 1 1- 2 .
4 4
1 68Mari Sandoz , The Cattlemen, From the Rio Grande Across the
ru Marias (New York : &stings House Publisher;:-1958)' 3 99. In Sandoz
highly colored account the exposure of Baxter' s theft is stated as a
fact . The only basis for this assertion seems to be Mercer' s innuendo
which begins : "Some persons have bee'n uncharitable enough to suggest .
Smith in War .2!! Powder River does not mention the Mercer-Sandoz
charge against Baxter.
1 6 9Shannon, Farmer' s Last Frontier, 2 6 , 2 .
3
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out under favorable market conditions was tempting.

In June , 1897 ,

Alex ,Moore , a Texas stockholder, pointed out to McGhee the advantages
of such a liquidation :
Cattlemen are all out of debt and getting rich, land is going
up and in demand , crops fine , and the .gras s and water condi t?-.ons could not be better, more range than stock to eat it ,
and cows and heifers wanted at big prices for breeding purposes .
Everything in the stock busine ss seems t o prosper except
"the We stern Union Beef Co , " judging from the price of shares
in New York for which I see $) . 00 pe r share is only offered.
This doe s not reflect much confidence in the Company with the
public , and seems ridiculous to thos e who know better.
If the Company can ' t make money under present conditions
and put the stock up to something near its value , the best
thing would be to liquidate , as soon as it can be done to ad
vantage .
.
.
. .
.
.
.
.
. . .
We don ' t know how long the prices of cattle will keep up ,
but we do know that they � fast , and experience has shown
that it is a good time to sell cattle when people want to buyf
at high price s . l70
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

During the summer and fall of 1897 the herds were sold and a 2 per
cent dividend was declared in November.
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At the beginning of 1898 a

circular went out to the stockholders proposing to reduce the capital
stock from $1J , 600 , 000 to $408 , 000 , represented by 4 , 080 shares of $100
each, and to change the company ' s name to the Western Livestock and Land
Company :
It is manifest that the outstanding capital stock of the company
is out of all proportion to the present value of its asset s ,
and therefore the board proposes t o decrease it . • . • The
company has marketed most of its cattle constituting its stock ,
and will soon have in hand therefrom about $700 , 000 in cash. I t

170
Alex Moore to McGhee , June 7 , 1897 .
l7L -

-w.

U. B. Letterbook , 465 , 473 •
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seems undesirable to re-employ said capital in furthe r pur
chases at this time , and the question is presented whether it
shall be retained inde finitely at unprofitable interest rates
or be distributed to stockholders by way of reduction of
capital . The company is free from indebtednes s of any kind.
We be lieve that the change of name and reduction of capital
will establish the company in high credit for such operations
as its means may permit , and give sound basis for its new
capitalization and future operations . l72
On February 28 , 1898 , the stockholders , meeting at Denver, approved the
proposals , and the We stern Union Beef Company went out of existence.

l73

The 1897 and the liquidation dividends , together with the new
stock amounted to 10 percent of the par value of the old Western Union
Beef stock.

The stockholders thus received in cash and new securities

an amount in excess of the figures at which the stock had been quoted
since December, 1895 .
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The dissolution there fore seems to have been

a sensible means of distributing to the stockholders the true value of
their share s .

This appears still more valid in view o f another distri-

bution dividend paid in 1899 which was roughly equal to the par value of
the Western L�vestock and Land share s .
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Thus an investor who bought

We stern Union Bee f at , say, eight , in December, 1895 , would have received
back the original cost of the stock plus a 25 percent return in something
over four years ' time--hardly a fantastic gain but still a respectable
profit .

Investors such as McGhee and Wilson, who bought stock in 1890

172
173

commercial and Financial Chronicle , LXVI ( 1898 ) , 84.
Ibid. , 531 .

17), .

�.

U. B . Letterbook , 480 ; McGhee Journal , 103 .

l75
McGhee Journal , 163 .
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at 12 1/2 , received a total of only about 11 percent above their original
investment in a nine year period.
The great losers were those who paid 25 cents on the dollar for
cattle t rust stock in 1887 .

..
Such unfortunates lost quite heavily by the

end of the twelve-year career of the trust and We stern Union Bee£.

But

most of the stock taken at this valuation was received in exchange for
cattle and land which probably could not have been sold for anything like
such values during the time of the severest cattle depression.

McGhee ,

of course , paid cash for his 2 , 000 shares in 1887 , but these were less
than one third of his 1898 holdings .

In the interval he had

managed

to

reduce his losses by moderately successful speculations in the trust ' s
and the company' s stock.
vestors did likewise.

Perhaps Wilson and other original cash in-

Both Wilson and McGhee drew other benefits from

their association with the enterprise.

Wilson' s firm got a yearly

$5 , 000 fee for its services as a financial agent ; McGhee drew a salary
for being the company' s vice president ; and both men had relatives and
personal employees on the payro11 .

176

It would not seem that these re-

wards were excessive , or that they outweighed the considerable total
services rendered by the financiers and their dependents .
The American Cattle Trust was organi zed at the beginning o f a
period of drastic readjustment in the range cattle busine s s .

Many of

the overblown corporations of earlier years were liquidated during the
industry' s severe depression which lasted into the 1890 ' s .

Despite

176
W. U. B. Letterbook , 272 . The treasurer was an employee of
Wilson' s firm ; the company ' s secretary was McGhee ' s private secretary,
Charles T . Leonhardt .
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frailties of organization and the insolvency of some of its component
companies , the cattle trust proved a haven for some Eastern financiers
and Western cattlemen whose investments were seriously threa�ened by
these business storms . The cattle trust was probably the product of two
major impulses : the urge to " fight monopoly with monopoly" and the de
sire to create an organization large enough to market its stock on the
New York Exchange . The former motive betrayed a sensitivity to the
growing sickness of the industry as a whole ; something was wrong with
the cattle business , and the trust seemed to be a way to correct the de
fect. The second motive , however, was , in a sense , a testament of con
fidence in the industry' s future .

A

large organization, it was believed,

could consolidate the prosperity of the cattle boom and become a de
sirable speculative investment . "Fighting monopoly with monopoly, " which
was the theme of

E.

M. McGillin1 s first trust proposal , may indeed be

viewed as a manifestation of "protest . " It is a mistake , however, to
regard the actual cattle trust as essentially a "protest movement . " The
influence of the "protest" motive may have been strong at the outset ,
but it quickly faded before the realities of business life .
The emergence o f the McGhee-Wilson interest , which became dominant
within a year of the trust ' s founding, marked a shift of power from the
West to New York City and a transformation of the trust ' s raison d 1 etre .
The financiers were interested in simply making the trust a paying enter
prise with speculative possibilities. Toward this end they worked with
mixed success. The Western Union Beef Company was wholly their creature
and was only a new vehicle for their consistent motive . In a sense Mc
Ghee and Wilson were thrust into control when Thomas Sturgis ' financial

1 94
difficulties exposed to them the precarious situation of the trust (and
the cattle industry as well) . They "took hold of it , " as McGhee would
say, and saved only a part of the original investment . Had the trust
been realistically capitalized from the beginning, their record would
have been much better; a more realistic organization and better

ge-

mana

ment at the inception would also have contributed to the project ' s prospects of success. As it was , the cattle trust and Western Union Beef
failed to make much money for their stockholders , or to rehabilitate the
cattle industry in gener,al , but the trust and its successor did salvage
some of the investments which almost surely would have been lost in the
collapse of the range cattle industry' s biggest boom.
McGhee ' s role in the Texas and Pacific was a natural outgrowth of
his other railroad activities ; his involvement in the Western Cattle business was accidental . Normally his investments were carefully planned and
were concentrated in his native state, for Tennessee was the place he knew
best , and there he sought returns in railroads , mineral resources , and
real estate . The promotion of the area' s economic potential was at the
hea:tt of these enterprises , but the drive for gain took precedence over
all' else . Thus , "developmental" and "opportunistic" approaches to invest
ment were mingled as McGhee sought to maximize his profits . 1 77
l 77 The terms "developmental" and "opportunistic" were devised by
Arthur M. Johnson and Barry E . Supple "to distinguish generally between
railroad investments made in anticipation of the long-run gains to be
derived from sustained economic growth
, and investments made with
relatively shorter time horizons , the context of which was not so much
future income growth as the securing of profits from available markets-
whether for goods , for railroad services , or for stocks and bonds . " See
Johnson and Supple , Boston Capitalists and Western Railroads , ! Study in
the Nineteenth-Century Railroad Investment Process (Cambridge : Harvard
University Press , 1 967 ) , 10.
•
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CHA.PI'ER VI
IRON, COAL,

AND LAND :

INVESTMENTS OPPORTUNISTIC

AND

DEVELOFMENTAL

The 1880 1 s is crucial in the history of the New South, for this
decade repre sented the " take- off" period for the region ' s industrializat �on.
.

1

The eighties were years of general prosperity in the nation--a

time of relief between the panics of the seventies and the severe depres.
. t �es
' .
s�on
o f the ear1y �ne

2

In the South i t was an era o f unprecedented

commercial and industrial development , when the region ' s resources attracted the attention of capitalists

who

exploited them as never before .

For years Southern publicists had dwelt on their section ' s advantages ,
had begged for Northern capital , had proclaimed what one historian has
called the "new order of thought and action. "

3

After 1880 there was a

lwoodward , Origins of the � South, 107-41 , disagrees with the
" scholars who have fixed upon the latter year [ 1880] as the beginning of
1 the industrial revolution ' in the South, " but he does not dispute the
fact that Southern investment and development was accelerated during the
decade . The activity of the eighties was especially important in Tennes
see . See Constantine G. Belissary, "The Rise of the Industrial Spirit in
Tennessee , 1865- 1885 11 (unpublished Ph. D . dissertation, Vanderbilt Univer
sity, 1949 ) , 256-58. The term "take- off" is used by W. W. Rostow in
� Stages of Economic Growth, ! �-Communist Manifesto ( Cambridge ,
England : Cambridge University Pre s s , 1960) , 7- 9 .
2

In 1873 the United States entered a period of general busines s
depression which lasted until the late 1890 ' s . Except for 1882-85 when
there was a recession, however, the decade of the eighties was a lull
between the severe depressions of the seventies and the ninetie s . See
Kirkland , Industry � of Age , 4- 8 .

3victor S . C lark, "Modern Manufacturing Development in the South,
1880-1905 , " Economic History, 1865- 1910 , Vol . VI of � South in the
Building of the Nation , ed. James Curtis Ballagh ( 13 vols . ; Richmond :
The Southern Historical Publication Society, 1909 ) , 266 .
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19 6
flood of such propaganda, culminating in Henry Grady' s famous "New South"
speech of 188 6 . 4 The ground thus prepared, local businessmen, Northern
and foreign capitalists, promoters and speculators launched a multitude
of railroad, mining, and manufacturing enterprises.

Many

of these faiied

at the first appearance of a contracting economy, but others survived the
depressed nineties to continue the industrial "evolution" in the South.
Hardly typical of the old regime , Tennessee nevertheless suffered
from the shortage of capital and enterprise which, it was widely felt , had
oppressed the entire region. 5 Immediately after the Civil War the Radical
Republicans, both for political and economic reasons , encouraged an in
flux of Yankees and Yankee capita1. 6 Even after the end of this Republi
can rule , Democrats like Joseph Buckner Killebrew7 and Arthur St . Clair
Colyar8 promoted immigration and industrial development . Thus the state

was well prepared for the long heralded boom of the eighties.
It was fitting that much of this economic activity was centered in
East Tennessee. The "invitation to carpetbaggers" had been issued during
the administration of a Knoxville Republican, Governor William G. Brownlow, and, East Tennesseans remaining loyal to the Republicans after the

!tpaul M. Gaston, The New South Creed, !. Study in Southern M.ytbmaking
(New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 197 0), 1 7- 45 ; Belissary, "Rise of the Indus
trial Spirit , vi-ix.
5 Ibid. , 128- 34 ·
6Hesseltine , "Tennessee ' s Invitation to Carpetbaggers . "
11

7 samuel Boyd Smith, "Joseph Buckner Killebrew and the New South
Mov�ment in Tennessee , " East Tennessee Historical Society' s Publications ,
No. 37 (19 65 ) , 5- 22 .
8 Clyde L. Ball , "The Public Career of Colonel A. S . Colyar, 18 7 018 77 , " Tennessee Historical Quarterly, XII ( 1953 ) , 2 3- 47 , 10 6- 2 8 , 213- 3 8 .
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restoration of Democratic rule in the state , could justly claim that
their section was receptive to northern men and ideas . In 18 6 9 the
Knoxville Industrial Association was formed to promote immigration and
encourage the development of the area' s natural resources. 9 The first
president of the organization was John W. North, a New York adventurer
who soon failed in Knoxville as an iron master and moved on to become one
o f the founders o f Rivers1de , ca1 1 forn1a. 10
0

0

0

Other Northerners were more successful in establishing prosperous
manufacturing enterprises in East Tennessee . Among the most prominent
were John T. Wilder and Hiram S. Chamberlain, who were intimately associated with the development of the iron industry in the area. Wilder, a
Union brigadier, and Chamberlain, Federal chief quartermaster of East
Tennessee , discovered the potential of the region' s iron ore during the
Civil War and remained to exploit it . 11 In 18 6 8 Chamberlain, with a
Welsh ironmaster, David Richards , incorporated the Knoxville Iron Company
which continues to this day the manufacture of finished iron products . 1 2
Together with Wilder and other Northern investors , Chamberlain founded
in 18 67 the Roane Iron Company, a more ambitious project , which manufactured
9Knoxville Industrial Association, Facts and Figures Concerning
the Climate , Manufacturing Advantage s , and the Agricultural and Mineral
Resources of East Tennessee (Knoxville : T. Haws and Co. , 18 6 9).
10Merlin Stonehouse , John Wegley North and - the Reform Frontier
(Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press , 1 9 65}.
1 �orrow Chamberlain, ! Brief History of the P)g Iron Industry of
� Tennessee (Chattanooga : Privately printed, 1942 , 6 .
1 2 Joseph Harold Clark "History of the Knoxville Iron Company" (un
published Master' s thesis, The University of Tennessee , Knoxville , 194 9 ) .
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pig iron until 1930 .

13

Although Wilder is perhaps better known and was

certainly a talented promoter, it is Chamberlain who typifies the crea
tive entrepreneur developing the . resources of the South.
The Roane Iron Company built the South' s first coke burning fur
nace which went into blast at Rockwood, some fifty miles southwest of
Knoxville , in 1868 .

Drawing its ore and coal from mines at the foot o f

nearby Walden Ridge , the company produced pig iron which for a time com
peted successfully in the Southern market and later was sold 'in other
sections of the country.

In 1870 the Roane Company merged with the S outh

western Iron Company which for several years had operated a rolling mill
at Chattanooga .

Now the possessor of properties which made possible

fully integrated production, the company plunged into the manufacture of
iron rails for the South ' s expanding railroads .

By 1876 the Roane Iron

Company, with a paid up capital of one million dollars , employed over five
hundred men at Chattanooga and half that number at Rockwood.
made 24, 000 tons of pig iron and rolled 28 , 000 tons of rail s .

It annually
With the

rising demand for steel rails and the accompanying decline in sales of
iron the company installed new equipment at Chattanooga , and in 1878
manufactured the first steel made in the South.

Although 50 , 000 tons of

steel rails were produced, a drop in the price of rails and the difficulty
of obtaining the proper ore forced the company in 1883 to abandon thi s
pioneer effort in steel-making.

A few years later, however , a five-ton

Bessemer converter was purchased , and the South ' s first Bessemer steel

lJ

Chamberlain , Brief History, 6- 8 .
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was made at Chattanooga in 188 7 .

14

It was about this time that McGhee

began to take an interest in the Roane Iron Company, and for fifteen
years thereafter he maintained a close relationship with Chamberlain
and exercised a strong influence on the company.
During the first twenty years of Roane Iron ' s history there were
two dominant groups of stockholders .

One was composed of the founders

of the company, Wilder, Chamberlain, and several Ohio and Indiana capitalists .

As a result of the merger with Southwestern Iron, Abram S .

Hewitt and other Easterners became Roane stockholders .

15

Wilder left

the company in 1871 , and Chamberlain, moving from Knoxville to Chattanooga ,
became vice president and general

mana

ger.

Succeeding to the presidency

in 188 1 , he retained that position until his death in 1916 .

16

For more

than forty years he was the guiding spirit of Roane Iron, marking the
company with what one economist has called Chamberlain ' s "unusually
. 17
good record" as a creative entrepreneur.
But though Chamberlain had
the imagination and energy to pioneer on industrial frontiers , he lacked
the capital to underwrite experimentation or to sustain the company in
hard time s .

I t i s unlikely that the Midwestern stockholders had the

means or the inclination to take much part in their Southern investment ,

l4

Ibid. , 6- 9 ; James F. Doster, "The Chattanooga Rolling Mill :
An Industrial By-Product of the Civil War, '! East Tennessee Historical
Society' s Publications , No . 36 ( 1964) , 54.
l5
Allan Nevins , Abram S . Hewitt , with Some Account of Peter Cooper
(New York : Harper & Brothers:- 1935) , 25� -16
Moore , Tennessee , the Volunteer State , III , 70- 75 .

l7
Redlich, History of American Business Leaders , I , 104.

I
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and though Abram Hewitt talked a good deal about the future of the
South, his remarkable caution seems to have prevented his doing very
much in that direction.

Thus Chamberlain turned to McGhee , the Southern

capitalist recently moved to New York , for the financial connections and
expertise which Roane Iron badly needed.
The two men had known each other since the Union army ' s occupation of Knoxville ; probably they had busines s dealings prior to Chamberlain ' s removal to Chattanooga.

They had different talents and backgrounds

and belonged to different political parties but they must have seen business matters in much the same way.

Both were conservative about money

but were willing to take a chance for a profit.

Neither would have hesi-

tated to liquidate or sell the company at the right price , but both men
remained convinced that it had a profit-making potential as long as it
was soundly managed.

Chamberlain was a skilled industrial manager, Me-

Ghee a resourceful financial director.

They formed a strong affinity

which withstood disagreement and adversity, and together they saw Roane
Iron through a crucial time in its history.
Just when McGhee bought stock in the company is unknown, but he
was a member of its board when the important decision to make Bessemer
18
steel was considered in 1 886.
In the summe r of that year he purchased
more stock and persuaded his busines s associate , Samuel Thomas , an ex
19
perienced ironmaster, to take some shares .
At the autumn stockholders '

18

chamberlain to McGhee , May 25 , 1 886 .
in this chapter are t o the McGhee Papers .
l9

Ibid. , July 22 , 1 886.

All manuscript reference s
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meeting of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad he had Chamberlain
elected a director, remarking that "the position will do you no harm. "

20

In January, 1887 , he wrote that he was holding back an order of a
thousand tons of rails for the M. & C . until Chamberlain was ready to
bid on them.

21

He persuaded the East Tennes see to " take all their rails

from you at what it would cost them to buy the rails from other mills
and lay them down at either Memphis , Brunswick , or Bristol , giving you
the benefit of the freight . 11 22

Besides making these helpful arrange-

ments McGhee sympathized with Chamberlain ' s desire for building up a
capital surplus .

Reacting to the declaration of a 3 percent dividend

in December, 1886 , he wrote :
As you say, it was not advisable that the dividend should have
been paid and while we cannot help this , we can avoid such
mistakes in the future , and if the directory as it now stands
are a class of men who cannot be controled [ sic] in such
matters we must make such changes as will secure a highly
conservative management . 23
Obviously he was taking a strong interest in the company; in return he expected regular reports from Chamberlain on production, sale s ,
and general progre s s .

But deep in the complexities of converting to the

Bessemer process Chamberlain seemed unable to satisfy his friend ' s thirst .
for information and responded to McGhee ' s questions by explaining that :
I dislike very much to write unless I can say something posi
tive one way or the other, either good or bad , and besides I
have had so many annoyances to contend with and so much

20
McGhee to Chamberlain, October 26 , 1886 .
21
23

Ibid . , January 24, 188 7 .
Ibid.

22

Ibid . , January 28 , 1887 .
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shaping up to do, that I have been kept on the jump con
stantly, and I have given little thought to anything or any
body outside of the work here . Have a little patience , and
after a while I shall have time to make my reports more
promptly. I wish you could have two weeks of starting a
steel mill. (No ! �) . We are gaining eveg day, and I
hope before long to make satisfactory reports . 24
McGhee , however, did not regard patience as a virtue in matters of this
sort . Chamberlain' s silences seemed inexplicable , and he was finally
moved to write :
I am very much at a loss my dear Captain, to account for your
extreme reticence with reference to the operations of the Roane
Iron Company[ . ] If the Company has done remarkably well and
you desire to give me an agreeable surprise by a favorable
statement or that you have met with difficulties in your opera
tions and do not wish to make a statement on that account which
I very much fear, I of course am unable to say, but in either
event you are making a mistake as my relations to the Company
and to yourself personally are such as to entitle me to full
and explicit information with reference to the Company' s opera
tions which I am sorry to say you do not seem to appreciate and
up to the present time no effort upon my part to extract the
information which I think is due me has been successful .
This is the last appeal I shall make on this subject. 2S
To his credit , Chamberlain was able to accept these rebukes with
good humor and to mollify McGhee with information about production and
sales .

Through the fall o f 1887 and winter o f 1888 the Captain tinkered

with machinery, changed production managers, cajoled workers, and was able
to make and market steel rails . 26 In New York the no less important task
of financing the company went forward under the direction of the Colonel,
24Chamberlain to McGhee , May 16 , 1887 .
2�cGhee to Chamberlain, July 29, 1887 .
26see , for instance , Chamberlain to McGhee , June 1 , September 2 ,
3
8 , 26 , October 27, 1887 , February 16, March 28 , 1888.

..

., , .

who endorsed notes and managed to keep Roane Iron ' s debt afloat . 2 7
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The best efforts of both men, however, were not enough to make the
venture in steel making a success. The trouble was in the quality of
rails made for the East Tennessee system. The railroad' s general

mana-

ger, Charles H. Hudson, on the recommendation of his superintendent ,
rejected a shipment found to have imperfections of length. 28 Although
Chamberlain maintained that the trouble could be corrected easily, the
East Tennessee suspended for several weeks its orders for rails, and the
Roane Company was forced to shut down during most of the month of March,
1888 . 29 "All you will have to do , " McGhee advised, ''is to convince Hudson you will make

him

good rails and I

am

sure he will , as far as pos-

sible , endeavor to favor you, as of course he knows of Thomas and my
interest in the mill. " 3 0 But the Roane Company could not afford even
temporary reverses.

"Not working in March, " wrote Chamberlain, "has

left us in no condition to meet April bills , and I say frankly, I am at
1 The company owed $ 9 , 000 to the Cranberry mines for
my wit ' s end. " 3
ore and unless this could be paid, "our position is very serious . It
is a humiliating thing, " Chamberlain confessed to his friend, "to annoy
you !with these matters , but I

am

compelled to talk with somebody, and

there is no one here who can appreciate the situation or give any
2 7McGhee to Chamberlain, August 1 , 188 7 , February 2 3 , 1888 .
3
2 8 chamberlain to McGhee , February 1 6 , 1888 .
29 Ibid. , April 9, 1888 .

3 0McGhee to Chamberlain, April 7 , 1888 .
3 lChamberlain to McGhee, April 9 , 1888 .
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comfort . 11

32

McGhee was not unsympathetic , but he felt it ne cessary to

lecture Chamberlain on what he regarded as the root of the problem :
The Superintendent of your Mill must be thoroughly incompetent
or these things would not occur. If it had not been for the
interest that General Thomas and I had in the Mill and that
Major [ Henry] Fink desired to do all he could to encourage the
manufacture of rails on the line of his road, the difficulties
they have had in securing perfect rails , would have long since
made them abandon any effort in that direction.
I know you have done the best you could and that you have
been very much worried in regard to the matter and if I could
see any way in which I could relieve you I should cheerfully
do so , but the only place it can be helped is in the mill. 33
In the end McGhee got the East Tenne ssee to lift its ban on Roane rail s ,
endorsed the company ' s $ 9 , 000 note and got it discounted a t Thomas '
Chase Bank in New York .

34

Although a disaster had been averted at least temporarily, the situation remained precarious .

McGhee was alarmed that the Rockwood furnaces ,

which had been supporting the entire property, seemed to be
lo s s .

35

runn

ing at a

The company' s 1888 statement confirmed thi s , and McGhee observed

that something was "radically wrong, " adding that "unless the Rockwood
property can so far improve its condition and earning capacity as to meet
the interest on our floating debt , the sooner we foreclose and sell out
36
the whole concern, the better it will be for all parties interested . "
The answer, in fact , to the company ' s troubles was to dispose of
the ,Chattanooga steel facility which had been a costly failure .
32
33

Both

Ibid . , April 10 , 1888 .

�cGhee

to Chamberlain, April 11 , 1888 .

34
Ibid. , April 19 , 1888 .
36
1Qi£. , February l , 1889.

35

Ibid. , November 30 , 1888 .
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McGhee and Chamberlain recognized this reality and as early as the summer
of 1888 had considered getting rid of the prope rty.

37

In the spring of

1889 a large party of Eastern capitalists toured the South in search o f
investment opportunities and on this occasion Chamberlain discussed a
sale with Abram Hewitt .

"He is very much impressed , " reported Chamber-

lain, "with the idea of making basic steel in Chattanooga from the cheap
pig irons of this section , and intimated that if he could get the property
here at the right terms he and other New York parties might feel dispos ed
to take hold of the enterprise . "

38

Characteristically, Hewitt delayed

a decision until his return from a visit to Europe to study steel making
proces se s .

39

Meanwhile others became interested in the Chattanooga property.
Tennessee Coal , Iron and Railroad Company, undergoing one of its periodic
management

upheavals , lost the services of two of its top officials ,

Alfred Montgomery Shook and Nathaniel Baxter, Jr.

Both were allied with

one of Tennessee Coal ' s largest stockholders , John H. Inman , who had
temporarily lost control of the company.

40

Casting about for new employ-

ment , Shook proposed to buy the Chattanooga mill for the Southern Iron
Company which he , Baxter, and Inman were organi zing.

4l

The delicate

negotiations which finally led to the sale were handled in New York by
McGhee , who had the difficult task of persuading Roane Iron' s scattered

37

�hamberlain

38
39
4l

to McGhee , July 14, 1888 .

Ibid. , March 26 , 188 9 .
Ibid.

;hook

40

I£i£ ·

to Chamberlain, April 23 , 1889 .
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shareholders. He was particularly anxious to make the sale because in
August , 1889, he assumed most of the company' s floating debt , which could
be liquidated only by selling the Chattanooga property. To avoid the
appearance of conflicting interests McGhee resigned from the Roane ' s
board and suggested that his son-in-law, Calvin McClung, be named in his
place . 42 This move he felt was necessary because he was charging 8 percent interest on the company' s $1.5 0, 000 debt . "This is a very high rate, "
he admitted, "but I have failed to find others willing to take any off
my hands . , 4J
Although a price of $ 2.5 0 , 000 for the mill was quickly agreed upon,
there was much haggling about the terms of sale . Shook, Baxter, and In
44
man offered part in cash and part in bonds of the Southern Iron Company.
McGhee and Chamberlain were willing to accept this arrangement since the
mill was , in McGhee ' s words, "worthless in its present condition, " 4.5
but several of the Roane Company' s Midwestern stockholders objected to
this low price for what one described as "perhaps the best unoccupied
location for a steel mill in the country. " 46 Thoroughly disgusted at
this opposition, McGhee told Antrim R. Forsythe of Indiana :
interest in the Roane Iron Company is not so large as to
make it a sine qua � that the property should be saved, but
my high regard for Capt . Chamberlain and his extreme anxiety

My

'
42McGhee
to Chamberlain, August 6 , 1889 .
4�cGhee to Antrim R. Forsythe , September .5 , 1889 .
44 "Preliminary Agreement , " Letterbook , 1889-1892, p. 242 .
4.5McGhee to Forsythe , September , 1889.
.5
46Forsythe to McGhee, September 7 , 1889.
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to bring it out all right has induced me to advance money and
to aid him to a very large extent , and having no interest in
any concern with which we are likely to trade , I feel that I
am in a position to look calmly and dispassionately at the
condition of things and
I feel my views are entitled to
more consideration than you gentlemen are disposed to give
them. 47
•

•

•

McGhee ' s firm arguments and his implied threat to wash his hands
of Roane Iron had the desired effect . The Midwesterners , representing
one third of the company' s stock, capitulated, and Forsythe admitted
in the matter. I am per
dread of the ways of ' Wall Street . 1 " 48 The Chattanooga

that "It seems I was unjustly suspicious
haps morbid in

my

•

.

•

plant was finally sold in October, 1889 , for $ 200 , 000 cash and $ 50 , 000
in Southern Iron bonds. 49 McGhee was relieved and looked forward to
better days for the company now that its floating debt was reduced and
its operations restricted to the Rockwood iron furnaces. The attempt at
steel making, he told Calvin McClung, had cost the company $200, 000 , but
notwithstanding this loss he felt · that the stock was a good investment
at fifty cents a share. 50 In February, 1890, he bought another 1 22
shares for $ 6 , l00 . 5 l
In order to sell the Chattanooga plant McGhee had been obliged to
make a small investment in the Southern Iron Company, taking $ 1 2 , 5 00 of
its bonds and $18 , 75 0 of its stock and becoming a member of the board of
47McGhee to Forsythe , September 6 , 1889.
48 Forsythe to McGhee , September 9 , 1889.
49McGhee to Nat Baxter, October 19 , 1889.
5 0McGhee to McClung, October 1 9 , 1889.
5 �cClung to Leonhardt , March 18 , 1890.
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directors. 5 2 Despite this involvement he never took much interest in the
affairs of the company. Southern Iron spent h�avily on its Chattanooga
property, and on September 15 , 1890 , its new furnaces produced the first
basic steel to be made in the South. Within a year this experiment had
failed too , and the Chattanooga plant shut down permanently. 53 McGhee
and Chamberlain appear to have been right in the decision to sell the
steel plant at a sacrifice . The South' s most capable iron manufacturers
had tried to make steel there and failed utterly. Not until 1899 was
steel again made in the South, and then it was at Birmingham rather than
at Chattanooga. 54 Southern Iron was liquidated but the Roane company
concentrated upon its Rockwood iron furnaces and survived the depression
of the nineties which swept

many

other companies into bankruptcy.

Among the reasons for Roane ' s rapid recovery from the nearly fatal
experiment in steel making was its venture into town promotion. Though
a discreditable incident in the company' s history, the sale of lots at
the town of Rockwood helped to cover some of the recent losses . The idea
for such an enterprise was naturally suggested by the outbreak of feverish town promotion schemes which were sweeping the South at the time .
Cardiff and Harriman, two town sites near Rockwood, were extravagantly
·boomed by land companiers largely controlled by Northern capitalists . 55
5 2 Leonhardt to McGhee , February 21 , 1890.
53Chamberlain, Brief Histo;r, 8 .
54Anne Kendrick Walker, Life and Achievements o f Alfred Mont
gome;r Shook (Birmingham : Privately printed, 195 2), 90.
55William F. Donovan, Jr. , "The Growth of the Industrial Spirit in
Tennessee , 1890-1910" (linpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Peabody
College for Teachers , 1955 ) , 2 7- 33 ; Donovan, "Real Estate Speculation in
Cardiff and Harriman, 1890-1893 , " Tennessee Historical Quarterly, XIV
(1955 ) ' 2 53- 56 .
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Although advertised as future industrial centers of great promise ,
neither of these locations could claim an established manufacturing enterprise of any importance . Rockwood with its Roane Iron works would appear
to have been a much sounder prospective town site , but it is clear that
there was a good deal of opportunism in the decision to boom the lot
selling at Rockwood. In December, 1889 , Chamberlain considered selling
five hundred acres of Roane Company land to a Rhode Island capitalist
for development. This scheme envisioned the organi zation of a furnace
company with a bond large enough to build and work an iron furnace .
Chamberlain reported that the developer "thinks he can place bonds on
this basis , and sell the land [ as town lots] for enough to cover the expenses , and make a handsome profit . " Yet he was skeptical about the
ultimate success of the promotion and thought the time would come when
the furnace could be "picked up cheaply" by the Roane Company. He told
McGhee that "I don' t feel like organizing a company myself and calling
my friends to take stock as you suggest , as I would feel a certain responsibility to make the thing a success , and might have to work harder than
I feel like doing at my time of life .
" 56
Notwithstanding Chamberlain' s early reluctance , it was the Roane
Company itself which handled the promotion of Rockwood. As advertised,
the company promised to build a new furnace as an inducement to speculating
lot purchasers . 5 7 The prospect of a great industrial boom in the South
along with an influx of Northern capital was very much a part of the
5 6chamberlain to McGhee, December 2 7 , 188 9 .
5 7Donovan, "Industrial Spirit , " 42- 4J .

2 10
public relations campaigns of the town promoters . The backers of Harrifor instance , organized special trains to import buyers from New
England and the Midwest to their town site. 58 Not wanting to be overman,

shadowed, Chamberlain urged McGhee to collect some imposing Northern
capitalists to o rnament the Rockwood sale on May 1 3 , 14 , and 1 5 , 1890 :
Would it not be possible for you and Thomas and Hewitt to get up
a carload of people and run down? The citizens of Rockwood do
not think the Directors of the Roane Iron Co . take much interest
in the property, and it occurs to me that in this instance the
New York people can afford to take a hand, as they have large
interests in the matter. If you can work this up I shall be
very glad. You think I ought to "boom" some , and I think you
ought to give a hand. 5 9
Although McGhee and his New York associ*tes did not do much to "boom" the
promotion, the Rockwood sale was a success . By mid-June , 1890 , Chamberlain reported that Roane had on hand enough pig iron and bills and
accounts receivable to pay all its debts. With general supplies, a
company store , $1 25 , 000 in real estate notes from the sale of lots , and
$ 5 0, 000 in Southern Iron bonds on hand he pronounced the company in
" first class condition. 11 6 0 Enough cash was available to pay a 2 per
cent dividend on July 10 , 18 90. 6 1
The dividend was made possible only by the sale of lots at Rockwood, but the payments had hardly gone out to the stockholders when the
I I

'

town building bubble burst spectacularly. The "Baring Panic" of 1890 and
5 8Donovan, "Real Estate Speculation, " 254- 55 .
5 9Chamberlain to McGhee , May 1 , 18 90.
6 0Ibid. , June 1 7 , 18 90.
6 1 orion

1.

Hurlburt to McGhee , July 10 , 18 90.
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the subsequent contraction of British investment were symptoms of
approaching hard times. The first victims were the town companies which
in many instances were based merely on the extravagant promises and the
greed of promoters . Cardiff and Harriman in East Tennessee , as well as
Middlesboro on the Kentucky border, were plunged into deep trouble .
Roane Iron soon joined the list of companies being sued by unhappy lot
owners. 6 2 A suit was brought based on Roane ' s failure to build the
promised new furnace at Rockwood ; when the oase was heard in the chancery
court , Judge Henry Gibson held in favor of the plaintiffs . As Chamberlain put it , "Gibson got in one of his communistic fits and decided the
case against us
" 63 On appeal to the Tennessee supreme court , how•

•

.

.

ever, the decision was reversed, and the Roane Company' s profit was
saved. 64 Chamberlain himself admitted that the down payments received
for the lots represented "a pretty good price for the property. " 6.5
The Rockwood promotion was conceived and carried out as a means of
cashing in on the temporary town building mania, but Chamberlain and the
owners of the company were soon busy with plans to improve their property
with a new furnace . Before launching the expansion, McGhee sought the
6 2nonovan, "Industrial Spirit , " 1- 7
4 4
63 chamberlain to McGhee , July JO , 1891 . Henry Richard Gibson was
an old antagonist of McGhee , having clashed with the financier when both
were members of the legislature in 18 7 1- 7 2 . Gibson was an outspoken
opponent of the convict lease system in Tennessee and was regarded as a
radical by the Sanford wing of the Republican Party. He was elected as
a Republican to Congress from the Knoxville district and served five terms ,
18 9.5-190) . See Rothrock, French Broad-Holston Country, 420-21.
64Ibid. , August 20 , 1891.
6.5Ibid. , July JO, 18 9 1.
•

.
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advice of the experienced A. M. Shook. After examining the works at
Rockwood, Shook recommended the extensive remodeling of one furance
and the construction of another, 66 a project carried out in 1893 with
the proceeds of a sale of $ 3 00 , 000 in bonds, most of which were taken
by McGhee and his New York associates , Thomas , Wilson, and Hewitt . 67
Although the New York financiers took the bonds at a large discount ,
it is apparent that the money could not have been raised otherwise , because Chamberlain was able to place only $ 5 0, 000 in the South and Midwest . 6 8
During the later 1890 ' s the Roane Company made money, thahks to
its improved furnace s , the close

gement of Chamberlain, and the
helpful advice and intelligence provided by McGhee . 6 9 This last was
mana

made possible by the New York capitalist ' s close ties with the management
of the

o th Tennessee Coal , Iron, and Railroad Company. Besides his

mamm

personal friendship with Nathaniel Baxter and A. M. Shook, who again
managed Tennessee Coal , McGhee had close ties with John G. Moore whose
firm, Moore and Schley, handled much of the corporation' s New York business. Finally, McGhee ' s old friend and railroad associate , John H. Inman ,
was for years the largest owner of Tennessee Coal ' s stock. Through his
correspondence with Baxter and his access to confidential reports from
66 shook to McGhee , October ll , 189 2 .
67McGhee to Chamberlain, January 2 3 , 1893 .
6 8chamberlain to McGhee , January 2 , 1893 .
4
6 9see "Roane Iron Company, Statement of Dividends , " Letterbook,
1899, pp. 1 3 0- 3 1.
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Moore ' s office , McGhee was able to keep abreast of Tennessee Coal ' s
production costs and sale prices . When this information was useful to
Roane Iron, McGhee passed it on to Chamberlain who was thus able to make
his decisions guided by the knowledge of what a large competitor was
doing. 7 0
McGhee ' s original interest in Tennessee Coal seems to have sprung
from a moderate investment in that company' s stock. 7 l Later he joined
the board and played a small role in its activitie s , but he seems to
have been too wary to become heavily involved in a company whose history
was especially marked by the struggle of ambitious men for control. It
is certain that he rejected the interesting appeal which Shook addressed
to him in November,

1896 .

"leaves the Tenn. Coal I

"The death of Jno .
& RR

H.

Inman , " wrote Shook,

Co . without a leader--and we naturally

turn to you. " Conceding that McGhee had declared he was "out of the
Current and preferred to stay out , " Shook maintained that it would not
be necessary for McGhee to take a hand in managing the company. Eut he
urged him to interest his friends , such as Samuel Thomas , in taking control , and he remarked that "it is greatly to the interest of the Southern
Rail Road and the [ Georgia] Central to have this property controlled by
friends who wo�ld and could give these systems Half a million tons more
freight than they now get. " Shook also argued that if McGhee and associates controlled Tennessee Coal , the acquisition of all the land and
7 °see , for instance , Chamberlain to McGhee , October 6 and McGhee
to Chamberlain, October 29 , 1894.
7 1 rn 1896 McGhee owned 1 , 7 00 shares which had cost him over
$ 42 , 000. McGhee to Nat Baxter, August 18 , 1896 .
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iron-making facilities at Sheffield, Alabama, would be an easy matter
and that "the people who acquired and brought these properties together
[ could] make a great deal of money. 11 7 2
Tempting as these proposals may have seemed, McGhee refrained
from any attempt to dominate Tennessee Coal. Perhaps its situation
reminded

him

of the late Richmond Terminal Company in whose affairs he

had recently been tangled. For whatever reason, Tennessee Coal remained only a peripheral interest , though he did join its board in
18 9 7 , probably at the urging of Shook and Nat Baxter. 73 On occasions

McGhee helped to shoulder some of the company' s floating debt , 74 and

the�e is evidence that he may have helped to arrange the financing for
the first of Tennessee Coal ' s Birmingham steel plants . 75
He played the role of broker in 1899 and engineered the sale of
the Sheffield Coal , Iron, and Steel Company to Tennessee Coal . The
Sheffield Company was created by a group of Tennesseans , led by
'

E.

W.

Cole , the one-time president of the East Tennessee and of the Nashville ,
Chattanooga, and Saint Louis Railroad. Beginning in 188 6 Cole and his
associates poured money into the town of Sheffield, Alabama, which suf
fered the fate of other boom towns in the depression of the nineties . 76
7 2shook to McGhee , November 8, 189 6 . There is no copy of McGhee ' s reply to this letter.
73Nat Baxter to McGhee , 'October 2 3 , 189 7 .

7�cGhee to W. S . Gurnee , December 7 , 18 9 7 .
7 5McGhee to James Bowron, May 1 7 , and to E . W. Cole , May 2 3 , 18 98 .
76Nina Leftwich, Two Hundred Years at Muscle Shoals (Birmingham :
Multigraphic Advertising Co . , 1 935), 2 60- 6�
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By 18 9 8 the blast furnaces , coke ovens , coal mines , and land controlled
by Sheffield were said to represent an investment of $ 2 , 000 , 000, but
the company remained a cripple which seemed incapable of paying divi
dends. 77 In this condition it was an attractive bargain to the acquisitive

gers of Tennessee Coal. As early as 18 96 it had caught the

mana

notice of Nat Baxter who asked McGhee to feel out the owners , one of
whom was James Columbus Neely of Memphis , father-in-law of McGhee ' s
youngest daughter, Eleanor. Baxter badly wanted to sew up the Sheffield complex and wrote to McGhee on November 1 that "there are some
other good furnaces at that place which we are attempting to get into
shape that we can acquire them very cheap . " 78 Within a week, however,
John

H.

Inman was dead, and the resulting power vacuum at Tennessee Coal

probably dashed Baxter' s dreams.
Neely was at that time inclined to hold on to the property any
way, 7 9 but by the fall of 18 9 7 he was ready to consider a proposal . MeGhee spoke to his friend John G. Moore , offering the Sheffield. property
to Tennessee Coal for $ 7 00, 000. Moore thought it cheap at that price
but pointed out that Tennessee Coal could hardly buy more furnaces while
it was barely meeting its fixed charges and some of its own furnaces
were idle . 80 Besides , the "bitter opposition" of James T. Woodward, a
77 Justin Fuller, "History of the Tennessee Coal , Iron, and Rail
road Company, 185 2-1 9 0 7 " ( unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of North Carolina, 1 967 ) , 114-15 .
7 8Nat Baxter to McGhee , November 1 , 18 96 .
7 9Neely to McGhee , November 1 7 , 18 96 .
80McGhee to Neely, September 22 , 18 9 .
7
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New York banker who had emerged as Tennessee Coal ' s new kingpin, blocked
the sales until the spring of 1899. 81 As McGhee pointed out to J . C .
Neely, Jr. , the iron business then was good, but how long this condition
would continue no one knew. He advised Neely that the company could be
sold for more than before . 8 2 Woodward 1 s earlier opposition in fact
cost Tennessee Coal $1 50 , 000, since in 18 99 it paid $85 0 , 000 for the
Sheffield property which had been offered for $ 7 00, 000 two years before .
The Tennessee Company took another loss in 190 2 when it sold Sheffield
to the United States Ore Company for $ 6 00, 000. 8 4
McGhee played the role of 19honest broker, " but his part in the
transaction serves to emphasize the casualness of his interest in Tennessee Coal--an interest based not on extensive financial holdings but on
friendly personal relationships with men like Shook, Baxter, and Moore ,
who owned or managed the company. To be sure , he seized the opportunity
to trade in Tennessee Coal ' s stock in a manner reminiscent of his dealings in Richmond Terminal shares ; one of the benefits of a directorship
was the advantage it gave in playing the stock market . 8 5 McGhee was
willing to serve on the board, to give advice , and to make modest cash
advances to the company as an accommodation to his friends and as the
price for an inside knowledge of Tennessee Coal ' s affairs.
His attitude toward Roane Iron Company was entirely different .
Tennessee Coal was Wall Street , but Roane Iron was East Tennessee. McGhee
8 �cGhee to J . C . Neely, Jr. , May 1 9 , 18 99 .
8 3Fuller, "History, " 11 .,..1 .
8 2 Ibid.
4 5
84Ibid.
8 5see, for instance, Ledger, 10 .
7

looked on the latter as a long term investment , especially after 1890.
With a capitalization of $1 , 000, 000, the company was the right size for
him

to dominate ; this he did in cooperation with Chamberlain, both a

close friend and a trusted business associate . Together they made Roane
Iron a prosperous business which paid a good return on investment . For
McGhee the return was e�pecially satisfactory in view of the nature of
his securities. He O¥lle d apprqximately 10 percent of the company' s
capital stock which he estimated in 1899 had cost him $ 5 6 , 900. 86 In
1893 he bought one fifth, or $ 60 , 000 , of the Roane ' s bonds at a discount
price of $ 46 , 200 . 8 7 Dividends from the stock averaged about 1 . 4 percent
a year between 188 6 and 18 99 , while the bonds paid 6 percent a year from
1893 onward. 88 The return on the bonds was thus almost 8 percent of the
cost price , and the actual stock dividend was nearly 2 . 6 percent . The
company' s policies , as dictated by McGhee and Chamberlain, made the bonds
a highly desirable and secure investment , while the stock was only medi
ocre in its earning capacity. 8 9 This was hard on the mere shareowners ,
but it was quite rewarding for those like McGhee , who , after all , furnished most of the capital which made the company' s earnings possible .
There was nothing improper about this particular example of one
of McGhee ' s favorite financial methods . Roane Iron was well

run

and well

8 6Letterbook, 1899 , pp. 1 0- 1.
3 3
8 7McGhee to Chamberlain, January ; Chamberlain to McGhee ,
23
March 2 7 , 18 93 .
88 Letterbook, 1899, pp. 1 0- 1 .
3 3
8 9Because he regarded the bonds a s a safe investment he placed
them in trust for his wife and children.
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taken care of; its stockholders could not legitimately complain about
the McGhee-Chamberlain management . The same cannot be said, however, of
other instances where similar methods were used to maximize McGhee ' s
profits . The

gement o f the Coal Creek Mining and Manufacturing

III8.l1..a

Company, for example , is a case of the unscrupulous use of raw power.
Here , he and his associates were guilty of virtual fraud against the
stockholders of that company and those of the East Tennessee , Virginia,
and Georgia Railroad as well.
McGhee ' s interest in the mineral resources of his native state
had begun even before the Civil War. He and ten other East Tennesseans
organized the Cumberland Mountain Coal and Land Company in 185 8, and
after the Civil War it was reorganized as the East Tennessee Iron and
-----9
Coal Company with McGhee as president . ° Although it owned large tracts
of land in Anderson, Campbell , and Scott countie s , the company never
-

seemed to earn much. In time McGhee ' s interest in it faded, but he retained his stock, probably because he could not find a sale for it . Much
more important was his involvement in Coal Creek Mining and Manufacturing.
-

Organized in 18 6 8 by Charles H. Bulkley of New York City and Henry H.
Wiley of Knoxville , it was reorganized four years later and the capital
increased from $5 00, 000 to $ 2 , 5 00 , 000. Half of its 25 , 000 shares were
owned by Bulkley and another fourth by Wiley. Among the other stockholders was McGhee who owned only fifty shares . The company' s chief
asset was some 90, 000 acres of rich coal land in the vicinity of the
90Rule , Standard History, 2 1 .
4
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mining town of Coal Creek in Anderson County; from royalties on this
property the company received about $45 , 000 in 188 5 . Coal Creek was a
leasing company which did not operate the several mines on its property
which were served by the Knoxville and Ohio Railroad. 9 1 According to
McGhee , the royalties were set so high that the development of mining
was seriously retarded. Because this held down the freight revenues
of the Knoxville and Ohio , he and several other "capitalists with enlarged views" acquired the Bulkley stock, and thus with McGhee ' s own
fifty shares , they came into control of the company in 188 5 . 92
Others charged that McGhee and his associates forced Bulkley to
sell out by threatening to divert the railroad facilities away from
Coal Creek' s property, thereby leaving those mines isolated and unable
to operate . It was alleged that McGhee and other directors o f the East
Tennessee were determined to dominate the coal fields along the line of
the Knoxville and Ohio , and that they used their control of the rail
road to force their way into the Coal Creek Company. 93 Subsequent developments seem to bear out this version of how the Bulkley stock was
acquired. After gaining control of Coal Creek Mining and Manufacturing
McGhee ' s syndicate attempted to eliminate competitors in the area by
just such a diversion as may have been threatened against Bulkley. In
this case they refused to permit the Coal Creek and New River Railroad,
9 1 Ibid. , 2 1- 2 ; Cullen v. Coal Creek Mining and Manufacturing
4 4
Company, 42 Southwestern (189 7-98 ) 6 9 3 -94 .
92McGhee to E. R. Chapman, August 18 , 188 6 .
93 cullen y. Coal Creek, 6 9 3 .
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a subsidiary branch of the Knoxville and Ohio , to haul coal from �e s
operated by John D . Heck and L . J . A . Petree in competition with the
Coal Creek Company' s mines. Claiming to be the victims of a conspiracy
which prevented their trade witl1 customers in North Carolina, Heck and
Petree appealed to the Interstate Commerce Commission. In one of its
first decisions the commission upheld Heck and Petree , ruling that the
Knoxville

and

Ohio

and

the East Tennessee , Virginia, and Georgia were

part of the same system and tllat the discrimination was a violation of
the Interstate Commerce Act . 94 During the attempt of the so-called RiceLibbey faction to unseat the management of the Richmond Terminal in 1888
this case was cited as proof that the McGhee syndicate had deliberately
reduced the earnings of the East Tennessee system in the attempt to drive
Heck and Petree out of business. 95
Although thwarted in the Heck and Petree case , the syndicate was
able to do a great deal toward consolidating the coal properties between
Knoxville and the Kentucky border. The Bulkley stock was secured in the
late summer or fall of 188 5 , and

on

October l a stockholders ' meeting put

the syndicate in full control of the Goal Creek Company. With one ex
ception the old board was
John

G.

/

Moore , Calvin

Sanford,v and

George

S.

ousted

and replaced by

McGhee , Samuel Thomas, �

Brice � . H. Kneeland, John

T.

Martin, Edward J.

Andrews ; all except Andrews , a Knoxville lawyer, were

directors of the East Tennessee , Virginia, and

Georgia .

The single

94second Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission
(Washington, 1888), 13 9- 40 .
95 commercial � Financial Chronicle , XLVI ( 1888 ) , 80-81.
5
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director from the old board was Edwin

F.

Wiley who represented the large

bloc of stock owned by the estate of Henry H. Wiley. At the regular
meeting on October 20 this board was reelected, and it promptly named
McGhee president , Andrews vice president, and McGhee ' s son-in-law, Calvin
M. McClung, secretary and treasurer. 96 The syndicate held a bare majority
of stock which was enough to elect the board, but the large minority
holding prevented complete domination.
Soon the syndicate was negotiating for the 6 , 25 0 shares of Wiley
stock, as well as other valuable property owned by the Wiley estate.
Also bidding for this stock were Curtis Cullen and Charles S . Newman ,
merchant partners of Knoxville, who owned 1 , 430 shares of Coal Creek
stock.

Chapman, of the New York firm, Moore and Schley, repre
sented the syndicate. 97 At stake were control of Tennessee ' s richest
E. R.

coal fields and the East Tennessee railroad system' s dominance of the
region. In the summe r of 188 6 the East Tennessee was not yet part of
the Richmond Terminal ' s empire , and in fact it appeared likely tha.t the
former company would join the Norfolk and Western in deadly competition
with the Terminal ' s Richmond and Danville. The latter was considering
a major invasion of Tennessee which would bring its lines into Knoxville, and Sanford reported to McGhee that Cullen had offered the

Dan-

ville control of the Wiley-owned Poplar Creek Coal and Iron Company.
Sanford realized that this would give the Danville an excellent base
from which to challenge the East Tennessee, and he urged that "if the
9 6cullen

�·

Coal Creek, 6 93- 94 .

9 7 Ibid. ; Sanford to McGhee , June 1 9 , 188 6 .
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R & D are in earnest the Wiley trade ought to be closed soon. " 98 The

syndicate now acted quickly and bought out all of the Wileys 1 interests
for $ 15 0 , 000 . For this price it received the Wiley shares in Coal Creek,
as well as 5 , 100 shares of Poplar Creek Coal and Iron and other assorted
stock and real estate. Shortly thereafter, the syndicate sold to Coal
Creek all of this property, except for the 6 , 2 5 0 Coal Creek shares , for
$ 21 7 , 343 . 10 . Included in this sale was other miscellaneous property belonging to McGhee and Sanford. The members received payment in Coal
Creek debenture bonds which bore interest at 6 percent . 99
In 188 7 the syndicate purchased the Walden' s Ridge Railroad Company and other property owned by the Oakdale Iron, Coal and Transportation Company for $18 3 , 122 . Almost immediately the real estate acquired
in this transaction was sold to Coal Creek for $20 , 000 cash and $100 , 000
1n
. de bentures. 100 Less than a year later the Walden' s Ridge Railroad,
which had cost $ 1 60 , 000 was purchased by the East Tennessee , Virginia,
and Georgia for $ 5 00 , 000 in first extension mortgage bonds . 101
McGhee and his associates had saddled Coal Creek with a bonded
debt of $ 35 0, 000 by 188 7 . Seven years later the company was able to pay
its first dividend to stockholders since 1 88 5 ; during the interval all
the profits had been paid out to the syndicate in the form of interest
and bond retirement . 10 2 Thus Coal Creek ' s earnings had been neatly
98 sanford to McGhee , July , 188 6 .
3
100Ibid. , 6 9 .
99Cullen v. Coal Creek, 6 9 .
5
4
.
10�Harr1son,
� History, 90 6 ; McGhee to D. A. Carpenter,
June 3 , 188 7 .
10 2 Cullen v. Coal Creek, 9 .
6 5
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diverted to the members , who not only drained the company' s treasury of
cash but also received a bonus in Coal Creek stock. Assessing the
syndicate ' s work, McGhee noted that he had paid in a subscription of
$ 75 , 000 and had received $ 5 0 , 000 in East Tennessee bonds , $ 35 , 000 in
Coal Creek debentures and 2 , 000 shares of Coal Creek stock. 103 The
latter securities he regarded as a very good investment , and in 18 9 7
after the company had begun to pay dividends again, he valued the stock
at $ 40 per share . 104 He and the other nine syndicate members each made
a profit of around $90 , 000 on the deals , 105 and they were not called to
account until 18 9 7 when Curtis Cullen and Charles Newman brought a suit
to recover damages which they claimed to have suffered as stockholders .
McGhee and Sanford based their demurrer on the lapse of six years under
the statute of limitations and did not attempt to refute the facts as
Cullen and Newman presented them. The Chancellor of Knox County, and
subsequently an appellate court , upheld the defendants . 10 6 Why Cullen
and Newman waited so long to bring suit is not known. It may have been
that it took them nine years to understand just what had happened, although this seems improbable . More likely, the two unfortunate stockholders became desperate and brought the suit in a frantic attempt to
recoup their fortunes when their mercantile business failed.
l0 3McGhee to McClung, June 1 , 188 .
7
3
10�cGhee to Sanford, August 18 , 2 , 18 9 .
7
3
l0 5McGhee to D. A . Carpenter, October , 188 .
7
7
10 6 Cullen y. Coal Creek, 6 9 -98 .
3
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The Coal Creek case was controversial ,

and

McGhee ' s part in it did

1

I

him no credit , but this was not the sort of affair which aroused public

I

l

outrage in the 1890 ' s. Business was conducted according to a set of
hard rules which left plenty of room for this kind of profit-making but
allowed little pity for the losers in financial struggles. Had Cullen
_succeeded in getting a majority of Poplar Creek stock, he would have
sold it at a premium to the Richmond and Danville , and little thought
would have been given to the welfare of Poplar Creek ' s minority holders .
But Cullen lost and suffered the consequences , while McGhee succeeded
and enjoyed the spoils. The nineteenth century held success in the

\

highest regard : success was equated with competence , and incompetence �

\1 \')
,l
'

it was believed, went hand and hand with failure .
Although this philosophy was often used to mask wickedness, it had
a certain harsh merit to it . Incompetence was dangerous and could do as
much, perhaps more , harm than ruthlessness . The promoters who "built"
the railroads and towns which never came to be did incalculable harm to
the small investors who took a few shares of stock or bought town lots .
Idealists and confidence men alike preyed upon a public that thirsted
for progress, growth, and profit . Governments and individuals sank
millions into schemes which never materialized, and few towns failed to
grasp the "golden opportunity" of subsidizing a railroad which ended in
dismal failure.
Some promoters were charlatans of the worst kind. This description seems to fit Colonel Albert

E.

Boone , whose Black Diamond line was

I

characterized by Edward J . Sanford as the "Wind Railroad. 11 10 7 Knox-
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ville ' s newspapers and government officials supported the Colonel enthusiastically until it became apparent that they bad been bilked. The
city' s mayor, Samuel G. Heiskell , then wrote a scathing letter in reply
to an enquiry from a mayor of a midwestern town:
Dear Sir: Yes , sir-ee, we know the versatile and tireless
colonel. We know him like a book. We have been privileged
to gaze upon him in all the splendor of a railroad builder,
whose lines extend from Knoxville , Tenn. , to Madison, Ind. ,
and from there to the isles of the sea and ends of the earth,
and thence in an air line , as the bird flies straight into
the pearly gates of the New Jerusalem. Not to know the colonel
is to have lived a void and empty life , to be a tree without
fruit , a bush without the rose , "a stunne d and stolid thing,
a brother to an ox.
11

Do we know the colonel! He got from our local suckers
$ 40 , 000 as a promoting fund to promote "the Black Diamond, "
and like John Brown' s soul our forty thousand "still goes
marching on" ; and as for the Black Diamond, it has already
been constructed over a circle of territory of which Knox
ville is the center and infinity the circumference and it
keeps on a-going. l08
Other entrepreneurs were truly talented and well meaning but
lacked the realism to make their fascinating dreams come t rue . Such a
promoter was Alexander Alan Arthur who founded Middlesboro , Kentucky,
and built the Knoxville , Cumberland Gap , and Louisville Railroad to his
new city on the Tennessee-Kentucky border. Arthur, a Scottish engineer,
visited Cumberland Gap on horseback in 188 6 and became convinced that
the area could be the hub of the New South. To him this part of the
Cumberlands seemed the healthiest , most beautiful , and potentially the
10 7 see above , Chapter IV.
108Knoxville Journal and Tribune , March 10 , 190 2 .
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richest place in the world. He was able to convince English investors
of the worth of his scheme , and the American Association, Ltd. poured
capital into the town which he described as the future steel center of
the United States . 10 9 Hungry as always for another railroad, Knoxville
voted overwhelmingly to subscribe $ 22) , 000 to finance the K. C . G.

&

L.

The confident Arthur promised to build the l�ne within two years and
further agreed that the subscription need not be paid until thirty days
after a train should run over the road to Cumberland Gap . 110 The actual
construction proceeded slowly, however, and Arthur apparently became
desperate as his self-imposed deadline approached. Ever on the alert
for a bargain in railroads , McGhee sensed that the K. C . G.

&

L. was in

trouble and asked an old friend in Knoxville , George Brown, for a report . Brown' s description of the line was hair-raising:
The road is very badly built in fact not near finished.
There is [ sic] several miles next to Knoxville that is only
half graded and many miles only one half of the X ties are
in. The bridges are on poles with one end in the bottom
111
of. the River
•

.

•

.

Finished or not , a train had to · travel over the line in order to secure the city' s subscription, and on August 22 , 1889 , the maiden
run

of the K. C . G.

& 1.

was made. Several miles from Knoxville ,

l09Robert L. Kincaid, The Wilderness Road (Indianapolis : The
Bobbs-Merrill Co. , 1947 ) , 3 12 - 2 4 .
110 11Brief and Argument of J . W. Yoe for Defendant , 11 in Knoxville
Cumberland Gap, and Louisville Railroad Comp{lF' et al . �· Board of
Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Knoxville N.p. : n. n. , n. d. ), 1- 4 .
This bound volume , consisting of the various briefs in the case , is
in the McClung Historical Collection.
111George Brown to McGhee , August 1 , 1889.
3
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while crossing Flat Creek, a trestle collapsed, and the train loaded
w1· th Knoxv1· 11 e a1gn1
· · tar1es
· fe 11 1n
· t o the rav1ne . 112 It was , as Calvin
·

McClung wrote , "The most terrible calamity that has befallen our community in

my

time . " A number of prominent men were killed and others

severely injured ; Arthur himself escaped with internal injuries and a
damaged career� ll3,
McGhee ' s approach to the development boom of the eighties was
conservative ; perhaps he felt that the spectacular success of the Coal
Creek syndicate had been due partly to luck. Sanford wanted to go
ahead with new plans for a town development near Knoxville in
McGhee averred that "our Syndicate has done very well .and

I

1887 ,

thi� it

best to rest easy for a time . " To his friend' s repeated urgings MeGhee replied :
I fully agree with you in the views that you entertain with
reference to the City
and would like very much to see
the enterprise undertaken and carried through. But I do not
feel willing that our Syndicate should embark in the enter
prise . We have as you say made a success and I do not feel
like embarking in anything that will take the profits that we
have already made . A capital of a million dollars would be
required to ensure the success of a city and while I would be
willing to put in $50 , 000 as my part of the venture , yet the
temper and spirit here is not now favorable to the giving of
the other $950 , 000 , I think if I would father the scheme _and
undertake to do so I could secure the needed amount of money
but if I did so I would have to assume the management of it
to some extent and would have to become morally responsible
to my friends who I would induce to go into it , this I feel
unwilling to do.
•

•

•

112Knoxville Journal , August 2 , 1889.
3
ll 3Kincaid, Wilderness Road, 2 .
3 5

but
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When you come on I will do what I can to aid your en
devers [ sic] to create a city
but I have not pluck
enough to do anyt hing myself except as an aid to some one
else . ll4
•

•

•

Without McGhee 1 s active leadership in New York there was nothing that
could be done and Sanford finally dropped the city scheme.
Properly skeptical of Arthur and his visionary plans , McGhee advised Ca.J:Iiin McClung to be very careful in advancing the Scot credit at
McClung' s hardware store , but he admitted to his son-in-law that

"I

am

too conservative entirely to direct any active business and therefore
you must receive all my cautions with proper allowances . 11 11 5 As the
boom continued into 1889 he may have wQndered if he was being too conservative for he wrote to a friend :
At one time I hooted at the idea of anyone bhilding [ rail] �oads
in East Tennessee knowing it was p�etty rough c6untry but they
build them all the same and I no longer consider an enterprise
as impossible of being carried through simply b�cause it Seems
to me to be unnecessary and expensive . ll 6
It

was possibly the fear of being bypassed during the boom, as well

as his deep commitment to developmental investments , that led McGhee into
a town building enterprise. When the stock of the Lenoir Manufacturing
Company was offered to him in the fall of 1889 he at first demurred. ll 7
This may have been a ploy to reduce the price , or it may have indicated
a genuine reluctance to make the investment , for McGhee had no further
nh·
�cGhee to Sanford, June 10 , 188 7 .

ll5McGhee to McClung, September , 188 .
7
7
11 6McGhee to W. T. Walters , May 18 , 1889.
'
11 7Cornelius
E. Lucky to McGhee , September 19 , October
McGhee to Lucky, November 15 , 188�.
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correspondence on the subject for several months. But in February, 1890 ,
he went to Tennessee , and when he returned to New York in April the
Lenoir City project was underway.
The property that became the town had been the estate of the
Lenoir family for eighty years . Unwilling to divide the large plantation, the Lenoirs passed it on intact from generation to generation, and
the 2 , 7 00 acres bought by McGhee and his associates was , by East Tennessee standards , an extraordinarily large single tract of arable land. It
was an ideal town site , located at the confluence of the Little Tennessee
and Tennessee rivers , and twenty- five miles southwest of Knoxville on
the main line of the East Tennessee , Virginia, and Georgia Railroad.
Besides hundreds of acres of fertile bottom land and rolling wooded
hills , the place included a flour mill , cotton factory, store , ware

houses , shops , barns , and twenty- six dwellings , all valued at $15 7 , 000. 118
The Lenoir City Company was incorporated in the spring of 1890
with most of the members of the earlier syndicate as participants . -Mc
�Ghee , �omas, �ice , Chapman, Moore , �sanford, and McGhee ' s friend, Oliver
*H. Payne , were the seven equal partners , with an eighth place left for
T . H. Heald of Knoxville . 119 The seven carried Heald ' s part at first ,
and several other Knoxvillians were soon admitted as stockholders. From
the beginning most of the actual work of the enterprise was done by an
enthusiastic Sanford, but almost at once he was pressed by the New York

5- 29 .

118Prospectus of � Lenoir City Comp�y (Lenoir, Tennessee [ 1890] ) ,
1
119McClung
to Leonhardt , June

4,

1892.
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partners to hurry the project in order to compete with the other town
promotions . His response , in a letter to McGhee , indicates his sound
approach to Lenoir City' s development :
I am surprised that Mr. :Brice thinks that we can sell an
imaginary city here without surveying it or can lay off a
town upon any piece of property without having some accurate
measurements and contour map , etc.
I am also surprised that Mr. Moore thinks that we will
have the only town site unsold and that he has lost faith
in it so soon, or could expect it to be sold by this time .
In all the other towns where I have known of, they have
been months at the same , they have had accurate surveys made ,
lithograph maps showing all the grades and lots and spent
thousands of dollars in advertising, getting up trains of
Pullman cars and hauling people down, and it takes months to
do each one of them. Harriman, :Bluffton, Cardiff, all have
been months in making preparations for their sale , and it is
evident to my mind, that that particular line of selling
property and making cities has been over done , and it would
be foolish to adopt that plan and to simply have a map of
lots drawn from imagination and offer it for sale and attempt
to have a sale at this time .
I am told privately, that Cardiff, while to the outside
world was a great success, yet the sales were very largely
made to the Directors of their own Company and there is much
dissatisfaction growing out of it. Their expense has been
so enormous and results so unsatisfactory. In this big hurrah
of sales now being made it has transpired of late , that a lot
of irresponsible speculators are on hand : they bid with reck
less freedom upon any and every thing, they get up excitement
with the outsiders if possible , and if they can sell their
bid to some innocent countryman or excited party over the
future of the place at an advance over what they paid for it ,
they will do so and let the sale be consummat ed, but if they
fail to do that and do not manage to swap off lots before
they have to pay for them, they silently take the train and
go off, leaving the immense sales made , only in the newspaper
articles. Now, I do not know personally about this , but I
can see very well how it can be done , and I imagine it is done .
The general impression that I hear on all sides and every
where , is that Lenoir is to be a substantial improvement . In
my opinion we cannot afford to make it any thing else.
We

23 1
cannot afford to start any thing there that will go up like
a rocket and come down like a stick. l 20
Clearly Sanford believed in real development rather than opportunistic promotion, and the way that Lenoir City Company shares were offered
to the publio shows that his views prevailed. Half of the capital stock
was issued to the members of the syndicate , while the remaining four
thousand shares were sold at par. With each share bought , the purchaser
also received a lot , so that the original property owners of Lenoir City
were also stockholders in the company. Half of the receipts was placed
in the company' s treasury, and the other half was paid to the syndicate
members to reimburse them for the purchase of the Lenoir property;' the
remaining land owned by the company was to be sold for commercial or
industrial development . 121 The value of the lots and stock was thus dependent upon the attraction of capital investment to the town, and this
objective occupied the attention of both Sanford and McGhee for some
years to come.
To show their confidence in the project the syndicate members each
bought a lot and built a house on it . This , Sanford maintained, "will
I

give confidence to people , knowing we are putting

own money in bui�a
ing, �hich can hardly be estimated in the public mind. " 122 Within a year
our

several manufacturers had located at Lenoir City, and it must have given
Sanford pleasure to send McGhee news clippings which described the
12�Sanford to McGhee , May S , 1890 .
121Prospectus of the Lenoir City Company, 22- 2 6 ; "Lenoir City
Syndicate , " a statement bearing date of May 1 7 , 1892.
122 sanford to McGhee , August 21, 1890. The houses were built to
rent ; none of these capitalists ever lived in Lenoir City.
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difficulties afflicting the rival towns of Cardiff, Harriman, and Rockwood. "When I read articles of this kind, " he wrote , "I am more than
satisfied with the course I have pursued with regard to Lenoir. 11 1 2 3 By
avoiding "the brass band and much promising course" he had laid the
foundation for slow but steady development .
The growth of Lenoir City would have been more rapid had not the
depression of the early nineties severely reduced investment and development in the South. This , and the difficulties of the East Tennessee ,
prevented McGhee and Sanford from building a railroad from Lenoir City
to the line of the Cincinnati Southern. 1 24 The difficulties of city
building during a depression were hard on Sanford. "I have not lost
faith in Lenoir, " he told McGhee , "and I feel it will all work out yet ,
although as I stated before I have had more disappointments in i t than
in any other business attempt in my life . 11 1 2.5 Nevertheless , both men
remained committed to the enterprise , and in 18 9 1 they increased their
investment by buying out Calvin Brice ' s interest . 1 26 They also became
heavily involved in the Lenoir Car Company, a manufacturer of railroad
equipment , which became the town 1 s major industry. 1 2 7 Lenoir City survived because of Sanford' s tireless . activity, supported by McGhee ' s
1 2 3 Ibid.
'
, May 2 6 , 18 9 1.
1 2�hey seriously discussed this idea in the summer of 18 9 0. See
McGhee to Sanford, August 2 .5 , 18 9 0 .
1 2.5sanford to McGhee , November , 18 1 .
9
27
1 26McClung to McGhee , May 8 , 18 .
92
2
1
1 27 Sanford
to McGhee , January 1 9 , 18 93 ·
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financial and moral influence . The latter' s New York connections made
the enterprise possible in the beginning; it was McGhee who drew in the
Northern capital to underwrite the Tennessee project . The investors ,
such as Brice and Moore , probably would have soon liquidated the company
to cut their losses had they not trusted McGhee , who in turn had great
confidence in Sanford.
The Lenoir City Company was truly a developmental enterprise , de
void of those unsavory features which characterized some of the two old
friends ' joint schemes. Ironically, it was also one of their less
successful ventures . These experiences illustrate some of the realities
of nineteenth century business life . Making money and holding on to it
was very difficult . The fortune which McGhee accumulated sometimes
seems to have been the product of a golden touch, but it was actually
the result of great shrewdness and energy. His business success was
based on his ability to seize the best opportunities for turning profits .
He was not attracted by vulgar schemes to defraud or steal ; neither was
he deterred by a modern sense of ethics . His code led him to be true to
his word, to avoid illegalities , and to be kind to his friends and de
pendents . Beyond these strictures he and many other businessmen of hi s
time felt free t o use any opportunity t o make money. The field of busi
ness combat was strewn with the failures of men like Alexander Arthur
whose talents were not equal to their ambitions. To succeed in business
was not easy, and success at McGhee ' s financial level required not only
intelligence , discretion, and perseverance but a touch of ruthlessness
as well.

2 34

With financial success came political power, which McGhee found
a useful concomitant of wealth. After his brief career as a politician
during the Reconstruction era, he devoted himself to business but his
money brought an influence in public affairs . The politicians sought
his favor, and some of them became his friends. Using these alliances
and his fortune , he exercised political power to advance his personal
and business interests.

CHAPTER VII
FRIEIIDS , ISSUES , ANTI INTERESTS : POLITICS ANTI
:BUSINESS IN THE GILDED AGE

\

During the years between the end of the Civil War and the late
1890 ' s the political life of the United States was especially dominated
by the. nation' s business community. Controlling both major parties ,
wealthy business interests imposed upon the politics of the day a remarkable sameness , a monotonous conformity of approach to many of the
important issues of the time . Little real difference could be detected
between the positions of Republicans and Democrats on questions affecting social and economic justice , regulation of the economy, or the role
of government in American life . Voters or politicians who sought different answers to these questions were driven to the fringes of politics,
to third parties or quasi-political activity. Not until the election of
1896 , when some of the "fringe" elements came into control of the Democratic party, was there a national contest which truly polarized the
electorate and gave a clear choice between the two great parties. 1
In the South, Tennessee , perhaps more than other states , reflected
the national political image . Unlike the situation in the United States ,
the Democrats were the dominant party, but the Republicans were a strong
minority which threatened this supremacy whenever their opponents became
;1
This general interpretation is drawn from John A. Garraty, The
New Commonwealth, l:.§TI-1890 ( New York : Harper & Row, 19 6 8 ) and Howard W.
Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley: National Party Politics, l:.§TI-1896
( Syracuse , N. Y. : Syracuse University Press , 19 6 9) .
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divided. It may have been that two-party politics prevented the development of the radical movements which in one way or another were making
themselves felt in other Southern states in the late eighties and early
nineties . At any rate , neither o f the two parties departed from the
stance of their national counterparts , and no successful third party
movement came into being. 2
l.
The politics of the Gilded Age were typified by the activities of
Charles McGhee and his close friend, Edward Sanford. The former had
strongly identified himself with the Democrats as early as 18 7 0 , and he
continued to be influential in the councils of his party. Sanford was
perhaps even more prominent in Republican affairs , attending national
party conventions and planning strategy on the state and local levels . 3
But if the two men really differed in their approach to issues there is
no indication of it . Their partisan roles seem to have been determined
by tradition; McGhee was an ex-slave owner and former Confederate , while
Sanford was Connecticut-born and had been a staunch Unionist .
Both men believed simply in policies favorable to their intere sts ,
and as long as these policies were being carried out it mattered little
2Folmsbee , History of Tennessee , II, 1 2 9- 2 00. In 1890 the Farmers '
Alliance managed to control the Democratic state convention and nominated
and elected John P. Buchanan, but the Buchanan administration, 1891-9 3 ,
did not represent a departure from the conservative policies of the past .
3A brief biography of Edward Jackson Sanford appears in Rothrock,
French Broad-Holston Country, 47 9-80.
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which party was in power. This was especially true of McGhee who , less
a partisan activist than his friend, was perfectly comfortable in using
his money to further the career of a good Republican. When William Rule ,
prominent Republican and editor of the Knoxville Journal, bought out an
uncongenial partner in his publishing company and sought new capital for
the enterprise he approached McGhee. "You may think me ' cheeky, "' he
wrote , "in asking you to take stock in a republican paper; but you know
the Journal has been uniformly friendly to things in which you have been
or are interested. This it will continue to be whether you think it
best to take stock or not . 11 4 Under the circumstances , McGhee ' s response
to Rule ' s "cheek" was entirely predictable , and he wrote to Sanford :
I have a letter from our friend Rule asking me to take stock
in his paper. Now the idea of him asking me , as good a
democrat as I am, to take stock in a republican sheet is the
most inconsistent and outrageous thing I ever heard of. If,
however, you will subscribe for $ 1 , 000 of the stock and have
it issued in your name I will pay for it . But I cannot so far
compromise my position with the Great Democ ratic Party as to
have my name upon the books of a republican organ. You know
just what sort of democrat I am. Seriously, however, in doing
the above I do not want anyone to know it . Of course I feel
disposed to help our friend Rule , and do anything he asks me
to, as he has always conducted a clean and decent republican
paper. He is in fact a decent man anyway. I do not even
want Cal [McClung] to know I have taken this stock, let it be
a matter between you and myself.
P. S. Upon reflection I have concluded to send the check
for $ 1 , 000 herewith. Do not give this check to Rule but pass
it to your credit and give him your check for the amount . The
secrecy is more on Rule ' s account than my own as you will
readily understand. )

4william Rule to McGhee , January 3 1 , 1889 . All manuscript cita
tions are to the McGhee Papers .
)McGhee to Sanford, February , 1889 . '
4
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In order to protect this Republican' s usefulness it was important
that he retain a seeming partisan purity, for if Rule ' s Republican influence were ever needed his business association with a Democrat could
be embarrasing. McGhee found that it was in fact more satisfactory for
this influence to be used behind the scenes. Thus when he was supporting the candidacy of former Democratic Governor James D. Porter for the
United S�ates Senate in 188 6-8 7 , he asked Rule to talk on Porter' s behalf to Republicans in the legislature . The Democrats controlled the
assembly, but in the event that the party could not agree on a single
candidate the election would be decided by the Republican members. 6
Although the state ' s parties were equally "safe" from the standpoint of the wealthy businessman, the Democrats in the mid 1880 ' s were
divided into three major factions . 7 The states rights or ex-secessionist
wing, led by United States Senator Isham Green Harris , was conservative
and agrarian. Another group, sometimes called the "young Democracy, "
composed of small farmers and restless young men ambitious for office ,
succeeded in electing thirty- six year-old Robert Love Taylor as governor
in 188 6 . Taylor was about the nearest thing to a radical which the
Democratic party produced during this time , but his "radicalism" was
more of style than of substance . The third faction of Tennessee Democrats were predominantly ex-Whigs who were especially identified with
the industrial and railroad interests ; it was to this group that Porter,
6Rule to McGhee , December 21, 188 6 .
7 This delineation of factions appears in Daniel M. Robison, Bob
Taylor and the Agrarian Revolt in Tennessee (Chapel Hill : University
of North Carolina Press , 1 9 35), 14-1 9 .
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a former president of the Nashville , Chattanooga, and Saint Louis Rail
road belonged. S
Because Porter' s political position was quite similar to Rule ' s ,
McGhee could expect the editor to lend important assistance , and Rule
went to Nashville to work for Porter, offering "to come out squarely for
him, even to the extent of writing editorials in my paper favoring his
election. " 9 McGhee also sent to the capital an old friend and nemo
cratic politician, Daniel A. Carpenter, to do what he could for Porter.
All of these efforts failed, however, when the Democratic caucus of
legislators selected William B. Bate as the party' s candidate and elected
him to the senate. 10
Although Porter was exactly McGhee ' s kind of Democrat , personal
rather than political considerations had led him to support the former
governor. McGhee ' s son-in-law, George W. Baxter, had recently obtained
an appointment as territorial governor of Wyoming, and Porter, who was
assistant secretary of state in Cleveland' s first administration, had
been useful in pleading Baxter' s cause . 11 Personal bonds of loyalty were
always of primary importance to McGhee , unlike some other businessmen of
the Gilded Age . This attitude explains his interest in the senatorial
election, but when Porter was defeated the financier accepted it philo
sophically, remarking to Carpenter that "Both you and

I

•

8 Ibid. , 18-19.
9Rule to McGhee , December 21 , 188 6 .
10Daniel A. Carpenter to McGhee , January 2 , 188 .
7
7
1 �cGhee to William Baxter, December JO , 188 6 .

•

•

have

240

discharged the obligation we owed him and it is not our fault that he did
not succeed. " 1 2
The extreme importance of these personal ties was illustrated
again two years later when he supported the reelection of Senator Harris.
This old war horse of the Democrats had never been a particular friend,
but he had recently endeared himself to McGhee at the same time that
Harris ' opponent , James DeWitt Clinton Atkins , had earned his deep
enmity. Atkins , a former congressman, was serving as commissioner of
Indian affairs when McGhee asked him to help to secure Baxter' s appointment as territorial governor of Wyoming. As McGhee explained it to his
sister in Tennessee :
Something like one year ago I was in Washington and thought I
might need the influence of Senator Harris and my old school
mate James D. Adkin [ sic] in regard to a matter. I called
Senator Harris and stated my case to him and, notwithstanding,
the fact that our relations had never been warm or close at all ,
he promptly told me I could command his services . I called
upon Adkins and was very warmly greeted by him, but as soon as
I broached the subject , I saw from his manne r that he was most
supremely selfish and would not exert himself to do anything
in my behalf. I , however, did not need the services of either.
The action of Adkins upon that occasion releases me from any
obligation that I might otherwise have had in forwarding his
political aspirations and leaves me at liberty, as far as may
be in my power, to promote the election of Harris. l 3
When McGhee made his position known to Carpenter it developed
that he too had suffered at Atkins ' hands :
When I made up my mind to apply for the Pension Agency you
gave me a very strong letter to him which I delivered in
1 �cGhee to Carpenter, Janua ry 1 , 188 .
7
3
l 3McGhee to Margaret Niles , August 29 , 1888 .

person
and the man almost became frantic and turned loose
a perfect torrent of objections to him having any thing to do
with the matter.
I thought he never would get done talk
ing about it . Of course I was mortified, and I knew you would
be if you knew how he had acted. And I made up my mind to save
you of the mortification and never tell you any thing about his
actions : but while in his office I made up my mind and swore
in my heart that I would be avenged for the insult offered me.
And when the Legislature meets I am going to Nashville and take
a Room near him and if I can influence E£ �' I will have the
satisfaction of letting him know the unbounded Contempt I have
for him and if it does him no harm at all it will do me a great
de�l of good. l4
•

•

•

•

•

•

In perfect agreement on the course to pursue , McGhee and Carpenter went to work for Harris. This involved spending money, furnished
by McGhee, to elect suitable members of the legislature , although as
Carpenter remarked, "Experience has taught you that it is hard to find
men that will faithfully use money for election purposes ; it is sorter
[ sic] like stealing from the Government or a Rail Road Co. The tempta
tion is great and man is weak. " l.5 McGhee could not very well expect
help from Republicans for such an avowed former rebel as Harris , but he
called for assistance from others , such as his friend, Robert N. Hood,
a member of the ex-Whig Democratic faction. ,Although he found it hard
to swallow Harris , "who has a prejudice against men like myself who were
in the Federal Army, " Hood promised to do anything that McGhee asked. 16
On this occasion McGhee ' s money and influence and Carpenter' s
work succeeded in helping to elect a senator. When the votes had been
counted Carpenter reported with great satisfaction :
l4Carpenter to McGhee , September
l) Ibid. , September 6 , 1888 .
16

18 , 1888 .

Robert N. Hood to McGhee, September

13 , 1888 .

We
had a Jolly time after the tlring was settled and
with your Experience with Legislators you know what I mean
when I say a Jolly time . While in Nashville I had a long
talk with Senator Harris, he told me a good deal about men
and things , and in the conversation your name came up. And
I simply wish to say that should it become necessary at any
time for you to call on the Senator for anything you can do
so with the full assurance that you can get anything that is
in his power to give . I enjoyed the mortification and
humiliation of Atkins hugely. I remembered him in his
spacious office in Washington. l 7
•

•

•

This election marked the beginning of a long friendship between
McGhee and Harris, and though the financier sometimes solicited the
Senator' s help in advancing the interests of those close to

him ,

there

is no indication that he ever asked Harris to violate his integrity in
political matters . 18 There were a number of other politicians whose
friendship he enjoyed and whose influence could be useful , and he took
pleasure in aiding them with money or other support . One such friend
was Senator Howell

E.

Jackson of Tennessee who was later appointed to

the United States Supreme Court . McGhee went to a great deal of trouble
to arrange a loan of $ 25 , 000 for Jackson and his brother, and finally
ended by lending them the money himself. 1 9 Another friend was Representative Joseph Wheeler, the ex-Confederate general through whose
Alabama district the Memphis and Charleston Railroad ran. Because
Wheeler was also a valuable political ally McGhee saw to it that the
l 7 Carpenter to McGhee , January 1 , 188 9 .
6
18On several occasions McGhee asked for Harris ' help in getting
assignments for his son-in-law, Lawrence D. Tyson, then a lieutenant in
the U. S . Army.
l 9McGhee to William H. Jackson, June 28, 1888 .

'.
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superintendent of the M.
respect . 20

&

C . treated Wheeler' s wishes with special

On some occasions McGhee attempted to influence important political decisions. He was , for instance, strongly opposed to the Interstate
Commerce Act , which he condemned as "one of the crudest and most mischievous measures that the unwisdom of legislators has ever undertaken
to impose upon the Country. " 2 1 In 189 3 he spent a good deal of time
in Washington unsuccessfully trying to get the law amended so as to permit pooling by the railroads. One of the strongest advocates of this
measure was Josiah Patterson, congressman from the Memphis district , with
whom McGhee worked closely. 22 When Patterson faced a hard contest for
renomination he was able to count on McGhee , who asked the Memphis and
Charleston s superintendent "to bring to bear al.l possible influence
in his favor at the approaching election. " 23
1

At other times , when the issue was less important to his interests ,
his efforts were merely perfunctory. He had no desire to champion lost
causes or to engage in political machinations for their own sake . Thus
when he was called upon to promote a subsidy for maritime shipping he
wrote Wheeler a letter which reveals much about his usual approach to
politics :
2 0McGhee to R. ] . Pegram, August 2 9 , 1888 .
2 1 Letterbook, August , 188 6.-February, 1888 , p . 3 .
4
22 see , for instance , Josiah Patterson to McGhee , June 2 , and
McGhee to Patterson, June 5 , 1 894 .
2 3McGhee to Pegram, October , 189 .
4
4

2�
The President of Pacific Mail asked me to aid him with my
friends in Congress in securing a subsidy. I said to him
that I would not ask any of them to vote for the bill , that
it was likely to be made a party measure . He then asked
that I use such influence as I had to secure a hearing. I
accordingly wrote , but delayed doing so until the legisla
tion has passed beyond the point at which a hearing was
desirable � or as it appears from your letter possible .
The Administration seem to regard an encouragement of our
merchant marines a measure of importance . Whether i t is
wise or not is a question for the future . If it is wise
the country will get the benefit , if unwise the Republican
party will be responsible for the error of the legislation.
If I were a member I would let the dominant party pass all
their pet measures (except the Force Bill) without hinder
ance . The more unwise the measure , the more the injury
that will result to the dominant party. 2 4
While men like Sanford and McGhee held supreme influence in their respective parties the latter could view politics with a comfortable
complacency. He contributed, for instance , $ 1 , 000 to Grover Cleveland ' s
campaign in 1888 , 25 but his true attitude was summe d up in a letter to
a son-in-law :
As you know I have no special feeling in regard to the matter
one way or the other, although of course I am for Cleveland,
but still I do not consider his election is essential to good
government and the prosperity of the country, as our interests
will be safe no matter who is elected. 26
All this was changed by the nomination of William Jennings Bryan
for president , and the adoption by the Democrats of a platform which incorporated enough of the Populist program to frighten badly McG�ee and
his fellows. Already he had seen the signs of what seemed to be dangerous radicalism in the party; in 1894 he noted that Democrats in New
2�cGhee to Joseph Wheeler, July 22 , 1890 .
2 5Chase Bank checkbook stub , August 2 8 , 1888 .
26McGhee to McClung, October 2 , 1888.
5
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York and Ohio were in serious trouble , but observed that "the fact is
there are a great many Democratic congressmen that do nobody any good
2 7 The old order, the accepted political way, was changing,
a:nyway. "
and McGhee was galvanized by what he viewed as the loosing of "the
forces of mis-rule. " To combat the new terror--"an attack on property,
on contract , and judicial institutions11 2 8 --he contributed money to the
McKinley campaign, circulated propaganda, and wrote letters to those
whom he might influence . 29
To McGhee , prepared as he was for political revolution, the results of the election were a great relief, and almost a surprise .
Nevertheless Tennessee and the nation had changed, and such businessmen
as McGhee and Sanford could no longer be so certain of the good will of
friendly politicians and subservient newspapers. Two years before the
McKinley-Bryan contest Sanford had noted that "our connection with

any

city improvement seems to have the same effect upon the citizens here
as a red rag does to a bull. " J O McGhee ' s last active business venture
was an investment in a kind of "city improvement , " a.TJ.d though a splendid
financial success, it acquainted him with this hostility and brought

him

into conflict with the new political forces at work in Tennessee .
2 7McGhee to Patterson, October 22 , 18 9 .
4
28McGhee to McClung, July 1 6 , 18 9 6 .
2 9McGhee 1 s campaign activities may be traced in Stanley J. Folmsbee
and Marguerite B. Hamer ( eds. ) , "The Presidential Election of 189 6 as
Reflected in the Correspondence of Charles McClung McGhee , " East Tennes
see Historical Society' s Publications , No . 22 ( 19.50 ) , 1.58- 6 8 .
J OSanford t o McGhee , September 1.5 , 18 94 .
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2.
The death of John

Hami lton

Inman in November, 18 9 6 , made neces-

sar,y radical readjustments in the companies in which he had major stock
holdings. For three decades the Southern-born capitalist had invested
heavily in the enterprises of his native region. Even after the collapse of his greatest venture , the Richmond Terminal, in 1893 ,

Inman

retained a sizeable interest in the South' s largest iron manufacturer,
the Tennessee Coal, Iron, and Railroad Company. 3 l Tennessee Coal had
its headquarters in Nashville where its long-time president , Nathaniel
Baxter, Jr. , made his home and where he had extensive interests, 3 2 among
them the Nashville Street Railway Company, which Baxter, Inman , and a
local magnate , General William Harding Jackson, had cont rolled since
1894 . 33 Inman ' s death was probably the occasion for the exchange of
securities which brought McGhee into the company. John Inman ' s partner,
James Swann, wanted to dispose of the interest held in the name of the
New York banking house , Inman , Swann and Company.
Having recovered from his bad scare over the McKinley-Br,yan election, McGhee was ready to embark on a new venture , and in November,
1896 , he wrote Baxter that "after quite an amount of talk

•

•

•

I have

3 lHolland Thompson, "John Hami lton Inman , " in Dictionary of
American Biograp�y ( 20 vols . and index; New York : 1928-1945 ), IX, 48 4 .
Fuller, "Histor,y of Tennessee Coal , " 125-28 .
3 2Baxter actually moved his office to Birmingham in June , 18 9 6 ,
at the request of Tennessee Coal ' s board of directors. Ibid. , 129- 3 0.
33Nashville Banne r, Februar,y 9 , 1894 .
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concluded that I will buy the Swann interest at $ 60 , 000 or thereabouts
and pay him the floating debt . " McGhee observed that this would give
him a one-third interest , equal to that of Baxter and Jackson. 34 Baxter responded with a proposal that McGhee join him in buying out General
Jackson, who appears to have been in financial straits . 35 Baxter would
later have cause to regret his role in securing Jackson' s interest ,
but the opportunity must have looked too good to resist.

On

December 11

it was announced that McGhee and Baxter had acquired a controlling in
terest in the company. 36 McGhee received 3 , 996 shares of stock and
$194 , 7 00 in bonds , for which he paid a total of $18) , 2 09. 6 3 ; but of
this amount $ 64 , 24) . 62 went to Inman, Swann to buy Nashville Street
Railway' s floating debt . Thus Inman, Swann took a loss in the securities it sold to McGhee, in return for which the latter assumed the unsecured note of over $ 60 , 000 , representing advances made by the banking
house to the street railroad. McGhee therefore acquired stock and bonds
with a par value of almost $ 6 00, 000 which actually cost him $1 20 , 9 64 . 01 . 3 7
Only a financier sure of ,himself and with plenty of capital could
have made such a lucrative deal. Nashville Street Railway had apparently
never shown much earning power. Its large floating debt and the willingness of Jackson and Inman, Swann to p art with their holdings at such
figures were telltale signs that the company' s pe rformance had been poor
3�cGhee to Nat Baxter, November 1 3 , 189 6 .
35Ibid. , November, 2 3 , 1896 .

3 6Nashville American, December 11 , 18 9 6 .
37 Leonhardt to McGhee , December 2 6 , 189 6 ; Journal, )2 .
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and that its prospects were uncertain. For McGhee , or indeed any
capitalist who might have taken such an interest in it , the important ·'
thing was to control Nashville Street Railway' s

mana

gement . There was

above all the matter of the floating debt which was certain to be paid
only if the holder of the note had a free hand in the company' s financial affairs. It is clear that after the purchase , McGhee , with Baxter1 s assent , exercised such absolute control .
McGhee approached the problem as he had approached similar one s .
To provide for the floating debt and t o pay the coupons on the company' s
bonds , he required that every spare penny be remitted to New York. 3 8
By May, 189 7 , something less than half of the debt to McGhee had been
paid with interest . 3 9 Baxter approved this policy and urged McGhee to
"make a clean sweep of what is left in the Treasury, anli leave them to
scuffle for their July [ bond] interest . " He hoped that June earnings
would be enough to cover both operating expenses and July interest , but
noted that "if it should not there will be no difficulty in obtaining
an accommodation from the banks for the short term
" 40 McGhee ,
•

•

•

•

however, was not such a hard taskmaster. He could afford to relax and
wait a bit for the re�t of his money. In reply, he observed "quite a
bit of demoralization in Nashville Street Railway securities , and it
occurs to me that it would be well to let them accumulate their July
3 8McGhee to Leonhardt , January 2 , 189 7 ; T. M. Steger to McGhee ,
February 1 3 , 20 , and 2 7 , 189 7 .
3 9Leonhardt to McGhee, May 10 , 189 7 .
4°Nat Baxter to McGhee , May 1 7 , 18 9 7 .
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interest before making any further payments .
he said, "they can pay me

After doing that , "

unsecured debt , and then can arrange to
accumulate their January interest . " 4l
my

After six months ' experience with the property McGhee expressed
himself as "delighted" with its earnings . 42 It was a good time to be
in the street car business in Nashville . The Tennessee Centennial Exposition opened in May, 18 97 , and the railway was busy carrying throngs to
visit the Exposition grounds during the summer and into the fall as the
Exposition was held open until November. Typically, McGhee was guardedly
optimistic about the road ' s future , but he kept in close contact with
the company' s president , Thomas M. Steger, a Nashville lawyer, and with
its general manager,

E.

C . Connette. Both officiers frequently consulted

McGhee about details of operations , such as the desirability of using
bumpers on the cars and the issuance of free passes . Likewise , the

mana-

gers were expected to justify their expenditures to McGhee ' s satisfac
tion. 43
It was perhaps well that McGhee maintained such close scrutiny of
the company, for Nat Baxter proved to be a less than perfect partner.
Baxter had little time to spare for Nashville Street Railway affairs because he needed all his energy to stay on top of Tennessee Coal. That
company had for years been the target of Wall Street raiders , its stock
4�cGhee to Nat Baxter, May 19, 1897.
42McGhee to Steger, June 2 , 18 97 .
43 see , for instance, McGhee to Steger, July 14 ,
and September 15 ; Steger to McGhee , July 6 , 1 3 , August
September 1 ; E . C . Connette to McGhee, July 1 6 , August

August 13 , 23 , 25
4 , 12 18 , and
2 , 189 7 .
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gyrating wildly as a result of the speculators ' maneuvers . In 189 7 Baxter was already losing control to a party of New York financiers , although
his ouster from the presidency was still a few years in the future. 44
Much of his stock in Tennessee Coal , as well as all of his original
Nashville Street Railway securities, was held as loan collateral by Inman,
Swann . 45 As early as May, 189 7 , James Swann predicted to McGhee that
"the time is coming when we will have to close up with Baxter, either by
selling his [ Nashville Street Railway] stock to someone else or by buying
ing with us so long,
that we cannot , in justice to ourselves , continue much longer. " 46 Meit ourselves

•

•

Baxter' s matters have been

runn

Ghee felt that Swann would be glad to take Baxter' s 2 , 7 00 shares to
settle the latter' s $1 25 , 000 debt , or that the New York banker would buy
it outright at thirty dollars a share . 47
Although effusively grateful to McGhee for taking the street rail
road in hand, Baxter could not refrain from speculating in its stock. 48
"Captain Steger says , " wrote McGhee ' s son-in-law, Lawrence

D.

Tyson,

"that every time Mr. Baxter comes to town, he boosts the stock about a
point , and that it is very hard to keep taxes down under such publicity. " 49
44Fuller, "History of Tennessee Coal , " 125- 2 8 ; Walker, Alfred
Montgome;r Shook, 80-8 1 , 114-15.
45McGhee to Tyson, June 3 0 , 189 7 .
46James Swann to McGhee , May 24 , 189 7 ·
47McGhee to Tyson, June 3 0 , 1897 .
48Nat Baxter to McGhee , June 2 8 , 189 7 .
49Tyson to McGhee , October 5 , 189 7 .
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Baxter, who was quite familiar with such practices through his Tennessee
Coal experience , doubtless found a congenial atmosphere in Nashville for
stock boosting. More than other Southern cities , Nashville was already
a center for securities speculation, and the

pulation of a local
company' s stock on this market was not unusual. 5 0 Still , such a pracmani

tice ran counter to McGhee ' s plans , which were to build a solid foundation for the company' s future earning capacity and to spend net profits
on the property to keep it in a "high state of physical condition. " He
found that Baxter wanted to pay stock dividends with the first available money. This , McGhee said, was "diametrically opposed" to his own
views . In a New York conversation he told Baxter that "I did not want
to be in his way, and that if he was opposed to the manner in which I
managed the finances of the property that

I

would sell

my

stock to

any-

body he might select that would take care of the property. " Baxter
disclaimed any desire to have McGhee sell and pled his precarious financial condition as justification. McGhee wrote Tyson that Baxter expected
to be in better condition the following year and added that "when he
goes back home , I hope he will cease his efforts to bolster up the price
of the stock. 11 5 1
Two months later, however, Baxter' s money problems caused an embarrassing incident . When Baxter bought half of General

W.

H. Jackson' s

street railway securities in December, 1896 , he apparently gave the
50John B. McFerrin, Caldwell and Compru;y: ! Southern Financial
Empire (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 193 9), 2 .
5 lThe conflict with Baxter i s fully stated in McGhee ' s letter
to Tyson, October 7 , 18 9 7 .

general a twelve-month note in payment . As the date due approached,
Jackson advertised the stock and bonds for sale to satisfy the debt .
A flurry of telegrams informed McGhee of this development , and Baxter
asked him for a loan to pay Jackson, but be.fore McGhee could respond
Baxter secured from Jackson a renewal of the note . 5 2
This incident was probably the occasion referred to in an anecdate related by J . C . Bradford, a nephew of James C . Bradford, who was
intimately associated with Nashville Street Railway:
"Colonel" Nat Baxter, Jr. had executed a note to GEI!leral
William H. Jackson of "Belle Meade" in connection with a
transaction in which Mr. Baxter had purchased an interest
in a street railway company in Birmingham, Alabama [ sic] .
The. note came due -and Mr. Baxter ' mailed· a renewal note to
General Jackson. The latter mailed it back, saying that
there was no understanding as to its renewal. This meant
of course, foreclosure on the collateral . Mr. Baxter got
his horse and buggy and a shotgun, drove out to "Belle
Meade , " and went to General Jackson' s front door with the
renewal note and the shotgun. When the general came to the
door, Mr. Baxter asked him if he would not renew the note .
General Jackson immediately accepted the renewal note , got
the old note , and delivered it to Mr. Baxter. ' Thereafter,
in Nashville banks when a note from Mr. Baxter appeared
it was commonly referred to as a "shotgun note . 1153
The story may be apocryphal , but it fits the situation too well to be
entirely discounted. Although he did not mention his shotgun, Baxter
explained to McGhee that he had "arranged" a four-month renewal with
Jackson. Baxter professed to have been shocked at the general ' s initial
intransigence until he learned that Jackson was bitter about the original
5 2Tyson to McGhee , December 1 9 ; Steger to McGhee , December 19 ;
Nat Baxter '.to McGhee , December 1 9 , 21 , 18 97 .
53William Waller ( ed. ) , Nashville in the 1890s ( Nashville :
Vanderbilt University Press, 1 9 7 0) , 100-l .
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sale of the securities to Baxter and McGhee. The general believed that
Baxter had squeezed him, "and now he had the opportunity to squeeze me
and had retaliated. " .54
In any case , Baxter kept his interest in Nashville Street Railway,
and McGhee found that actual control of the property could be secured
by working through James Swann, who still held a large block of the
Baxter stock as security .55 By the spring of 1898 McGhee had assumed
•

complete direction of the company and his son-in-law, Lawrence Tyson,
was installed as president , replacing Thomas M. Steger. James C . Bradford became vice president and general counsel . Close management and
more prosperous times began to make the street railway a paying in
vestment , fully justifying McGhee ' s gamble on its future . 5 6
But if the company had by the middle of

1898

come a long way on

the road to prosperity, its journey had not always been an easy one .
Among the more persistent problems which faced McGhee and his associates
was the railroad ' s relationship with government and the general public .
Like most municipal public transportation facilities, Nashville Street
Railway was a monopoly under a charter granted by the city government .
The company was a big business with assets which were highly visible
on the streets of Nashville , and transactions in its securities were
quoted in the local press. The company naturally attracted the attention

1897 .

5�at Baxter to McGhee , December 2 1 , 1897 .
55McGhee to Swann, December 22 , and to B. S. Clark, December 2 7 ,

5 6McGhee to Tyson, June
Baxter, August 19 , 1898 .

1,

to Bradford, June 2 1 , and to Nat

2 54
of tax collectors, and it was rmderstandably resented by some of its
farepaying patrons. With a large stake in mrmicipal government , some
of the company' s employees became involved in local politics. General
Manager

E.

C . Connette was active in the Democratic party, and, using

the company' s patronage to expand his influence , he built something of
a political machine and became president of the city' s board of educa
tion. 5 7 While he never shrank from using political power to accomplish
desired ends , McGhee disapproved of Connette 1 s occupying such an obvious public position, but he was rmwilling to have his general manager
driven from office by critics who were beginning to attack not only
Connette but Nashville Street Railway as well. 5 8
"There is a daily newspaper here called 1 The Srm, 1 " wrote T. M.
Steger, "which has promoted and urged these attacks , and if it continues
rmder its present management , it has other troubles in store for us . 11 5 9
In fact , by July, 18 9 7 , when the president reported thus to McGhee , the
Nashville Daily Srm had made the Nashville Street Railway Company one of
the chief objects of its war on "the corporations , the monopolies and
the trusts. " 6 0 From its inception in December, 1895 , the Srm had proclaimed its readiness "to arraign at the bar of public opinion individuals ,
.5 7McGhee wrote Connette that "your political strength i s largely
due to the fact that you have had the patronage of the Company at your
disposal--without the Company you would find yourself sadly shorn of
power, " McGhee to Connette , July 2 7 , 1899 .
58McGhee to Steger, July 1 2 , 18 97
.5 9steger to McGhee , July 6 , 189 7 .
•

6 0Nashville Daily Sun, December 1 9 , 189 .
5
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corporations , and public officials who invade or attempt to invade or
disregard the rights of the people . " 6 1 Founded especially to advance
the doctrine of free silver, the Sun became the Nashville voice of left
wing Tennessee Democrats and Populists , as well as a Bryan campaign
organ in the election of 18 96 . After Bryan' s defeat , it focused attacks
on the Louisville and Nashville and the Nashville , Chattanooga, and
Saint Louis railroads , blaming these corporations for opposing Bryan
and for generally oppressing labor and the citizenry of Nashville . 62
In the spring of 189 7 the newspaper began to assail several local publie service corporations for a variety of offenses . Typical of these
attacks was an editorial directed at Nashville Street Railway and
entitled "Corporation Tyranny" :
Nashville,has come to look with great susp1.c1.on upon certain
local corporations operating under grants from the people
and growing fat by exactions from the people .
Take , for instance , our local street car company. There
are a great many people who believe that it should pay more
taxes. There are many who believe it should give some quid
pro quo , owning as it does by grant of the city the right
of way through streets and thoroughfares . There are those
who insist that it should not be allowed to gobble up streets
at its pleasure, or for its profit , and stop the running of
cars on certain lines because the same may not be so profit
able as others .
There are thousands who are of the opinion that this
company should get out and stay out of politics and leave
our Board of Education and our City Council severely alone .
All of these matters are going to be looked into, and The
Sun gives its warning in due time . This is not a healthy
62 rbid. , November 8 , 1 3 , 189 6 .

2.5 6
year for such methods as are unquestionably being complained
of. There is a growing sentiment that these corporations
are not so powerful that the people canno t take them in hand.
The Louisville and Nashville Railroad dwelt in false security
when it .imagined that the fight made by The . Sun for a Railroad Commission would be a losing one . Let the Nashville Street
Railway Company profit by the example of the Louisville and
Nashville . There are new councils to be elected, and those
who win will have to secure the support of the people . That
support will be terribly slow in coming once those same people
are aroused to a proper sense of their duty. Corruption can
not long thrive , tyranny has but temporary life , and the
right is sure to be eventually done . 0 3
Taxes proved to be the most effective stick with which to beat
the corporations , and the Sun campaigned to raise the assessments of
the street railway, gas, telephone , and electric companies. 64 After
several weeks of editorial bombardment , the newspaper was able to claim
victory when the Board of Assessors announced a general rise in cor
poration assessments. 6.5 Nashville Street Railway' s taxable assets were

a

raised by the city from
raised to

$1 , 000 , 000 .

$710 , 000

to

Although the

$860 , 000 ;
�

the county assessment was

thought the assessment should be

it was jubilant over the increases and promised that "we are
not through with you yet , Mr. Street Railway. 1 1 66
$1 , 800 , 000 ,

The Sun' s attacks , while bothersome , did not at first seem of much
importance to McGhee . When apprised o f them, he was not inclined to
give the matter much attention. "I can give you no views in regard to
the newspaper, " he wrote Steger, "as it is a subject that I do not
63 Ibid. , May l ,
J
64Ibid. , June l ,
6.5 Ibid. , July 2 ,

1897 ·
2,

3 , 4, 6 ,

1897 ·

7 , 10 , 18 , 20 , 1897 .

66Ibid.
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understand, and

I

must leave it to you and

Mr.

Tyson. " 67 Probably he was

reluctant to spend money to stop the Sun, and he was too concerned with
the larger financial affairs of the company to notice the clamor of a
scurrilous Nashville newspaper. McGhee ' s Tennessee associates would
have to handle the situation as best they could. At first it seemed
possible that the Sun' s victims might buy out their antagonist . Dissension among the paper' s owners had become bitter as two factions
fought for control , and so William Morrow, one of the original stockholders , approached Steger for help. The street railway executive organized a syndicate composed of his company, the gas and electric companies , and the

1. &

N. Railroad to furnish the money for Morrow to gain

control of the Sun. 68 Other political or business interests must have

sought to secure the paper, however, because Steger decided that the
bid should be withdrawn when the price was driven up. 6 9 Having failed
in the attempt to buy it , Steger hoped the paper would go into receivership, but , although beset by creditors , it continued to publish attacks
on the street railway and other corporations . 7 0
Perhaps it was an affront of a more personal nature which stung
McGhee into striking back.

In

an editorial entitled "Quasi Public

6 7McGhee to Steger, July 1 5 , 18 9 7 .
6 8 Steger to McGhee , August 4 , 18 9 7 . Dr. William Morrow, a prominent Nashville capitalist , was originally from East Tennessee. He made
a fortune in the manufacturing .firm known as Cherry, Morrow and Company
and in the leasing of convict labor from the state penitentiary. He was
state treasurer of Tennessee , 18 7 1- 75 . Waller, Nashville in the 1890s , 7 9 .
6 9steger to McGhee , August 12 , 18 9 7 .
7 °steger to McGhee , August 18 ; Tyson to McGhee , October 5 , 18 9 7 .
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Corporations , " the Sun for the first time concentrated its fire on the
man who controlled Nashville Street Railway:
The submissiveness of the American people comes not so much
from patience as from the circumstance that these wrongs
are not directly inflicted by an individual , but through an
impersonal entity, the corporation.
•

Of course , there is an individual or several individuals
behind the corporation.
•

Take , for instance , the street railway company, which,
while it benefits , perhaps to the extent of $1)0 , 000 from
the Centennial , yet it is a daily and constant source of
danger and annoyance to our people and to strangers who
visit the city.
If the people of Nashville realized exactly that it is
Col. Charles McGhee of Knoxville , who owns the monopoly of
the use of the streets for street car transportation, they
would look upon the concern as an impersonal corporation.
Colonel McGhee is a worthy gentleman and an excellent
citizen of Knoxville . His chief and probably only interest
in Nashville is entirely confined to knowing how much his
exclusive right to tax the people of this city will add
to his yearly income . 7 l
Early in November McGhee went to Tennessee. The reasons for his
visit to his native state may have been varied, but certainly the problem
of the Sun was one of them. On November

10 ,

he wrote A.

B.

Andrews , the

Southern Railway' s vice president : "The news-paper deal was closed a
few days since , and under the agreement I paid
in addition to

$12)0

on

my

earliest convenience for

$12)0 . 00

on your account ,

own account . Please remit check at your

$12)0 . 00 . " 72

had revealed that E. T. Noel ,

W. W.

Four days previously the paper

Page , and David Crutchfield had

sold their interest in the paper to Wharton Allen, the Sun' s business
7 1sun, October
7 �cGhee to A.

17 , 1897 .
B.

Andrews , November

10 , 1897 .
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ger. 73 The paper' s staff and policies would remain the same it was
announced, but five weeks later the Sun abruptly ceased publication. 74

mana

From McGhee ' s correspondence it is possible to reconstruct the
stor,y of the demise of this radical journal. When he went to Tennessee ,
McGhee arranged for the cooperative purchase of the Sun by his street
railroad, the Southern Railway, and probably a number of other corporations . Once the paper was bought by a "dummy , u Wharton Allen, its
control was entrusted to J. C . Bradford, vice president of Nashville
Street Railway. 75 No abrupt c hange in editorial policy occurred, but
references to specific individuals or corporations disappeared. The Sun
continued to pursue a generally reformist line , calling occasionally
for the assessment of franchises and attacking the issuance of free
passes by railroads to public officials . 7 6 Thus the new owners averted
suspicion. "We have been able to mystify people completely about the
ownership of the paper, " wrote Bradford, "and no one knows who are the
real parties. It has been whispered on the streets that the gas and
street railroad companies controlled it ; and again it has been said Bob
Taylor' s friends controlled it . " 77 So well was the secret kept that
Jacob M. Dickinson, the local attorney for the Illinois Central Railroad,
one of the participating owners , did not know of his company' s involvement . Suspecting that the street railway controlled the Sun, he
73 sun, November 6 , 18 9 7 .
74Ibid. , December 17 , 189 7 .
75J. C . Bradford to McGhee , December 1 7 , 189 7 .
76 sun, November 12 , 1 7 , December l , 3 , , 1 8 9 7 .
4
77Bradford to McGhee , December 1 7 , 1 8 9 7 .
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threatened to complain to McGhee about an editorial which criticized the
railroads ' opposition to the state railroad commission. 7 8 Dickinson
need not have worried, for the paper' s new owners had decided that it
must die , and soon after its second birthday, they ended the Sun' s crusading career. Ironically, Nashville Street Railway continued to have
occasional troubles with the press. The Nashville Daily American, organ
of the Nashville , Chattanooga, and Saint Louis Railroad, took an antagonistic position in the summe r of 1898 , and McGhee complained to Bradford :
I have been surprised at the course of the "American" in re
gard to the matter. In order to get the "Sun" out of the way
and stop its abuse of Maj . [ John W. ] Thomas and ourselves we
contributed $.15 00. [ sic] to the purchase of the "Sun" and we
had a right to believe that the "American" would be friendly
to us . It seems to me that [Mayor E. C . ] Lewis and Thomas
have treated us badly in the matter. 7 9
Differences with the American, however, could not seriously discomfort McGhee as Nashville Street Railway seemed to go from strength to
strength. In the summe r of 18 9 8 its debt was lower than at any time
since he had bought into the company, and earnings for the first quarter

of fiscal 1898 were almost $12 , 000 above operating expenses and interest. 80
Early in 1899 he

and

his associates decided to sell out to a syndicate

led by Hambleton and Company, a Baltimore firm which owned other street
railroads around the country. 81 Besides Nashville Street Railway, Hambaeton bought Cumberland Electric Light and Power Company, and Citizens

1899 .

7 8 Ibid. , ; Sun, December 12 , 189 7 .
7 9McGhee to Bradford, August 2 5 , 1898 .
80Ibid. , ; McGhee to Nat Baxter, August 18 , 18 98 .
8 �cGhee t o Baltimore Trust and Guarantee Company, February 11 ,
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Rapid Transit Company, thus consolidating all of the city' s street car
and electric power interests. These purchases were underwritten by
the Baltimore Trust and Guarantee Company which expended $ 1 , 6 9 7 , 7 0 9 . 81
in buying the securities of the various companies. McGhee sold his
stock at fifty dollars per share and received a bonus of $ 40, 000, which
brought his total receipts to $ 240 , 000, or roughly twice his original
cash investment in Nashville Street Railway. 82 Not included in the sale
were bonds with a face value of $1 94 , 7 00 which he retained. He also
participated in the syndicate which consolidated these electric and
transportation properties into a new company called Nashville Railway,
but by the beginning of 1 9 00 McGhee had to all intents retired from the
active management of the Nashville street car business. 8 3
In smoothing the way for the new Nashville Railway Company, MeGhee played the role of elder statesman which had become typical of his
later years. He was able , for instance , to instruct the new Yankee

mana-

gers in some of the finer nuances of doing business in the South. When
the city ordinance which was necessary for the consolidation of the
companies encountered the opposition of some Nashville politicians , MeGhee wrote a long letter of advice to T. Edward Hambleton, president of
the new company :
8 2 Ibid. ; Commercial and Financial Chronicle , April 1 , 18 .
99
5
8 3 "0riginal Syndicate Agreement , " April , 18 99 . Nashville Rail.:..
6
way soon suffered bankruptcy, probably as a result of its rapid expan
sion. The company was reorganized in 1 9 01 under the leadership of a
Nashville businessman, Percy Warner. Commercial and Financial Chronicle ,
August 24 , 1 9 01.
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From Baxter' s letter, a copy of which I sent you, aad from my
conversation with Judge [ J . C . ] Bradford, it seems that the
power most potent against favorable action by the Mayor [ of
Nashville] is the influence of Judge Malone , president of the
Gas Company. This being the case , it occurs to me that you
should authorize your representatives, Judge Bradford and [Major
E. C . ] Lewis , to assure Judge Malone in the most positive terms
that it is not your intention to attempt to operate opposition
gas works. You know, of course , better than I do the impor
tance to your syndicate of the passage of the consolidation
ordinance . In my judgment the acquisition of the gas works
is a matter of no importance whatever as compared with the
consolidation ordinance . Please telegraph me on receipt of
this letter and let me know whether you will give such authority
to Judge Bradford and your representative in Nashville . If your
answer is in the affi�tive , I think I can send some telegrams
to Nashville that will be of great service to you, as my rela
tions with Judge Malone and the Mayor are most cordial. Judge
Malone and the Mayor were in the same regiment and in the same
company during the war of the Rebellion, and the Mayor will
not , in my judgment , do any act that will materially affect
the interests of Judge Malone . 84
The Nashville Street Railway experience conformed to the pattern
which McGhee followed--or attempted to follow--in numerous business investments . His formula was to buy at a bargain and t o consolidate his
control of the company' s

gement , especially of its financial policy.

mana

Acting directly, or through trusted associates and subordinates , he
would pursue a conservative program, eschewing short term profits and
dividends , improving the company' s physical plant and protecting its
securities from other speculators . He never hesitated to make unsecured
advances to a company at reasonable interest rates--a safe investment if
he in fact controlled the company' s management . When the company was in
sound condition McGhee could buy or retain its bonds , secure in the
knowledge that the coupons would be paid. If, as in the case of
8 �cGhee to T. Edward Hambleton, September , 1899.
4
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Nashville Street Railway, he could sell out his st�ck at a �;rge profit ,
he would do so because he was essentially an investor with speculative
instincts rather than an entrepreneurial developer or empire builder. ,
In this way he was different from the promoters , traction magnates , or
Wall Street raiders who were his contemporaries . His insistence upon
" sound" or conservative business principles in the operation of the
companies which he controlled set him apart from the ambitious , imagin
ative "spinners of dreams" as well as from the unprincipled "sharks" of
Wall Street . Neither did he seek to dominate any particular industry
or territory. In business his goal was profit , and his pursuit of
profit was characterized by shrewdness, perseverance , and the applica
tion of what he considered to be sound business principles . If McGhee ' s
methods and his objective prevented him from being an entrepreneurial
innovator or a charismatic captain of industry, they also saved him
from the stigma of being a ruthless "robber baron. "

CHAPTER VIII
LEGACIES OF A FINANCIER
The active business career of Charles McGhee ended during the
last years of the nineteenth century, and although he lived until

1907 ,

his time was spent not on Wall Street but with his family in Knoxville
and at various resorts. In a real sense all the accumulation of money
had probably been for the benefit of his wife , his daughters , and their
husbands and children, and indirectly for the multitude of others who
claimed kinship with thim. It was a fortune which, if not equal to the
demands of all of his kith and kin, was sufficient to support a dynasty
of wealth that consisted of his immediate family and their descendants .
Unfortunately McGhee ' s papers do not contain complete statements
of his assets and liabilities, but his extensive financial records are
enough to give some indication of his wealth. In

1888

a list of his

securities showed stocks , bonds , and other negotiable commercial paper
with a par value of almost

$3, 000 , 000 .

1

Much of this amount was in

bonds which had a value near or even above par, but the stock was probably worth far below par, and it is not possible to determine the market
value of many of the items on the list. Nor is there a listing at the
time of his real estate holdings , the personal and unsecured company
notes that he held, or his liabilities. At various times these items
involved large amounts .
1

Letterbook, 1888- 188 9 , p. 24. The list is reproduced in the
Appendix. All manuscript citations in this chapter are from the McGhee
Papers .
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He owned a number of business buildings in Knoxville , for instance ,
and in 18 95 his rental property was valued at $ 3 1 2 , 6 88. 46 . 2 In 189 2 he
held forty personal notes with a combined value of more than $ 2 0 , 000, 3
but these did not include special loans to relatives or important friends
such as Senator John B. Gordon of Georgia who owed him $ 5 , 000 throughout
the decade . 4 Although McGhee himself often owed a large amount , this
was usually in the form of a single loan from a New York bank. 5 During
1895 he filed a return for the federal income tax which was later ruled
unconstitutional. On this statement he declared an income of $ 70 , 266 . 66
in 18 94 , of which $1 3 , 200 was salary from the East Tennessee Railroad
and the Western Union Beef Company. 6 During that same year he made
$ 2 1 , 7 1 6 . 3 8 in speculation and lost $ 4 , 141. 5 0. The bulk of the rest of
his income came from interest and dividends. McGhee listed as deductions $ 6 , 7 1 6 . 1 6 paid out in interest and $ 5 , 62 7 . 34 , the amount of local
taxes paid. 7 He thus had an annual disposable income of about $ 5 8 , 000
at a time when the national per capita income was under $ 35 7 . 8
Withal , he did not consume lavishly but spent conservatively and
lived in comfort . In New York he stayed at the Murray Hill or Plaza

1898 .

2 Ledger, 8 .
4
3Letterbook, 1892-1894 , p. 2 67 .
4Gordon to McGhee , August 1 6 , 189 2 ; McGhee to Gordon, October 10 ,
5McGhee to F. P. Olcott , May 1 7 , 1889 .
6Leonhardt to McGhee , February 1 3 , 1895 .
8Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age , 01 .
4
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hotels where a typical weekly bill was $ 1 9 7 . 25 . 9 He ·belonged to the New,
Manhattan, and New York clubs , as well as the New York Southern Society,
and he bought steadily from Park and Tilford Co. which supplied him with
liquors and cigars . 10 Although he was naturally generous with himself,
friends , and family, he paid close attention to details and hated to be
cheated, as a letter to his tailors illustrates :
Your bill has been received but before paying it , I must in
sist that you make my last pair of trousers fit me . I returned
them once but they are still too long. I also have a pair of
blue serge pants that you made for me last summer which I have
not worne [ sic] until now and I find them a misfit also , being
to [ sic] long, and not seeming to fit anyway.
It is too much trouble for me to run back and forth to get
my cloths [ sic] to fit and also pay you whatever you may see
fit to charge . I shall therefore not pay the bill until your
work is satisfactory . ll
McGhee ' s warmest and most tender feelings were reserved for his
daughters , and he certainly must have agreed with Sanford who wrote him
that

"I

think we can both safely feel that it is not for ourselves that

we are working. With the start we will be able to give our children, if
they can ' t take care of themselves , they could not keep what we give them
no matter how much it might be . 11 12 Still it was hard for him not to
worry about them, especially after the death of his daughter, May Lawson,
who married David Shelby Williams and died after childbirth in 188 3 .

188 7 .

9Receipt from Plaza Hotel , October 2 , 18 99 .
10See , for instance , receipt from Park and Tilford, August 8 ,
1 �cGhee to Lea�ens & Thompson, July , 188 .
7
5
1 2 Sanford to McGhee , December , 18 90.
5
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This tragedy, made more heartbreaking by the death a few months later
of her baby, was an agonizing reminder to McGhee of the loss of his
first wife and their son many years before. 13 Often he was in New York
while his family was in Knoxville or elsewhere , and on such occasions
he fretted, as in a letter to his son-in-law, Calvin McClung:
It was necessary for the family to go to Tennessee and this
has brought about a separation that is very distastful [ sic]
to me as I find myself tied here by business connections al
though I am continuall [ sic] trying to arrange matters so I
can run down and see them. It does seem to bad that Nellie ' s
frealth should be so delicate and for poor Annie to be such a
sufferer. Nellie ' s health and the wory [ sic] of the present
financial situation has left me in no comfortable frame of
mind but still I feel that I am in the line of duty, which
is one of the greatest comforts one finds in life .
I find myself in about as much worry about Nellie as I was
when she was sick last winter. She is my baby. l4
Despite the tragedies and anxieties he was fortunate that each
of his daughters was apparently happily married to a

man

of means and

promise . Margaret , the eldest , married George White Baxter, some time
territorial govern�� of Wyoming and an official of the Western Union
Beef .Company. 15 After McGhee ' s wife , Cornelia, died in 190 3 the Baxters
returned from the West to Knoxville and made their home at McGhee ' s
Locust Street mansion. 16 Next door to this house lived Calvin McClung
1 �aClung, McClung Genealogy, .
37
1�cGhee to McClung, August 1 6 , l88 7 . McGhee ' s youngest daughter,
Eleanor, married James Columbus Neely, Jr. , of Memphis . She died in
19 64 at the age of ninety-one . Knoxville News-Sentinel, April 1 7 , 19 6 4 .
'
15McClung, McClung Genealogy,
37 .
16
1Ei£ . ; Knoxville City Directory, 1905 , p. 1 33 .
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and his wife Annie , McGhee ' s third daughter, who died suddenly in 1898. 1 7
The relationship between McGhee and t'his son-in-law was especially close ,
and for years McClung

mana

ged McGhee ' s property in Knoxville , as well as

ing a highly successful wholesale hardware business. Since McClung

runn

was interested in history and book collecting his father-in-law took
pleasure in finding rare volumes for him in New York. 18 He showed his
regard for McClung in an even more important way when he wrote him that
"You have husban[ d] ed and taken care of the money which
given Annie �n a satisfactory
for $20, 000.
,, l 9
•

•

e r and

mann

I

I

have heretofore

herewith enclose your notes

.

Much of his money and his influence with politicians were used to
advance his sons-in-law, particularly Lawrence n . Tyson, who married Mc
Ghee ' s daughter Bettie in 188 6 . 2 0 On several occasions he used his connections to help Tyson' s career, and it was probably a result of McGhee ' s
efforts that the young West Point graduate was assigned as professor of
military science and tactics at The University of Tennessee in 1891 . 21
While at this post Tyson studied law, resigning from the army in 18 95 to
join the Knoxville law firm of Lucky and Sanford. 22 Prior to serving at
the University, however, Tyson considered becoming a merchant , and McGhee
l 7McClung, McClung Genealogy, .
37
18McClung to McGhee , April 20 , 1889.
l 9McGhee to McClung, July , 1889.
2
20McClung, McClung Genealogy, 37 .

21 see , for instance , McGhee to James D. Porter, August 2 , 188 .
7
22Rothrock, French Broad-Holston Country, 98 .
4

agreed to invest

in the mercantile business of Daniel Briscoe
and Company so that his son-in-law could become a partner. 2 3 Tyson later
$)0 , 000

repaid McGhee ' s interest with a number of military, financial , and pol1tical successes. He volunteered for service in the Spanish-American War
and World War I and achieved the

rank

of brigadier general during the

latter. Between the wars he was active in some of the Knoxville companies
in which McGhee was interested, and in
senator from Tennessee. 2 4

1924

was elected a United States

It was both natural and easy for McGhee to be generous to his own
daughters and their husbands , but his assistance to his many less successful relatives and friends is a further demonstration of his devotion to
the mores and principles of the time in which he grew to manhood. The bond
of kinship was so important that he seemed never to be able to refuse at
least the first appeal from anyone who had such a cla� �pon him and who
really needed his help. Over a period of at least fifteen years he . gave
and lent money to his brother Barclay' s son, John B. McGhee , and was sometimes irritated by his nephew' s inability to do without this aid. Usually
he gave John perfunctory advice , as when he wrote , "Enclosed I send you
check for

Please sign the enclosed note and return to me . The
only suggestion I have to make is greater economy and more energy. " 25
$300 . 00 .

Occasionally, however, he became angry and poured out his exasperation :
2 �cGhee to McClung, May 1) , 188 9 . In the end Briscoe made other
arrangements and Tyson did not become a partner.
24aothrock, French Broad-Holston Count;Y, 498- 99.
25McGhee to John B. McGhee , November

3 , 1894.
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I have tried to make you a successful business man, and would
have been willing to aid you further if I could see any hope
of you becoming self sustaining. You have in some way run
behind several hundred dollars each year, and if it continues
the end is not difficult to predict , nor would any aid I could
give you avert it . Contrary to my advice you have kept a little
store where you and your family set [ sic] around when you should
have been out on the farm at work. The position of [ United
States] Commissioner pays you but little and keeps you running
around to attend the Federal Courts . I f you can satisfy me that
you will change in the management of your business affairs which
will enable you to become self sustaining, I will lend you money
to pay your debts , take a mortgage upon your entire farm. But
if you are to continue running your little store and your Com
missioner' s business, instead of working on your farm, I shall
not attempt to give you any temporary relief, as it will do no
good whatever.
I w1· 11 t ry t o ge t Ma.ry t o c 1nc1nna
·
· 1n June . 26
t 1· some t 1me
·

·

Mary was John' s daughter, and McGhee paid for her musical education. While he often warned her that he would "be greatly disappointed
if you fail to cultivate and develope [ sic] your talent , "27 he wanted her
to enjoy herself:
I want you to have everything to make you comfortable and to
enable you to keep yourself neat . If your companions are
from time to time in the habit of going to places of amuse
ment , I want you to feel at liberty to use some of the money
for the purpose of seeing something of the theatrical world.
You ought , however, never to go to any places of amusement
with a young man alone . 2 8
He was anxious that his relations should go to school, and he paid to
educate John ' s children as well as those of his sister' s son, Thomas

W.

Humes. Taking what he felt was a practical approach he advised that

"A

thoroughly good english education is about all that you can reasonably
26 Ibid. , May 29 , 189 .
5
27McGhee to Mary S. McGhee , July 26 , 18 9 .
5
28 Ibid. , October 18 , 18 9 .
5

27 1
expect to give them and it is all that is necessary to success in life
and a respectable situation in society. A clasical [ sic] education, " he
added, "I do not consider of any substantial � . 11 29
Unfortunately, neither "success in life" nor "a respectable situation in society" was achieved by John McGhee and his children. When she
was a few weeks short of her fourteenth birthday, John9 s daughter, Alvah,
married Thomas C . Howard, thus enraging her father against the Howard
family and causing a feud to break out in 1898 when John McGhee and his
son, Joseph, killed Thomas Howard' s brother, Ernest . 3° For four years
the killings continued until in 1902 Thomas Howard was shot to death by
John McGhee ' s nephews , Joshua and Moultrie Jones. 3 l Loyal to his kinsmen
though revolted by their troubles, McGhee paid the legal expenses for the
defense of John and Joseph McGhee in their trial for murder. 32 He kept
in close touch with the lawyers , and wrote one of them at

"I

have felt

very much like coming to Knoxville in order to be near at hand, but really
the whole matter has so nauseated me that
rely on you

•

•

•

think I shall stay away and
to do what is necessary. n 33 Repulsive though the affair
I

was , he must have taken a certain pride in remaining loyal to the end to
his unhappy relatives.
29McGhee to John B. McGhee , June 10 , 188 7 .
3 °state of Tennessee v. John B. and Joe McGhee , Brief for Appe llants
in McClung Historical Collection.
3 �cClung, McClung Genealogy, 35- 3 6 .

3 2McGhee to McCroskey & McCroskey, June 22 , 1899. The McGhees were
eventually acquitted, but Joseph was murdered in 19 33 .
33McGhee to W. L. Welcker, September 12 , 1899.
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If he stood by these members of his more immediate family McGhee
was also generous to distant cousins and old friends. When they needed
a house to live in, medical treatment , or a loan he was glad to oblige if
they were truly in need. 34 Yet his generosity was based on traditional
personal relationships , and it does not seem that he was especially responsive to some of the larger needs of society. Thus when he made a
"generous response" to an appeal for the Sisters of St . Mary home for
children in Memphis it was probably because the applicant was the daughter
of an old friend. 35 He could also adroitly turn aside requests which did
not touch his interest or sympathy. Dr. William Morrow, a wealthy supporter of Emory and Henry College , asked for a donation, and McGhee replied half seriously:
I feel a deep interest in the cause of education. Emory &
Henry is an old institution and should be supported in the
good work which it is doing. Feeling entire confidence in
your earnestness , and ability to succeed in any thing to which
you put your shoulder, I shall in he future feel no anxiety
in regard to that time honored institution, but shall turn
my attention to other beneficiaries that have not secured the
interest of such an able supporter. 3 6
McGhee ' s greatest philanthropy was the public library which he gave
to Knoxville as a memorial to his daughter, Lawson. The city' s public
library movement had been a struggling enterprise before he decided to
build a three-story building to house the collection of books. He selected
a lot at the north-east corner of Gay and Vine streets in the heart of the
34see , for instance , McGhee to Mr� . Anne Thompson, December 6 , 1888 ,
July 8 , 29 , August 15 , 1889, November 5 , 1895 .
35 Lizzie J . Tate to McGhee , July 1 6 , 1895 .
3 6McGhee to Morrow, January 29 , 1889.
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downtown business district as the site , for it was his intention that
the first floor of the building should be rented for commercial purposes
to help support the library. 3 7 When the cornerstone was laid in 1885
the occasion was bailed as "the beginning of an ep�ch, n 38 and when the
building was completed at a cost of around $50 , 000, a Knoxville newspaper
claimed that "There is not in the Southern States such an elegant build
ing . .. 3 9 Having donated the building which made a true public library
possible , McGhee was determined that the people of Knoxville should support it. In response to a request from Judge 0. P. Temple , the president
of the board of trustees , for "$5 to 10 , 000 of books , " 40 he replied that
"with such a donation as you suggest there would be nothing left for the
pommunity to do but enjoy the benefits , that would be improper, they
should have a part to perfor.m. "4l Some years later, however, he did
make at least one donation of $1 , 000 to Lawson McGhee Library. 42
His code owned much to the patriarchal ethos of the Old South, but
he also believed fir.mly in the newer Social Darwinism of the late nineteenth century. McGhee ' s fortune had been accumulated by skill and hard
work, and he gave no indication of believing that he did not deserve every
penny of it .

Neither did he pass judgment

on

the financiers and businessmen

3 7Rothrock, French Broad-Holston Country, 243 .
38 rbid. , quoting Knoxville Journal , July 25 , 1885.
3 9Tribune , October 29 , 1886.
40Temple to McGhee , May 5 , 1887.

4�cGhee to Temple , May 1 3 , 1887.
42 Leonhardt to McGhee , January 17, 1900.
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of his era except in individual cases , as when he described Robert Garrett ,
president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, as 11not worthy to associate
with the brokers of Wall Street . " 43 In the last years of his life he
must have enjoyed the knowledge that he had endowed his descendants with
a fortune which could last for generations.
As had become his custom, he spent the winter of 190 7 in Florida,
returning to Knoxville in late April . Shortly after his arrival he
developed penumonia and for �o weeks he sank steadily. 44 His last
moments were described by his son-in-law, Calvin McClung :
On the evening o f a beautiful Spring Sunday, May 5 , 1 90 7 , at
ten minutes before 7 o 1 clock , Colonel Charles McClung McGhee
peacefully passed away, in his bed-room on the first floor
at the South-west corner of his old Homestead, 505 Locust
Street , Knoxville , Tennessee , aged 7 9 years 3 months and 1 2
days .
At his bed-side were his daugh ers , Margaret W. Baxter and
Bettie McGhee Tyson, his sons-in-law, George W. Baxter, Calvin
M. McClung and Lawrence D. Tyson, his old friend and physician
Dr. John M. Boyd, Dr. R. P. Oppenheimer, and his attendant and
nurse for some three years past , Otto Lutts.
He was buried in Old Gray Ceme ery between his two wives
on the afternoon of Wednesday, May 8th. 45

43McGhee to W. T. Walters , July 13 , 188 7 .
44Journal and Tribune , May 6 , 1 90 7 .
45 Calvin Morgan McClung, 11Record of Births , Marriages and Deaths
of Members of the McClung and Related Families, unpublished manuscript
volume in the McClung Historical Collection.
11
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APPENDIX

AMOUNT OF SECURITIES AND WHERE PLACED
February 25th. 1888 .
Texas Rios , 230 , 000 .
R . T . Wilson & C o . ,
220 , 000 .
Moore & Schley,
10 , 000 .
New Orleans P . Bonds , 237 , 000 .
20 , 000 .
J . W. Davis & C o . ,
A . M. Kidder & C o . ,
35 , 000 .
1 , 000 .
Moore & Schley,
R. T . Wilson & C o .
181 , 000 .
Cotton Seed Oil , 80 , 000 .
80 , 000 .
R. T . Wilson & C o . ,
Texas Stock 530 , 000 .
R . T . Wilson & Co. ,
20 , 000 .
Moore & Schley,
30 , 000 .
J . W. Davis & C o . ,
300 , 000 .
A . M. Kidder & C o . ,
180 , 000 .
Knoxville & Ohio Bonds 108 , 000 .
Cent . Trust C o . ,
100 , 000 .
R. T . Wilson & C o . ,
8 , 000 .
E. T . First Pfd . , 9 , 300 .
J . W. Davis & C o . ,
200 .
Box
9 , 100.
E. T . Consols , 256 , 000 .
Cent . Trust C o . ,
200 , 000 .
Moore & Schley,
56, 000 .
Mo . Pacific , 100 , 000 .
A . M. Kidder & C o . ,
100 , 000 .
Texas Consols , 179 , 000 .
144, 000 .
Kuhn, Loeb & C o . ,
14, 000 .
A . M. Kidder & C o . ,
J . W. Davis & C o . ,
21 , 000.
Mich. & Ohio Trust Rect s . , 82 , 000 .
R. T. Wilson & C o . ,
82 , 000 .
Richmond Terminal , 100 , 000 .
100 , 000.
Moore & Schley,
Wabash 2d Mort . , 20, 000
A . M. Kidder & C o . ,
20 � 000 .
Fort Worth Firsts , 50 , 000 .
J . W. Davis & C o . ,
so , ooo .

1

1

Securities in Safe and Box
M. & 0 . Stock ,
3 , 000 .
87 , 800 .
Roane Iron C o . Stock ,
8 , 300 .
Chase Nat . Bank Stock ,
39 , 000 .
Knox. Water C o . Stock
11
11
11
10 , 000 .
Bond s ,
Memphis Elevator Bonds ,
2 , 500 .
Knox. & Ohio Stock
8 , 500 .
11
Fire Ins . Stock ,
10 , 000 .
11
Woolen Mills Stock ,
20 , 000.
E. T . I . & Coal Stock,
90 , 000 .
11 , 400 .
Citico Furnace Stock ,
Mabry & Bell Ave R . R. Stk.
1 , 000 .
Crown Cotton Mill Stock,
3 , 120.
5 , 000.
New River Mining Co. Stock
J . Allen Smith Stock,
S, OOO .
American Cattle Trust Stk. , 300 , 000.
67 , 000 .
L. N. O . &T . 1st Mort Bonds ,
11
11
Do
2d
53 , 000 .
56 , 000 .
Do
Incomes ,
Do
Stock
2 7 , 800.
35 , 000 .
Coal Creek Debnt Bonds ,
90 , 000 .
E. T. Extentions
5 , 000 .
Duluth So. Shore B6hds ,
Do
1st Stock, 12 , 500 .
Do
Com. \ 11
15 , 000 .
6 , 000 .
Sundy Creek Coal Stk Pfd .
11
11
11
11
7 , 500 .
Com.

Letterbook , February, 1888-February, 188 9 , p . 24, McGhee Papers .
Numbers represent par values of securities .
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